History of Military Schools of the United States: Origin, Rise, Decline, Resurgence, and Potential in Future Public Secondary Education

John Alfred Coulter

University of the Incarnate Word

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HISTORY OF MILITARY SCHOOLS OF THE UNITED STATES: ORIGIN, RISE, DECLINE, RESURGENCE, AND POTENTIAL IN FUTURE PUBLIC SECONDARY EDUCATION

A Dissertation

By

John Alfred Coulter II

Presented to the School of Graduate Studies and Research of the University of the Incarnate Word in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

The University of the Incarnate Word

May 2013
DEDICATION

In memory of
Dr. Richard Lee Henderson (1944–2011)
Professor and Coordinator for Organizational Leadership in the Ph.D. Program.
Campus Administrator, China Incarnate Word Campus Feb–July 2010.

Without Dr. Henderson’s inspiration I could never had completed this educational journey which included three states, three countries and the War in Afghanistan.
Abstract

MILITARY SCHOOL HISTORICAL TRENDS IN EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CURRENT POTENTIAL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION

John Alfred Coulter II

Chair of the Dissertation Committee: Dr. Judith E. Beauford

This study examined military schools in the United States from events which resulted in the establishment of the United States Military Academy at West Point to 2011. From 1802 to 2011, 834 military schools have operated in the United States, privately and publicly funded, and including teaching components for elementary, secondary, and college levels. The importance of understanding this subject has grown as the number of military charter and public secondary schools has increased tenfold since 1999. This study's purpose was four fold, the first of which is to identify those men who have had the greatest impact on military schools in the United States. The second purpose was to illustrate that the military schools were not an educational format largely restricted to the South. The third purpose was to identify those social, political, and economy events which impacted military schools. The final purpose of this study was to establish evidence that from 1999 to 2011 the popularity of the military school format made a return. Additionally the study provided an analysis of the military school culture and an examination of the efficacy of public and charter military secondary schools compared to similar nonmilitary public and charter schools.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

With the establishment of the Military Academy at West Point, a new educational format that included military training was introduced in the United States. From 1802 to 2011, 834 military schools have operated in the United States. These schools, both privately and publicly funded, include teaching components for elementary, secondary, and college levels. The importance of understanding this subject has grown as the number of military charter and public secondary schools has increased tenfold since 1999. To date, a holistic look at the origin, history, and culture of military schools has not been fully developed.

This study's purpose is four fold, the first of which is to identify those men who have had the greatest impact on military schools in the United States. The expansion of the military format and development of the military school culture is largely the product of four educators and associated alumni of three institutions: Alden B. Partridge (1785–1854), founder of Norwich University; Sylvanus Thayer (1785–1872), Superintendent of West Point; Francis H. Smith (1812–1890), Superintendent of Virginia Military Institute; and Stephen B. Luce (1827–1917), champion of the maritime academy education.

The second purpose of this study is to illustrate that the military schools were not an educational format largely restricted to the South. Historians traditionally have attributed the popularity of military schools to the southern culture and regional orientation. On the contrary, military schools have had a wide regional representation across the United States. The popularity of military school, rather than being a product of Southern culture, should be attributed to historical, economic, and cultural events that stretch far across the nation.
The third purpose of this study is to identify those social, political, and economy events which impacted military schools between 1802 and 2011. Webb (1958) provided a 19th century study which served as a starting point for this study. It was Webb's hope that others would "dig deeper into the history of military education, a field hitherto ignored and neglected by educational historians" (p. iv). Likewise, Hadley (1999) identified the need for future research to address the historical "social, economic, cultural or political circumstances" (pp. 195-196) that impact military schools and to pull together meaningful statistics to provide greater understanding of military school failures. His work proved to be the first comprehensive list of military schools and was a starting point for the formation of the list of 834 military schools and their years of operation addressed in this study.

The final purpose of this study is to establish evidence that from 1999 to 2011 the popularity of the military school format made a return. There was a dramatic decline in the number of military schools starting in the 1960s. Starting in 1999 public and later charter military schools made their appearance initially in Chicago and Oakland, California. This was followed by the establishment of military schools in public educations across the country.

The military school format is characterized by students as cadets or midshipmen habitually in uniform and under military discipline. This format started in the United States when Congress created the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. The opening of West Point in 1802 did not originate that educational environment but imported it from Europe. The military format has experienced varying periods of popularity in the educational history of the United States.
Through an examination of historical cultural, educational, and political events, trends in the popularity of the military school concept has been explained in this study. There was steady growth of military schools after the formation of West Point in 1802, with 171 military schools operating between 1855 and 1866. During this time, the line between secondary and higher education military institutions was ill defined, with terms such as institute, academy, and even college titles used freely between the two levels (Beadie, 2010). But clearly, military schools were dominated by secondary schools with approximately 128 (75%) at that level.

The growth of military schools peaked between 1903 and 1926, when at least 278 to 280 military schools operated across the United States. By this time, the line between secondary and higher education was well defined. Secondary military schools numbered approximately 257 (about 91% of the military schools in the country). Public education was firmly established by then; almost all secondary military schools were private schools.

After the start of America's involvement in the Vietnam War, the 20th century saw the number of military schools in the United States decline dramatically. In the early 1960s, approximately 203 military schools were operating in the United States. Antimilitary sentiment "engendered by the Vietnam War was reflected in much public anathema toward military education" (Hadley, 1999, p. 124). With schools closing or dropping their military requirements, the number of military schools declined by 63%. In 1998, only 74 military schools remained in the United States. Of those, 42 were secondary schools, three of which were public military schools.
The dramatic decline in the number of military schools in the United States began its reversal with the opening of the Chicago Military Academy in 1999, 24 years after the fall of Saigon and the end of the Vietnam War. Since 1999, 38 military schools have opened in the United States; 15 were public military high schools, 18 were charter military high schools, and five private military schools. Among the newly established military schools, 87% were in public education rather than in private schools, the traditional home of military schools. In 2011, there were 91 military schools, 66 of which were secondary schools, an increase of almost 55% since 1998. The trend of establishing new military institutions does not appear to have slowed—the New Orleans Military Maritime Academy opened in the fall of 2011 in Louisiana.

In 2011, the United States had 22 military schools operating on the college level. This number included the five federal service academies and 12 military colleges or universities and five military junior colleges. There were 40 private military schools that operated on a primary level and secondary level. Two of the private schools were primary schools and 38 schools were primarily or totally secondary education. There were also public and charter schools with a military program; this includes 16 public secondary military schools, and 13 charter military schools. The total number of schools, private and public (charter included) totals 91 institutions with approximately 50,550 cadets or midshipmen.

Organization of Chapters

The subsequent chapters are organized chronologically as much as possible with the initial chapters dealing with the establishment of the United States Military Academy and three of the four most influential figures in the military school movement. The two
chapters that follow deal with the impact of the Civil War on military schools, followed by a chapter dealing with the establishment of maritime related military schools and the fourth influential figure in military school movement. The following five chapters address the social, economic and political events which have impacted military schools following the Civil War until 2011. The remaining three chapters provide a quantitative study of the potential for military schools in public secondary education, an overview of the military school culture, and finally conclusions.

Chapter 2: The Long Road to West Point explains the influences that led to the establishment of the United States' first military school, the United States Military Academy at West Point. It examines the influences of European military education and the environment shaped by the Revolutionary War, which created the need for a military school. The actions of prominent proponents are documented, including Presidents George Washington and John Adams, General Henry Knox, Alexander Hamilton, and Marquis de Layette.

Chapter 3: Captain Partridge and the Expansion of the Military School Concept, presents Captain Alden Partridge (1785–1854) as the first of the four fathers of the American Military School concept. Partridge’s strengths and weaknesses are evaluated, as well as his contributions to the early years of West Point. The chapter further explores Partridge’s role in the initial establishment of the military school concept beyond the confines of West Point with his establishment of the American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy (Norwich University) and Partridge’s crusade to establish military schools across the United States.
Chapter 4: Sylvanus Thayer and the Military School Culture describes another founder of the U.S. military school movement, a man considered to be the father of West Point. Silvanus Thayer was Alden Partridge's replacement as superintendent of West Point and had a very similar educational background. This chapter tracks the difference in Thayer's later development as a soldier, leader, and educator. In contrast, Partridge's major accomplishments had a focus outside West Point, while Thayer's had an internal focus which developed the cultural pattern for military schools in the United States.

Chapter 5: Francis Smith and the Virginia Military Institute tracks the contributions of one West Point alumnus and his twofold contribution to the military school movement. First was his establishment of an institution whose standards would be embraced by southern culture. Second was his expansion of the number of military schools in the South by encouraging graduates to pursue teaching as a profession. The chapter documents military schools that Smith and the alumni of his institution established prior to the Civil War and explores the southern military school tradition. The explanation for both the growth and regional southern shift in military schools extends beyond a southern cultural orientation to militarism. The chapter offers a critique of that view along with a numerical analysis related to the influence of the military school movement based upon the influences of Smith and the Virginia Military Institute.

Chapter 6: Civil War examines the impact of the Civil War on the nation's military schools, including the impact of cadets serving as drill masters, leaving school for military service, and school closing (especially in the South) due to the recruitment of cadets for military service and northern occupation. The chapter also addresses the contributions of military schools and their alumni to the war efforts of both the North and
South. The activities of six schools from the South that participated as military units in combat are addressed in detail: Virginia Military Institute, the Citadel, University of Alabama, Georgia Military Institute, West Florida Seminary, and the Confederate Naval Academy.

Chapter 7: The United States Naval Academy and Stephen B. Luce's Maritime Academy Crusade addresses the development of the American nautical and maritime academies. The chapter explains the origins and influences that affected the establishment of the United States Naval Academy. From the earliest days of the Naval Academy, Stephen B. Luce emerged as a leader. Through his writing, he fostered a nautical orientation to the military school movement, which helped establish the maritime military academy. This movement spanned almost a century and included the opening of the New York Nautical School in 1874, the United States Merchant Marine Academy in 1943, and the Texas Maritime Academy in 1962. The Maritime Academy, which includes a collegiate orientation, has become historically one of the most enduring forms of military school, after the federal service academies. Eight maritime academies have been established, with six still in operation in 2011. Also addressed in this chapter is the establishment of the United States Coast Guard Academy, a school influenced by both the naval academy and maritime academy movement.

Chapter 8: The Lost Cause and General Expansion of an Educational Format examines those factors contributing to the revival of the southern military schools after the Civil War caused the closure of 74% of them. The influence of the social reaction to the "Lost Cause" in the South and establishment of senior military colleges under the
Morrill Land Grant Acts of 1862 and 1890, which included the establishment or transition of 15 agricultural colleges to a military format, is also documented.

The nationwide adoption of the military school format by educators who were not products of military education is explored, as well as the impact of veterans of the Grand Army of the Republic (Union Army) and their founding of military schools in the union states. Associated with this is the adoption of the military school format by the Episcopal and Catholic Churches and other denominations. The only two African American military schools' history is documented as well.

*Chapter 9: The Spirit of 1898 and the Peak of the Military School* covers the influences of post-Spanish-American War "Spirit of 1898," with its militarization of American culture, through the peak in number of military schools, when some 280 military schools operated in the nation, between 1903 and 1926. Facts contributing to the end of military school movement expansion are examined including the rise of the antimilitary feelings centered on the post-world-war pacifist movement, the roaring twenties and its departure from tradition, and the impact of the Great Depression. Also addressed are military schools' contributions to World War I and the dangers of fire in military schools around the turn of the 20th century.

*Chapter 10: The Second World War through the 1950s* addresses the positive cultural climate towards military schools in the 1940s and 1950s. The organization of the military schools into industrial associations by the Association of Military Colleges and Schools starting in 1914, and the National Association of Military Schools established in 1950 are addressed briefly. World War II and the Cold War are addressed in terms of military school alumni efforts.
Chapter 11: Vietnam and the Decline of the Military School explains the dramatic decline of military schools during and after the Vietnam War. This decline is credited to changes in the American culture in the 1960s and the antiwar student movement. This culture also brought about the end of all-male membership in the majority of military school programs. This change in status addressed both controversial court cases associated with the Citadel and Virginia Military Institute as well as those institutions that pioneered the coeducation military school environment.

Chapter 12: Resurgence of an Old Educational Tradition accounts for the quiet entrance of three military schools in the early 1980s in Richmond, Virginia; St Louis, Missouri; and Highlands, New Jersey. It explains the educational setting leading up to the 1999 establishment of the Chicago Military Academy and the dramatic rise in number of military schools through 2011. The principal opposition groups are identified and their philosophy and objections are presented. The prominent proponents of the growth of military schools are also identified and include Mayor Richard Daley, Governor Jerry Brown, and Secretary of Education Arne Duncan.

Chapter 13: Potential Impact of Military Schools in Public Secondary Education explores the question of whether the introduction of the military school format into secondary public education is a positive force in the development of children. This question is explored with a statistical analysis of the performance of secondary public and charter military schools with dropout rates, graduation, attendance, and standardized test scores. This study uses initial data from 19 of the 28 public or charter military schools in operation from 2009–2010. They are compared to nonmilitary public schools from their school district or areas with student bodies of similar socioeconomic status. Because the
number of public and charter military schools is so limited, the data only provides indicators of performance comparisons.

Chapter 14: Military School Culture is devoted to exploring what the culture is, and is not. It draws on the thread of commonality from federal services academies to private military secondary prep schools to public military secondary schools including the nation's two military primary schools. Differences between the culture of the armed forces and military schools are explored. The common objectives of development of the whole cadet in body, mind, and spirit are examined. Those elements of artifacts, espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions are addressed as well. The similarities between religious-based schools and military schools are also a topic that links a common format to that of the military school.

Chapter 15: Conclusions will identify the four men whose considerable influence on the military school movement should be identified for recognition as the Fathers of the American Military School Movement. The chapter will illustrate the distribution of military schools regionally from 1802 to 2010 and address the popular concept that military schools are historically largely a part of southern culture. The chapter will graphically associate the ebb and flow of the number of military schools and the links between the economic, cultural, and political environment and the popularity of military schools. Finally, this chapter will answer the question as to whether military schools have been making a recent comeback in popularity in the United States since 1999.

Definitions

Military School: An institution of education that organizes cadets (all or a portion of the student body) into a corps under military discipline. It requires all members of the
corps to be habitually in military uniform when on campus. It has as its objective the
development of the cadet's character through military training and regulation of conduct
according to principles of military discipline (Association of Military Colleges and
Schools of the United States, 2010). The program is not limited to technical skills such as
pilot or nautical navigation, nor is it described as a drug treatment, or behavioral
modification camp. The school may provide elementary, secondary, or college education.

*Charter School:* An institution of education not state or federally owned but
receiving its charter and most of its funding from the local, state, or federal government.
It is usually owned by an individual or a corporation. Charter schools are similar to
private schools in that they are independent and their students attend by choice. Unlike
private schools, charter schools are accountable to governmental authorities for results
(Finn, 2000).

*Neighborhood School:* A public school with attendance boundaries. Generally
open to all students who live in the school’s designated area. In some cases students from
other areas may be offered enrollment, but students living within that school’s boundaries
have priority (Chicago Public Schools, 2011).

*Magnet School:* A public school specializing in a specific subject area, such as
mathematics and science, fine arts, world languages, or humanities. These schools may
require application or lottery selection for attendance (Chicago Public Schools, 2011).

*Cadet:* A cadet is a military student at a military school. Some schools use the
term midshipmen or midshipwomen. The term cadet is used for military students
regardless of gender or academic class. Some military schools have dual student bodies:
civilian students and military cadets.
**Service Academies:** College-level institutions operated under the authority of the U.S. Federal Government and associated with an armed service or merchant marine. The cadets or midshipmen are organized into a corps of cadets, brigade of midshipmen, or similar formation. These institutions grant baccalaureate degrees with the objective of granting military commissions. Service academies develop cadet character through military training and regulation of conduct according to the principles of military discipline. They require all members of the corps to be habitually in military uniform when on campus.

**Senior Military College:** College or university that grants baccalaureate degrees and organizes all or a portion of the student body into a corps of cadets. It requires all members of the corps to be habitually in military uniform when on campus. Its mission is the development of the cadet's character through military training and regulation of conduct according to principles of military discipline similar to those maintained at the service academies (Department of the Army, 2011). Unlike service academies post graduate military service is not a requirement.

**Junior Military College:** Military school that does not grant baccalaureate degrees but provides high school and junior college education and organizes all or a portion of the student body into a corps of cadets. It requires all members of the corps to be habitually in military uniform when on campus. It has as objectives the development of the cadet's character through military training and regulation of conduct according to principles of military discipline similar to those maintained at the service academies (Department of the Army, 2011).
Lost Cause: The literary, intelligent and social conscience of the post-Civil War South. The Lost Cause encompassed the beliefs held by the white population of the South that helped them deal with defeat and change. It presented the “wartime sacrifice and shattering defeat in the best light” (Gallagher & Nolan, 2000, p. 1). The objective was to justify the actions of the southern states, and find positive historical interpretation of the war. It focused on the military rather than the less positive political and social aspects of the war. General Jubal A. Early is cited as the former Confederate who was most influential in the shaping of the Lost Cause with a reverential view particularly of General Robert E. Lee.

Regional Designations: Regional designations are based on the Bureau of Statistics division of the United States for the census. The North (Northeast is used by the Census) includes Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The Midwest contains Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. The South has Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Because of the number of military schools located in the territory of Puerto Rico and its geographic location, it was also included in the South. The West has the remaining states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.

Political Regional Designations: The division of the United States in the Civil War is addressed in three groups. The Union States, which firmly remained with the
United States, are California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. The Border States, which were divided and had factions on both sides, are Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri. The Confederate States are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

**Limitations and Delimitations**

This study uses the documentation of the 834 military schools to reach conclusions of a historical nature based on the schools’ years of operation, founders’ backgrounds and motives, and other contributing factors. In many cases, individual schools have very limited documentation. For example, the record of Daniel Boone Military Institute in Kentucky is limited to its act of incorporation and Elm City Military Institute (likely also known as Stowe Military Academy) in Connecticut is limited to its act of incorporation and mention in a biography.

Prior to the advent of public education, many military schools were basically one-room school houses with the number of cadets limited to 15 to 25. The limited historical footprint of schools, especially those with short life spans, does not always provide the details required to confirm the exact year of establishment, year of closure, transition to or from military school format, or founder identifiers. The confirmed dates of operation have been used to estimate years of operation. Because analysis, particularly prior to 1900, is based on 12-year time spans, accuracy of number of schools operating in any particular year is minimized.
The school policies regarding uniform and discipline requirements are largely unavailable. If schools historically used the term “military” in their title, and no evidence was found that uniforms and military discipline were not required they are assumed to have been military schools by the definition provided in the section above and are included in the statistical examination of the number of operational military schools in the United States. Another limitation includes difficulty in determining whether early military schools had elementary, secondary, junior college, or college orientation. Many of the schools listed actually include multiple levels of education. Prior to the 20th century, the lines between secondary and higher education were often blurred, and there is often no attempt to identify schools according to level of education offered.

Finally, Chapter 13: Potential of the Military School in Public Secondary Education uses a sample of only 19 public or charter military schools. With such a small sample size, statistical conclusions cannot be determined. Therefore, performance indicators in public and charter military schools are limited to dropout rates, graduation, attendance, and standardized-test scores.
Chapter 2: The Long Road to West Point

The initial interest in developing military schools in the United States grew from requirements of the Revolutionary War and the influence of European military schools. Prior to the war, at least two schools taught subjects related to military engineering, artillery, fortifications, and gunnery. These subjects were conducted in traditional academic style and included technical military subjects along with the curriculum of the time. The school in Westmoreland Potomac, Virginia, was headed by the Reverend Thomas Smith in 1771; the other was the English Grammar School in New York City, founded in 1774 (Webb, 1958). There is no evidence that the schools incorporated a uniformed militarized student body as defined in a military school.

European military schools were established not long before the American Revolution and several of their graduates served in the Continental Forces of General George Washington. The most influential were Gilbert du Motier and Marquis de Lafayette, who attended the military academy at Vincennes near Paris and left there as a Lieutenant of Musketeers. The school was established in 1751 and had 500 young noblemen as cadets. Its location was moved to the Champ de Mars in 1765. Napoleon Bonaparte was a 1785 graduate of Champ de Mars. The current French Military Academy, St. Cyr, is often cited as influencing West Point's establishment but was actually founded by Napoleon in 1802, the same year as West Point. Another French military school influencing the establishment of American military schools was the Royal Engineering School of Mezieres, established in 1748 (Langins, 2004).

A Polish Officer serving with the Continental Army who influenced the formation of the first American military school was Tadeusz Kościuszko. He rose to general in the
Continental Army and was one of the original members of the corps of cadets established by Poland’s King Stanislaw in 1765. The school was located in Warsaw and addressed military and liberal arts courses (Lafayette Square, 2008).

The greatest influence that encouraged Americans to professionalize the officer corps was the enemy. The British officer corps was highly trained via the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, which was established in 1741 with the goal of producing "good officers of Artillery and perfect Engineers" (British Army, 2009, p. 1). They constituted a very professional leadership group of British engineers and artillery in America that was the envy of General George Washington’s Chief of Artillery, General Henry Knox.

The memorandum to Congress from General Henry Knox titled *Hints for Improvement of the Artillery of the United States*,

reflected the envy he had for the British military educational system:

An officer can never act with confidence until they are masters of their profession, an academy established on a liberal plan would be the utmost service to the continent, where the whole theory and practice of fortification and gunnery should be taught; to be nearly on the same plan as that at Woolwich, making allowance for difference of circumstances; a place to which our enemies are indebted for the superiority of their artillery to all who have opposed them. (p. 3)

General Henry Knox wrote John Adams in May of 1776. At the time, Knox was on the Congress’ Board of War “suggesting the establishment of academies for educating young gentlemen in every branch of the military art” (Webb, 1958, p. 2). John Adams replied, “I am fully aware of your sentiments that we ought to lay foundation and begin building institutions . . . for promoting every art, manufacture, and science necessary for the support of an independent state” (Webb, 1958, p. 2). This comment from the future second President of the United States foretold the place military schools would take, well beyond the instruction of military art to that of science and liberal education.
An early indication of the direction military schools would take was from the report of a Continental Congress Committee to study the state of the army. They arrived at the Continental Army Headquarters in September, 1776, and spent several days studying the state of leadership and the army. Their report reflected an army “badly officered” and even encouraging “soldiers by their examples to plunder and commit other offences” (Boyington, 1871, p. 176). The committee’s recommendation stressed the importance “of having officers of known honor, ability and education.” Their resolution read “that the Board of War be directed to prepare a Continental Laboratory and a Military Academy and provide the same with proper Officers” (Boyington, 1871, p. 176). The recommendation foreshadowed the role that morality, honor, and gentlemanly conduct would take in the formation of the future military school culture. Expectation well beyond that of teaching basic theory of war and technical skills of the warrior’s craft emerged very early.

The memorandum from General Knox and the report and recommendation of the committee that visited the Continental Army arrived at the Continental Congress within days of each other. Two days after the committee’s report, and three days after the General’s memorandum, the Continental Congress passed a resolution dated October 1, 1776: “Resolved, that a Committee of five be appointed to prepare and bring in a plan of a military academy at the Army” (Boyington, 1871, p. 177).

The war would delay the formation of The United States Military Academy for 26 years until 1802. There were several measures implemented short of a military school which included allocation of funds for an officer course at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in 1778. This was likely the Corps of Invalids’ school which was for “propagating military
knowledge and discipline” for officers having “good character, both as citizens and
soldiers” (Webb, 1958, p. 5). A course for engineers and artillerists operated at West
Point for a few years then was terminated in 1780 (McMaster, 1951).

In 1783, after the war had ended, Congress appointed a committee that included
Alexander Hamilton, charged to develop a plan to support General George Washington’s
desire to establish America’s first military schools. General Washington responded to
Hamilton’s request for his views on the project by soliciting the views of his key generals
in New York, as well as foreign officers and the Governor of New York (Webb, 1958).

It was no surprise that General Knox was the strongest advocate of military
schools:

A perfect knowledge of the principles of war by sea and land is absolutely
incumbent upon people circumstanced as we were, and determined to be free and
independent. From these considerations arose an indispensable necessity of
forming and adopting a complete system of military education. (Webb, 1958, p. 8)

Knox actually advocated the creation of three military schools for the southern, eastern,
and middle regions. General Baron Von Steuben also supported regional military schools,
but his views also called for 90% of graduates to return “to civil life to diffuse military
education among the citizens and become leaders in a well-regulated militia” (Webb,
1958, p. 14). Von Steuben’s views would foretell a future direction of the citizen soldier
concept and military education outside the jurisdiction of the federal government.

Governor George Clinton of New York went a step further and advocated a
military school for each state “where degrees in the arts and science are conferred”
(Webb, 1958, p. 9). Colonel Jean Baptiste Gouvion, a graduate of the French Royal
Engineering School of Mezieres, submitted a series of detailed recommendations that
included practical application of techniques, not just theory (Webb, 1958, p. 10). General Washington forwarded his personal recommendation to Congress which called for an academy of engineers and artillerists where young gentlemen could be instructed in the theory of the art of war. Shortly thereafter, Washington wrote French General Louis Le Begue Du Portail, another French Royal Engineering School graduate, indicating that French engineers would be needed for a future military academy when Congress acted on his recommendations (Webb, 1958).

The next year, in 1784, Baron Fredrick Von Stueben published a pamphlet outlining his plan for three regional military academies. Two years later, Henry Knox, who was then the Secretary of War, submitted a plan almost identical to that of Baron Von Steuben to Congress calling for “efficient institutions ... or the military education of the youth ... that knowledge acquired therein shall be diffused throughout the community” (Webb, 1958, pp. 14-15). This action was not taken by Congress nor was President Washington able to get results after his inauguration in 1790. As President of the United States, he called on Congress in 1790, twice in 1793, and again in 1796 to establish a military academy without success (Webb, 1958).

The lack of support by Congress was attributed to two factors: the fear and disdain of a standing army based the experiences of the British army being used as a method of repression and the question of constitutionality, which led Thomas Jefferson to oppose the establishment of the school. Jefferson opposed the establishment of a federal military academy because “none of the specific powers given by the Constitution would authorize it” (Ambrose, 1999, p. 11). His opposition was vigorous when in 1793, the national military academy was proposed. At the time, Jefferson and others viewed the
constitutional powers shared with the states much less narrowly than those assigned to the federal government. The terms "necessary and proper" when exercising powers shared between the federal and state governments were his point of contention (McDonald, 2004).

Under the administration of President John Adams, in 1798, the number of cadets was expanded to 56 by Congress, and four teachers were authorized (Boyington, 1871). There was no military school established and cadets were assigned to the army as officers in training. President Adams submitted a report prepared by the Secretary of War, James McHenry, that estimated the cost of establishing a military academy. Harrison Otis presented a bill calling "for establishment of a Military Academy and for organizing the Corps of artillerists and engineers" (Webb, 1958, p. 25), but again, the bill was not acted upon.

Finally, in 1794, an Act of Congress authorized the Corps of Engineers and Artillerists and "the necessary books, instruments and apparatus for the use and benefit of the said Corps" (Webb, 1958, p. 18). The rank and number of cadets would number 32. West Point, New York, was the station of the Army's Corps of Artilleries and Engineers (also called the First Regiment of Artilleries and Engineers) and a logical location for the training (Holden, 1904). The school taught military courses, but it was not really a military school. The cadets took courses associated with their assignment with the Corps of Artilleries and Engineers until 1796, when the building they used burned to the ground, a theme that became familiar in the future of military schools.

President Washington's final appeal in 1796 solicited the support of the Senate. Vice President John Adams, who had supported the military school cause in 1776, signed
the positive response (Webb, 1958). But action was still years away for the actual establishment of the school. Twice in January, 1800, Secretary of War James McHenry submitted reports to Congress through President Adams addressing the need for a military academy (Boyington, 1871).

The Secretary of War’s report addressed the concerns of maintaining a large military force in that “it is important that as much as perfection as possible be given to that [force] which may at any time exist,” and that these troops should be “perfect in organization and discipline and dignity of character” (Boyington, 1871, p. 189). The report called for a military academy which expanded the military school well beyond that of simply teaching a few courses for artillerists and engineer officers. McHenry’s report outlined that cadets were to be prepared to become engineers (including geographical engineers), miners and officers for the artillery, cavalry, infantry and navy and the school would teach all sciences necessary to perfect knowledge of the different branches of the military art . . . and be provided with the proper apparatus and instruments for philosophical and chemical experiment . . . for astronomical and nautical observation and surveying. (Boyington, 1871, p. 190)

It took the concept of the military school well beyond that which was considered a preparatory course for military service. It also pointed out the importance of character development, which would become a central part of the military school ethos. This report had been largely ignored in its implications for the development and expansion of the educational concept of military schools across the United States.

Ironically, under the presidential administration of Thomas Jefferson, on March 16, 1802, the House of Representatives passed a bill addressing the recommendations of
McHenry to put into law the United States Military Academy. The acts that finally lead to the establishment of the first military school in part read:

shall constitute a Military Academy . . . that the senior Engineer officer present [at West Point] shall be the Superintendent of the Academy, and authorized the Secretary of War to procure, at public expense, the necessary books, implements, and apparatus for the use and benefit of the institution. (Boyington, 1871, p. 192)

McDonald (2004) describes Jefferson’s early opposition to West Point “essentially as instinctive, but not well-considered, knee-jerk reaction against Hamiltonian Federalism” (p. 56). But there might have been another reason for Jefferson’s newfound interest in the concept of a national university. As President he wanted to establish a national school with an orientation towards science. West Point offered a means by which he could win over the sectionists, a group of which he was formerly a member, with a national military academy. An indication of this potential support came from Charles Pinckney as he admitted that state militia were ill prepared to handle the challenges of engineering and artillery duties (Ambrose, 1999).

The school’s establishment was never seen by President George Washington, its ranking proponent, as he died in 1799. The academy’s supporters included some of the greats of early United States history including Secretary of War General Henry Knox, President John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, General Baron Frederick Von Steuben, Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, and Secretary of War James McHenry. Also influential were the military schools of Europe, especially Royal Military College at Woolwich, and the French Royal Engineering School of Mezieres.
Chapter 3: Captain Partridge and the Expansion of the Military School Concept

Captain Alden Partridge was born in Norwich, Vermont, and attended Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire. He left as a senior in 1805 to become a teacher. His departure from Dartmouth was in good standing with recommendations from the Professor of Mathematics of having "good moral character and is well qualified for instructing a school" (Baker, 1986, p. 2). But a teaching career was not in his immediate future as he became a cadet in the Corps of Engineers at the United States Military Academy at West Point on July 9, 1806.

In the early years the curriculum was still developing as well as the identity of the school as a military school rather than a technical course that cadet members of the Engineer and Artillery Corps attended. The transitional state of the school became more obvious during Partridge's short time as a cadet. Partridge enrolled as a cadet at West Point (July 9–October 30, 1806). After four months, he was commissioned as a first lieutenant. He remained at West Point from 1809 to 1817, rising through academy faculty ranks from military commander of cadets and instructor in mathematics (1808) to professor of mathematics, was then promoted to captain (1810), and finally promoted to military commander of the cadets in April, 1813 (Baker, 1986).

Also in 1813, Partridge was promoted to professor of engineering and appointed superintendent in 1815, where he remained until 1817. Between the years of 1807 and 1815, Partridge was also responsible for the academy during the many absences of the West Point superintendent, General Joseph Swift. Swift was also the Army's Chief of Engineers and his absence was particularly extensive during much of 1812–1813 as he attended to duties away from West Point during the War of 1812 (Baker, 1986).
Partridge held significant positions of leadership for eight of his first 15 years at the academy. Partridge can be credited with two changes that were critical to the growth of West Point as a military school. One of those changes was that no cadet was to leave the academy for detached duty until his academic studies had been completed; secondly, that upon completion of studies, the institute would issue a certificate signed by the superintendent and professors (Baker, 1986).

Partridge was even responsible for the trademark gray uniforms. During the War of 1812, General Winfield Scott led regular army troops dressed in gray uniforms in the major victory at the Battle of Chippewa. The uniforms were gray because the issue blue dye was unavailable. To demonstrate West Point’s pride in the regular Army’s victory, Partridge adopted the gray uniform (Cowley & Guinzburg, 2002).

Even his most ardent critics credit him with “establishing regulations for the operation of the academy that forced a more balanced curriculum, along with emphasis on drill. He also initiated the separation of the position of superintendent from the position of chief engineer. “The evolution of a military school in the United States came about with no other school in the country to emulate. It evolved as an institution of higher education, providing basic engineering training . . . with mathematics and drawing … natural philosophy, French and engineering arts” (Manning, 2003, p. 103). The school grew from 40 authorized cadets in 1802, to 250 cadets in 1812.

However, Partridge’s relations with the faculty, both civilian and fellow military officers, were not good. Initially problems at West Point were twofold: the dual nature of the cadets’ responsibilities during the earlier years coupled with the leadership’s lack of experience with the military school concept. Cadets were assigned duties to support their
regiments, which took them away from their academic duties. It was not that
Partridge and Swift did not seek the best for their academy; it was that they were not sure
what a military school should be, and neither Partridge nor Swift had the background or
experience of working in a well-established military school. The majority of Partridge’s
educational experience was at Dartmouth and Colonel Swift’s was at Harvard.

The experience needed to run a military school could have come from George
Washington’s desire for the academy in 1783. Washington clearly desired a school where
French engineers with their experience from the Royal Engineering School of Mezieres
would teach and initially run West Point (Webb, 1958). But the Army’s Officer Corps
fought this idea even after the War of 1812. Captain Partridge supported the opposition of
French officers taking leadership positions in the Army. Interestingly, General Swift
recommended that General Simon Bernard replace Captain Partridge as superintendent at
West Point in 1816 (Baker, 1986). General Bernard was a French officer and a graduate
of another French military school, École Polytechnique, which was founded in 1794 and
was a military school from 1804–1970 (École Polytechnique, 2010).

Captain Partridge’s lack of success with the academy faculty was further
compounded by members of the faculty who complained not to General Swift, but
directly to the Secretary of War, William Crawford, about Partridge’s leadership.
Members of the faculty supported the separation of scholastic and military duties.
Partridge’s vision was that a cadet’s academic and military chain of command should
function as one (Baker, 1958). The ongoing conflict with the faculty led to a court of
inquiry and finally Partridge’s court martial and permanent removal from West Point and
active military service.
The downfall of Partridge at West Point came quickly after a visit to the academy by the President of the United States, James Monroe. The Secretary of War involved the President and, unfortunately for Partridge, he had not made an ally of either. Monroe suggested, in no uncertain terms, that Partridge should be replaced by Major Sylvanus Thayer. "I do not think much of your Captain Partridge and would prefer to see Major Thayer in his place" (Baker, 1958, p. 81). The President directed that a court of inquiry be conducted.

General Swift, who was chief of engineers and still had oversight over the academy, gave Partridge an option of assuming duties away from West Point or taking leave until the court of inquiry occurred. In accordance with the President’s wishes, the academy changed command on July 28, 1817, and Partridge departed for Vermont. After 33 days, on August 30, Partridge’s better judgment failed him and he returned against orders and personally logged his return to West Point as having "taken upon himself [Partridge] for the present, the command and superintendence of the institution, as senior officer of engineers present" (Baker, 1958, p. 83).

Up until this point, Partridge still had a promising career in the Corps of Engineers and was only facing a court of inquiry. He could have been in the army long after Monroe’s administration was out of office, but as a result of his actions of August 30, General Swift placed him under arrest and a court martial was convened (Baker, 1958).

Partridge was found guilty of disobeying orders in that he assumed command of West Point following the appointment of Thayer as headmaster. He also was found guilty of issuing illegal orders. As a small consolation for Partridge, the court president, General
Winfield Scott, requested “in consideration of the zeal and perseverance which the prisoner [Partridge] seems uniformly to have displayed in discharge of his professional duties . . . leave to recommend him to clemency of the President of the United States” (Baker, 1986, pp. 89–91). In accordance with the judgment, Partridge resigned from the army in disgrace on April 15, 1818.

There are two basic points of view regarding Captain Alden Partridge, one being that he “possessed few leadership qualities and as a result alienated the academic staff” (Manning, 2003, p. 103) and the other that he was the victim of a political struggle between the Secretary of War and the Chief of Engineers, which influenced the President’s ruling against him. There was no clemency for Partridge as the Army did not want to return to the issue involving the civilian authorities and further negative public attention (Baker, 1958).

These events, despite their negative connotations, resulted in the emergence of parallel efforts to refine and expand the military school culture and concept in the United States. The first was the beginning of a second career by Alden Partridge, who established and led a successful university. Perhaps of even more historical significance, he started a nationwide crusade for the establishment of military schools outside the federal government’s administration.

The second parallel effort brought about by the departure of Alden Partridge from West Point was the appointment of Sylvanus Thayer as superintendent at West Point. He would lead that institution from 1817 to 1833, and firmly establish an ethos and standard of education that led to the expansion of the military school concept well into the current century.
According to Baker (1986), the court martial left Partridge with "severe emotional scars" (p. 94) and he became suspicious of the federal bureaucracy. He immediately moved forward to find redemption for his reputation through the founding of an alternate military school. The American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy, later known as Norwich University, was founded in 1819 in Norwich, Vermont, with its first cadet enrolled on September 4, 1820. Partridge opened the doors of the new school with a faculty of six to include himself, a chaplain who taught ethics, a professor of chemistry, two professors teaching languages (English, Greek, and Latin), and a professor of practical sciences (geometry, topography) who also acted as master of the sword (physical fitness). Partridge taught mathematics, philosophy, and military science (Ellis, 1898).

The American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy gave Partridge an opportunity to develop cadet regulations and standards that reflected his own philosophy without political interference. The rules of standards in the 1826 prospectus of the school included rules against "prevarication or falsehood" which lead to immediately cadet dismissal (American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy, 1826, p. 25). These standards were an early foreshadowing of what is now a common part of the military school culture that includes codes against lying, cheating, and stealing.

Partridge's reputation was reestablished through his competence as a scientist and mathematician. Samuel Latham Mitchill, who was considered the Father of American chemistry, stated Partridge's "scientific zeal and proficiency I have often given a very favorable opinion" (Baker, 1958, p. 111). Mitchill called his contributions to learned
journals valuable and encouraged him to take on a survey of the eastern United States (Smith, 1922).

Enrollment at the new school indicated that the public, at least in his state, either overlooked or sided with him on the West Point scandal. In the first year of operation, there were 100 cadets; in the second year, 140; and by the sixth year, no less than 197 cadets (Ellis, 1898). This enrollment compared very favorably with West Point, where authority was given to increase the cadet corps to 250 in 1819 (Lowrie, 1832). Cadets at Norwich were uniformed in dark blue with three rows of bullet buttons, in contrast to West Point’s gray attire (Ellis, 1898).

Although in the beginning most cadets were from New York or New England, by 1826, 100 of the 293 cadets were from the South. Partridge actively sought out cadets from across the country and particularly from the South (Baker, 1986). One reason for the large southern enrollment may have been the antimilitary attitude in New England after the War of 1812. As late as 1834, there was a strong antimilitary feeling in the north and a tide of contemporary social influence against the military setting of Norwich University. Critics of Norwich regarded it as “not only as out of tune with the age, but also as a promoter of that wild war spirit” (Poirier, 1999, p. 7).

Captain Alden Partridge is best known as the Father of Norwich University and as the Father of the Reserve Officer Training Program (ROTC). Norwich University is the second oldest military school in the United States, having operated for more than 192 years. It is also the only privately owned military college in the country and in 2010, had a student body of 2,100 undergraduates and 1,200 graduate students, of which 1,123 were members of the corps of cadets.
In forming his first school and those that followed, Partridge was guided by his analysis of the shortcomings he saw in education and defense in the United States. This analysis was both a product of his educational experiences at Dartmouth and West Point, with its focus on engineering and a concern for the leadership of the state militias. Outside West Point, there was no military school in the United States before Norwich's establishment. West Point was strictly focused on providing officers for the regular army, and until Norwich, there was no school providing professional military education for officers of the militia.

Partridge saw five significant shortfalls in educational institutions of the time. The first was that the classical education of the time was “not sufficiently practical nor was it properly adapted to the various duties an American citizen may be called upon to discharge” (Russell, 1826, p. 395). He criticized the liberal colleges and universities for their emphasis on Latin and Greek languages at the expense of English and practical technical subjects. Second was the total neglect of physical education for “preservation of health . . . capable of enduring exposure, hunger and fatigue” (Russell, 1826, p. 396). Third was the amount of idle time allowed students, which he considered “injurious to their constitutions and destructive to their morals” (Russell, 1826, p. 396) rather than utilizing the time for improvement of the mind and body.

The fourth defect in education, according to Partridge, was the freedom of students to use their wealth to engage in activities encouraging moral corruption. His fifth objection was that courses of studies were too limited and did not fully utilize students’ capacity or inclination for the acquirement of knowledge. His final objection was that the course of studies was based on a prescribed length of time rather than the student’s rate
and capability of progress (Russell, 1826). At the same time, Partridge saw a critical shortcoming in the nation’s approach to leader preparation in the state militia.

These conclusions were made by Partridge even before his departure from West Point. In 1815, he wrote the Secretary of War, Alexander J. Dallas, concluding that West Point alone was insufficient to meet the demands of the nation’s military forces, which were largely state militias. His plan called for diffusion of military science throughout the country in order to provide sound officers to the militia and educate the midshipmen of the Navy in a more professional manner (Baker, 1986). The plan also included three additional military academies patterned after West Point to support the Eastern, Southern, and Western regions, with an enrollment of 150 federally funded cadets and 250 privately funded cadets, for a total of 400 per academy. This would allow those cadets who desired a civilian career and association with the militia to initially enter the militia with the same preparation as those cadets going into the regular Army. His plan was not well received and the concept of privately paying young men attending one of the military academies was considered controversial (Baler, 1986).

Between 1815 and 1816, Partridge sought political supporters for his plan. Congressman Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky was the chairman of the Military Affairs Committee and became a supporter. He concurred with Partridge’s plans with the exception of the privately funded cadets not bound for the regular Army. This part of the plan was central to Partridge’s desire to expand the professional military training to the militias (Baker 1986). This was a fundamental issue for Partridge and has since become part of the Citizen Soldier concept in the United States. Partridge would eventually be associated with the Citizen Soldier concept and years later be known as the Father of
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). ROTC was not established in the United States until 1916. But Partridge's work following his release from West Point brought military education out of the confines of the United States Military Academy and helped produce military officers for the nation for more than 100 years before the federal government established a formal program for military officer education outside West Point.

Between 1820 and 1842, 43 new military schools opened beyond the confines of West Point. This was the beginning of military school expansion in the U.S. education system and was initially led by Captain Alden Partridge. Starting in the late 1820s, Captain Partridge traveled across the United States lecturing about his educational philosophy and led efforts to start military schools across the country. Between 1819 and 1853, Captain Partridge had a direct hand in the establishment of 18 military schools, by personally starting the institutions himself, sending educators, or visiting to establish or transition schools to the military format.

These schools included the American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy (Norwich University) and the following schools with those marked with * as transitioning to the military format (see Table 1).
Table 1

Military Schools Established by Captain Partridge after Norwich University

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opened or Transition</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td>Western Literary, Scientific and Military Academy</td>
<td>Buffalo, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td>Literary Scientific and Military Academy</td>
<td>Perth Amboy, NJ</td>
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<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td>New Jersey Institute</td>
<td>Orange, NJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1828*</td>
<td>Dinwiddie (Hatch) Military Academy</td>
<td>Danville, VA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td>American Institute</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td>Virginia Collegiate Institute</td>
<td>Portsmouth, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829*</td>
<td>Jefferson Military College</td>
<td>Washington, MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>North Carolina Classical Literary, Scientific and Military</td>
<td>Oxford, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institute (M.I.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>North Carolina Classical Literary, Scientific and M.I.</td>
<td>Fayetteville, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839</td>
<td>Virginia Literary, Scientific and Military Academy</td>
<td>Portsmouth, VA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1842</td>
<td>PA Literary, Scientific and Military Academy</td>
<td>Bristow, PA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>Raleigh Military Academy</td>
<td>Raleigh, NC</td>
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<tr>
<td>1844*</td>
<td>North Carolina Literary, Scientific and Military Academy</td>
<td>Raleigh, NC</td>
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<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>Missouri Literary, Scientific and Military College</td>
<td>Saint Louis, MO</td>
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<td>1846</td>
<td>Wilmington Literary, Scientific and Military Academy</td>
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<td>1849</td>
<td>Gymnasium and Military Institute</td>
<td>Pembroke, NH</td>
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<td>National Scientific and Military Collegiate Institute</td>
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Partridge's negotiations were not always successful in the establishment of military schools. Much of his success was based on his personal reputation and his ability to provide quality professors. In 1827 Judge Henry Shippen suggested that military training be part of the Allegheny College program. Shippen was a veteran of the War of 1812 and had been a major with the Pennsylvania Division (Honeyman, 1921). Shortly thereafter Shippen became president of the college board and suggested that a "military academy, similar to that at West Point or one run by Captain Alden Partridge . . . would be useful to this community and more likely to receive legislative aid" (Smith, 1916, p. 59). In 1828 Partridge visited the school, and the next year the issue of conversion of the school and Captain Partridge's financial commitment was discussed by the board. James McKay represented Partridge and committed to sharing any initial loss equally between Partridge and the board as a group. As a guarantee McKay requested a $500 commitment, but the Allegheny College board only offered $350 and "thus by a kind Providence, in due time, Alleghany was delivered from the military experience" (Smith, 1916, p. 61).

Norwich University between 1819 and 1911 had 70 of its alumni working as faculty in military schools. In addition to the 17 military schools listed on the previous page, the alumni of Norwich University founded or helped transform five military schools: Pennock Military and Classical School, Rutland, Vermont in 1824; Arrow Military Academy, Arrow Rock, Missouri in 1839; Mount Sterling Literary and Military Academy in Old Fort Mason, Kentucky in 1847; Russell Military Academy, New Haven, Connecticut in 1840; and Highland Academy to Highland Military Academy, Worcester, Massachusetts in 1857 (Ellis, 1911). There were a total of 23 military schools associated with Partridge and his students prior to the Civil War.
Prior to the establishment of the Virginia Military Institute in 1839 and the Military College of South Carolina in 1841, Captain Partridge and the alumni of Norwich University were critical to the expansion of the military school concept beyond West Point. Norwich University educated not only cadets from the Northern States and New England but also the South. After the establishment of Norwich, the reputation of his schools, cadets, and alumni helped expand the military concept throughout the United States. Captain Alden Partridge’s personal efforts to spread the military concept set the stage for a format of military education that would eventually include 834 schools.
Chapter 4: Sylvanus Thayer and the Military School Culture

Captain Alden Partridge’s replacement as Superintendent of West Point was Major Sylvanus Thayer. As part of Partridge’s campaign to create multiple regional military academies after his departure, he was publicly critical of West Point. This dismayed and turned many, if not the majority, of West Point Alumni against him (Wineman, 2006). After the court martial, Thayer and Partridge had a very bitter relationship. In fact Thayer degraded Partridge until the day he died (Baker 1986).

But the two educators had many things in common. Both had attended Dartmouth College. Where Partridge departed his senior year, Thayer left just prior to the graduation ceremony where he was valedictorian of the Dartmouth class of 1807. Thayer, like Partridge, attended West Point for a brief time as a cadet, Thayer for one year and Partridge for three months. Both Thayer and Partridge were faculty members together in 1810 teaching mathematics (Baker, 1958; Manning, 2003).

The War of 1812 ended the similar experience between the two. Thayer left West Point for service where he distinguished himself “for actions at Canary Island and in the Defense of Norfolk” (Kammen, 1996, p. 7) in 1814 for which he was promoted to major. Service in combat is no small point of honor among military men.

It was not uncommon to have military officers who had not served in combat to be looked upon less than favorably by their contemporaries. Combat experience, both from the practical viewpoint and the bankroll of credibility, helped Thayer with his work at West Point. The other benefit of his service was seeing the poor performance of the American Officer Corps, largely untrained and without the benefits of West Point, likely giving him vision of the importance of the West Point mission.
But the biggest advantage Thayer had was his personal experience with a European military education. Between 1815 and 1817, Thayer and Colonel William McRee studied the French military school, École Polytechnique, and collected 1,000 technical texts, which formed the basis of the West Point library (Manning, 2003). École Polytechnique was established in 1794 as a civilian engineering school but was converted by Napoleon to a French military engineering school in 1804 (École Polytechnique, 2010). Unlike the United States with a shortage of West Point trained officers, there was no shortage of officers in France who were trained at the École Polytechnique or one of the other French military schools. So the school Thayer studied was well advanced beyond West Point as both an engineer college and a military school.

Some of the changes Thayer made upon assuming the duties of West Point Superintendent in 1817 were the establishment of classes small enough to allow daily recitation by each cadet with the intent to provide practical experience, a focus on subjects which orient the cadet to be a technically trained military engineer, a requirement of daily grades and resectioning based on those grades, and the institution of rank ordering by academic standing and year group (Manning, 2003).

Thayer further “regularized the entire cadet schedule” (Manning, 2003, p. 116) which helped translate West Point’s culture to the military school culture of the future. He insisted on “high standards of appearance, weekly attendance at chapel, and a strict enforcement of rules against lying, stealing, and other irregular or immoral practices” (Manning, 2003, p. 116). The cadets were organized into two cadet companies by height, well equipped with muskets, well drilled, and led by cadet officers. They were marched
to and from the mess hall in formation and were dismissed in front of the North and South Barracks (Latrobe, 1887).

Thayer is widely credited with the start of the honor code at West Point, which actually became a written code in 1932. What Thayer did was engrain in the corps of cadets the following:

A code of ethical behavior set forth as the ideal of the commissioned officer corps. Central to the ethical system was the idea that an officer’s word was his bond. The penalty for failure to meet this standard, was for the officer [cadet] to be immediately cashiered and disgraced. (Sorley, 2009, p. 17)

The combination of his approach to academics and cadet discipline became known as the Thayer Method (Manning, 2003).

The Superintendent at Culver Military Academy summed up Thayer’s contribution by stating that Colonel Thayer “is perhaps more than any other man responsible for that blending of military, intellectual and moral training that has enabled the graduates of West Point to achieve distinction in civil no less than in military pursuits” (Gignilliat, 1916, p. 9). Thayer actually did more in that he refined the organizational culture of the military school concept and perfected a model for the country’s military schools. According to Manning (2003), where Partridge had failed, Thayer had succeeded for three reasons. First, he was building on the predecessors who established the initial facilities, curriculum, and policies. Second, he had complete support of three presidential administrations: Madison, Monroe, and Adams. Finally, he possessed the organizational skills to enlist the support of a competent faculty who could have taught elsewhere if they desired.
Thayer’s support of the faculty, however, may not have always been the best for the institution. The Commandant of Cadets was Captain John Bliss, considered the best drill instructor in the army. Unfortunately, he had a temper which resulted in his assault of a cadet. Five cadet leaders presented their objections to Thayer in the form of a petition of over a hundred cadets and were reprimanded by Thayer. When the five returned with a new petition representing 189 cadets despite the superintendent’s warning, they were dismissed. The ring leaders were court martialed and their dismissal was upheld by President Monroe. Although Captain Bliss departed the academy in January, 1819, the grievances of the cadets who remembered Bliss as “harsh and tyrannical” were never redressed (Latrobe, 1887, p. 10).

Thayer and West Point did not escape criticism during his time as superintendent. Chief critic was Partridge, as part of his quest for regional academies. Among others was Congressman Newton Cannon of Tennessee whose resolution in 1820 called for the abolition of West Point. Congress rejected that proposal but again in 1830 the famous Congressman Davy Crockett accused West Point of being exclusively for the privileged, educating the sons of the rich and neglecting the poor (Webb, 1958). The state legislature of Kentucky in 1833 called for West Point’s abolishment (Webb, 1958).

Despite the criticism, the academy grew in reputation. Its graduates proved to be competent soldiers with outstanding educations provided by the school. In the midst of a poor showing by the army at large in the War of 1812, the West Pointers were a bright spot. No West Point-engineered fortress fell to the enemy. Ten of the 47 West Point graduates serving among 3,495 officers in the army were killed. But the West Pointers accounted for 10% of the promotions for bravery or exceptional service (brevet
promotions). By 1823 the reputation of West Point had grown so that there were 1,000 applications for the limited openings. Outstanding professors such as Dennis Hart Mahan and Edward H. Courtenay brought the academies at the school to new academic heights (Cowley, 2002).

The student body’s small size of 250 is deceptive and must be placed into historical perspective of the early 19th century. The nine most influential colleges in the 1800s included Harvard, with an enrollment of 200, Princeton 150, Dartmouth 140, and University of Pennsylvania 150 (Manning, 2003). West Point in 1819 was the only engineering school in the country until Norwich University doors opened in 1820, and in 1824 Rennsselaer School, a nonmilitary institution, became the third. After 1833, more civilian institutions of higher learning began offering civil engineering courses of study (Manning, 2003).

But Thayer, like Partridge, had growing conflicts with President Andrew Jackson. President Jackson referred to Thayer as a tyrant and overturned a series of the superintendent’s disciplinary decisions. The last of Jackson’s actions against Thayer’s wishes involved the dismissal of Cadet Ariel Norris. Norris had a long record of reprimands, courts-martial that included a previously overturned dismissal. When Jackson reversed his second dismissal, after 26 years as superintendent, Thayer resigned (Cowley, 2002).

Thayer, unlike Partridge, was focused inward on West Point. His demands on the academic institution of West Point established it not only as the country’s first engineering school but the best of his time. His leadership and application of the school
standards he saw in France helped create the model military school culture for military schools to emulate for the next two centuries.

Thayer did not accomplish this influence with an effort to expand the military school concept outside of West Point but did so through the reputation of the school and its alumni. West Point alumni were very involved in the establishment of other U.S. military schools. This included American Classical and Military Lyceum, opened in 1826 and whose first superintendent and founder was Augustus L. Roumford, Class of 1817. The American Classical and Military Lyceum opened in 1826 in the building formerly used by a Catholic seminary in Germantown, Pennsylvania. Roumford had been a teacher at the seminary and uniformed his cadets in gray uniforms and white trousers in the summer. The cadets wore caps with a seven-inch crown adorned with a yellow cockade and eagle and conducted daily drill and morning and evening parades ("Obituary of Colonel," 1878).

The American Classical and Military Lyceum’s cadet corps contained 150 young men and boys, many of whom were from the South. They marched to Saint Luke’s Episcopal Church for religious services. Among the cadets were at least two from Mexico and others from Cuba. General George Meade, Union commander at Gettysburg, was prepared for West Point at the school as was Confederate General Beauregard. Roumford taught mathematics and languages and employed at least six other professors including future Confederate General Quitman, and Colonel Kober, a Prussian who taught German. The school operated for 10 years, closing in 1836 (Houtchkin, 1889; Germantown Independent Gazette, August 2, 1878).
After the founding of Rounford's school, there were at least 17 other military schools documented to have been opened with West Point founders or under West Point alumni leadership. Among them was the Huntsville Military, Scientific, and Classical School, which Bradley S.A. Lowe, Class of 1814, founded in 1831 in Huntsville, Alabama. The Aiken Classical and Military Academy opened in South Carolina in 1842 with Alfred Herbert, Class of 1835, as the principal (Cullum, 1891). Georgia Military Academy in Greenville opened in 1847 with William F. Disbrow, Class of 1843 (nongraduate), as principal.

That same year the Maryland Military Institute (Military Academy) in Oxford was founded by Tench Tilghman, West Point Class of 1832 (Winemann, 2003). The school's first superintendent was John H. Allen, also of the Class of 1832. John Allen would depart after 10 years and founded his own school in Chillicothe, the Ohio Military Academy, which opened in 1857 (Cullum, 1879). Saint Thomas Hall in Holly Springs, Mississippi, transitioned to Saint Thomas Hall Military Academy in 1849 under the leadership of Claudius W. Sears, Class of 1841, as president. The Mississippi Military Institute was founded in 1848 by a man who claimed to be a West Point graduate, but Colonel Goldsborough's claim has not been confirmed. The Alabama Scientific and Military Institute, Tuskegee, founded in 1846, was under Arnoldus Brumby, Class of 1846, who in 1851 would become the first superintendent of Georgia Military Institute, Marion (Winneman, 2007).

Kentucky Military Institute, in Farmdale, was founded in 1846 by Colonel Robert T. P. Allen, Class of 1834, and he later transitioned the Bastrop Academy in Bastrop, Texas, to Bastrop Military Institute as their first superintendent in 1857. Other military
schools founded under West Point alumni included the Western Military Institute, Georgetown, Kentucky, founded in 1847 by Colonel Thornton Johnson, West Point Class of 1822 (nongraduate) (Winneman, 2007). He was followed in 1851 by Bushrod Rust Johnson, Class of 1840, who lead that institution until the Civil War (Warner, 2006). Caleb Goldsmith Forshey, a nongraduate of West Point’s Class of 1838, established Texas Military Institute in San Antonio, Texas, in 1854 (Olson, 2011). D. H. Hill, Class of 1842, was the first superintendent of Hillsboro Military Academy, Hillsboro, North Carolina, opened in 1860. Louisiana Seminary of Learning and Military Academy, Alexandria, opened in 1860, and its first president would become one of West Point’s most famous alumni, General William Tecumseh Sherman, Class of 1840.

The most influential alumni in the expansion of the military school format in the United States were the first superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute and, to a lesser degree, the initial leadership of the South Carolina Military Academy, which is referred to as the Citadel, its designation officially starting in 1910. The Virginia Military Institute’s first president was a West Pointer, Colonel Francis H. Smith, Class of 1835. The Citadel’s first two presidents directed the school for nine years and were both West Pointers. Captain William F. Graham, Class of 1838, died of tuberculosis in office as president and was followed by Major Richard W. Colcock, Class of 1826 (Citadel, 2010).

The United States Military Academy under the leadership of Thayer perfected the Thayer method and much of what would become the common organizational culture of military schools for the next 200 years. The alumni of the academy founded, transitioned, or initially directed 20 of the early military academies, including Alden Partridge at Norwich. Additionally, two other military schools, Virginia Military Institute and the
Citadel, would influence the expansion of the military school concept extensively in the southern United States in the years preceding the Civil War.
Chapter 5: Francis Smith, Virginia Military Institute

Between 1843 and 1854, 91 military schools operated in the United States: 52 (57%) in states that later became the Confederacy and 28 in the Union States, with 11 associated with states considered Border States during the approaching Civil War. In the seven years just prior to the Civil War, southern military school expansion was dramatic. Between 1854 and the beginning of the Civil War, the number of military schools in operation had expanded by 49% with 137 military schools operating. Ninety-eight (71%) of those schools were in what would become Confederate States. This increase and regional shift was directly related to the establishment of two southern military institutions and the superintendent of one of them.

The creation of a state-supported military school in Virginia had been discussed in that state prior to 1835. That year, an article published by Lexington, Virginia, lawyer John Preston stated that the idea of an institute of a military character was not new and had become a popular idea since the establishment of the arsenal in Lexington, which was guarded by undisciplined state soldiers that had been involved in a murder.

The reputation of West Point was a subject of the Lexington Gazette only three weeks prior to John Preston’s comments. In January, 1836, a petition of 94 Lexington citizens called for the arsenal to be the responsibility of a new military school. This action progressed through the state legislature until the Governor appointed a Board of Visitors with directions to establish a military school in Lexington. The Board included the State Engineer, Colonel Claudius Crozet, a Frenchmen, graduate of the École Polytechnique, who served under Napoleon prior to coming to the United States in 1816 and worked at West Point as a professor of mathematics under Alden Partridge (Couper, 1939; Baker,
1958). At his suggestion “the regulations of the West Point Academy were made substantially the code of laws for the government of the institution” (Smith, 1912, pp. 54–55).

But Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was not to be a clone of West Point. West Point was to serve as a model, but the education was “not to fit its graduates for a single profession . . . but to prepare young men for the varied work of civil life” (Couper, 1939, p. 33). This required the education at VMI to have a “diminished intensity” but a “comprehensiveness enlarged” (Smith, 1912, p. 23). VMI was the nation’s first state military college and, like Partridge’s Norwich, looked at an education beyond the engineering focus of West Point to the needs of the state and its militia.

The first superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute was Francis Smith, West Point Class of 1833. He had been at West Point the last four years of Colonel Sylvanus Thayer’s reign as superintendent. Smith’s feelings about Sylvanus Thayer were revealed in his address to the West Point alumni in 1879 when he spoke at the annual reunion. Smith described Thayer as “a noble specimen of West Point character” (Smith, 1879, p. 7) and alluded to his encounters with him before and after graduation. Smith served in the 1st Artillery Regiment and then returned to West Point as a professor of moral and political philosophy before resigning from the army in 1836 and becoming an educator at Hampden-Sydney College in Virginia, where he taught mathematics (Wineman, 2006).

Smith took charge of the institute’s initial 28 cadets and led the institution for 50 years, 1839–1889. Smith built a college based on many of Thayer’s West Point academic fundamentals that included much of the science and mathematics core curriculum. But Smith added liberal arts as he desired that VMI provide for a “thoroughness of education”
that would give VMI a distinct character and provide for the production of good teachers with the command of English and "sound mathematical minds" (Wineman, 2006, p. 45–46).

Through his connections, the superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute recruited a pool of military educators to expand his philosophy of education. Initially these educators were, like him, West Point graduates, but as Virginia Military Institute produced graduates, they became his source for teacher and administrator recommendations. In the first 15 years of VMI existence, 54% of its graduates became teachers, giving Smith many opportunities to expand his philosophy as well as VMI’s reputation (Green, 2008).

Colonel Francis Smith’s correspondence while superintendent reflects an interest in helping both West Pointer alumni and VMI graduates with advice and employment referrals. West Pointers who requested his advice and assistance included Colonel Robert T. P. Allen at Kentucky Military Institute, who requested VMI’s regulations. Major Richard W. Colcock, who took over the Citadel after the untimely death of its first superintendent, visited VMI and sought out Smith’s advice on a variety of subjects. Arnoldus Brumby sought his advice as he took over Georgia Military Institute. Colonel Tench Tilghman sought Smith’s advice on a variety of issues and requested the VMI regulations for his Maryland Military Academy. And Major William Tecumseh Sherman at the Louisiana Seminary of Learning and Military Academy also turned to Smith for guidance. Smith used these relationships and those with nonmilitary educators to help the alumni of both West Point and VMI with employment (Wineman, 2006).
Like West Point, many VMI alumni actually started military schools of their own based on their educational experiences. But the list of pre-Civil War military schools with founders or initial leadership from VMI was even larger than from West Point, as the Virginia school’s alumni were more prepared to go into educational careers.

A total of 26 military schools were established or created by VMI alumni prior to the firing on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861. John B. Strange, Class of 1842, transitioned Norfolk Academy in Virginia to the military format in 1843 as the assistant principal and then as principal in 1847 (Brown, 1993). He later started Albemarle Military Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia, in 1856. James L. Bryan, Class of 1843, was the founder of Petersburg Classical and Military Academy in Virginia opened in 1848 (Wineman, 2006). After the war, he established Cambridge Military Academy in Maryland. Abingdon Military Academy in Virginia had a series of VMI men as principals starting with B. F. Ficklin in 1849. John Henry Pitts, Class of 1844, transitioned the Rumford Academy in Virginia to the Rumford Military Academy in 1849. Thomas Benton, Class of 1850, was co-principal at the Arkansas Military Institute when it opened in 1850. Valentine Saunders, Class of 1842, chose the 1853–1854 time frame to open his Baton Rouge Military Institute in Louisiana which closed shortly thereafter due to a yellow fever epidemic (Wineman, 2006). James J. Phillips, Class of 1853, established the Chuckatuck Military Academy in Chuckatuck, Virginia, in 1854. Titus V. Williams, Class of 1859, established the Jeffersonville Military Academy in Tazewell County, Virginia (Wineman, 2006). Charles E. Lightfoot, Class of 1854, was key in organizing the Culpeper Military Institute in Virginia in 1857; John W. Lewis, Class of 1859, helped transition St. John’s College, Arkansas, in 1859 as commandant. Thomas Harris, Class of
1851, helped transition Elizabeth City Academy in North Carolina to military in 1851. Charles Derby, Class of 1848, was first superintendent of West Alabama Military Institute in 1851 (Walker, 1875). William Elisha Arnold, Class of 1853, was the first superintendent of Lafayette Military Institute in Missouri in 1859.

Lynchburg Military College in Virginia was established in 1855, and Captain James E. Blankenship, Class of 1852, was among the faculty as mathematics professor and a member of the military department, as may have been other VMI alumni. He would go on to help convert Randolph-Macon College in Virginia to a military format after the Civil War began. Also on the faculty with Captain Blankenship at Lynchburg Military College was James Thomas Murfee, VMI Class of 1853, who taught natural sciences. He is an excellent example of how far and long VMI's influence in the military school movement went. Prior to coming to Lynchburg, he taught at Madison College in Pennsylvania. Madison was not a military school, but they required uniforms for drill and had a demerit system (Hadden, 1913; Gates, 1905). During the Civil War he served as commandant for the University of Alabama, and after the war he converted Howard College to a military school as its president, and later founded Marion Military Institute.

The Virginia Military Institute alumni contributed to an explosion of military schools in the South. Edward J. Magruder, Class of 1855, ran the Rome Military Academy from 1855 until the start of the war in 1861 (Battey, 1922). Valentine M. Johnson, Class of 1860, went to West Florida Seminary as Commandant of Cadets shortly before the war. He was joined there by James Cross, Class of 1856, who became the professor of mathematics and tactics. Cross had been principal of Winchester Military School in Virginia which was established in 1856, during its early years.
Military Institute Archives Online Historical Rosters, 2010). William Keiter, Class of 1859, started Shelbyville Military Academy in Tennessee in 1860. Frederick Bass, Class of 1851, as first professor of military tactics and later as president of Marshall College in Texas, transitioned the school to military around 1858. James W. Keeble, Class of 1857, was professor of tactics and principal of Sharon College in Mississippi when it transitioned to military in 1860. James W. Hairston, Class of 1858, founded Hairston School in Mississippi in 1859. James H. Waddell, Class of 1855, was the first commandant in 1860 for the Cappahosie Military Academy in Virginia. James V. Hall, Class of 1852, established the Craddockville Military Academy, in Accomack County, Virginia, around 1853.

Joseph H. Hebard and Edward C. Edmonds, both of the Class of 1858, were hired at the Hampton Academy in Virginia as it transitioned to the Hampton Military Academy in the late 1850s (Brown, 1997). Edwards left shortly thereafter to help found Danville Military Academy (Institute) in Danville, Virginia in 1859 (Walker, 1875). William Mahone, Class of 1847, and Thomas R. Thorston, Class of 1852, were both employed at the Rappahannock Academy and helped transform it to the Rappahannock Academy and Military Institute in Virginia.

Once the war began, many private, male, nonmilitary schools and colleges saw enrollment drop dramatically. In 1860, one of these colleges in Virginia was Randolph-Macon College, was at the “climax of its antebellum prosperity” (Irby, 1899, p.151). By August 1861, so many students had departed the college to enlist in the Confederate Army that the leadership “sought to reinvent the school as a military academy” (Davis & Robertson, 2009, p. 242). The Board of Trustees of the Methodist college initially
appointed Rev. Major William H. Wheelwright, VMI Class of 1845, as professor of military tactics in August 1861. The following February, the board completed the military reorganization of the college with the president, Rev. William A. Smith, named colonel and commandant of cadets and another VMI man, Major J. E. Blankenship, Class of 1852, named professor of mathematics and military science. "A regular uniform was prescribed, drills were observed daily, and other things of a similar character were enjoined, all looking towards preparation of the student for the duties that awaited him in defense of his country" (Irby, 1899, p. 155).

After the war, Randolph-Macon would reopen as a nonmilitary college and thrive. But years later, reaching back to those few years of military operation, the school's two affiliated academies, Randolph-Macon Academy in Front Royal and Randolph-Macon Academy in Bedford, would convert to military prep schools in 1910 and 1920, respectively.

The contributions of Francis Smith and the Virginia Military Institute alumni prior to the Civil War to the expansion of the military school concept explained the popularity of the military school in the southern United States, but it does not tell the whole story. In South Carolina, Governor George McDuffie proposed the creation of a state military school combining "military instruction with the usual subjects taught in state schools in 1836" (Buckley, 2004, p. 2). Military schools by this time were becoming familiar, as about 100 South Carolina men had attended Norwich and seven served in the state legislature (Kraus, 1978).

In 1842, South Carolina Governor John P. Richardson established two schools, one at Columbia and the other in Charleston. The schools were under one Board of
Governors and the cadets would, like VMI, take the duties of guarding the arsenals at each location. In March, 1843, 20 cadets reported to the Citadel Academy in Charleston and 14 to the Arsenal Academy in Columbia. The two schools were known collectively as the South Carolina Military Academy (The Citadel). After 1845, only cadets in their initial year at the academy were housed at the Arsenal in Columbia (Buckley, 2004). Between opening in 1842 and the start of the Civil War in 1861, the Citadel had four superintendents. Captain William F. Graham only served one year prior to his death; he was replaced by Major Richard W. Colcock, who served as superintendent until 1852. He was replaced by a Citadel faculty member, Major Francis W. Capers, who served until 1859 and was replaced by Citadel graduate, Major Peter F. Stevens, Class of 1849 (Citadel, 2010). Unlike Francis Smith at VMI, whatever part the four Citadel superintendents played in the establishment of additional military schools prior to the Civil War was largely lost to history when the Citadel was destroyed by Union forces in 1865. But a number of military schools created by the school’s alumni have been identified. The Citadel alumni, like Virginia Military Institute, were much more likely to go into the education field than the alumni of West Point, with 27.7% following that profession (Green, 2008).

Nine military schools are known to have been established by Citadel alumni, but others are likely to have had Citadel graduates as founders or key faculty. In Alabama, Gibson Hill was assisted by N. W. Armstrong, Class of 1851, in establishing the Southern Military Academy in Fredonia in 1851. In North Carolina, Wilmington Military Academy was opened in 1856 by James D. Radcliffe, and Hillsbourgh Military Academy was founded by Charles Tew (University of North Carolina, 2010). Bowden Collegiate
Institute was started in 1856 by John Richardson in Georgia. Florence Wesleyan University in Alabama transitioned to LaGrange Military Academy in 1858 under James W. Robertson, Class of 1850, as the superintendent (Wythe, 1907), and the Brandon State Military School in Mississippi was founded by Pierre S. Layton in 1860.

In South Carolina, Citadel graduates established Aiken Classical and Military Academy in 1856 with C. W. McCrary and T. H. Mangum, both of the Class of 1856, as principals. Around that same time, Anderson Military Academy was established with Joseph Manning Adams, Class of 1856, as principal. But by far, the most successful of the Citadel-inspired schools was King's Mountain Military School. It was founded by Michael Jenkins, Class of 1854, in January 1855. Its military and academic programs were so well thought of that the school's graduates were permitted entrance into the Citadel as sophomores (Thomas, 1893). The school opened with just 12 cadets, ages 11–16, but by the end of the first year, had expanded to 60. The curriculum spanned five years and included mathematics, history, chemistry, languages, literature, astronomy, geology, physiology, and philosophy. By 1861, cadets numbered 140. At the onset of the Civil War, the school closed but reopened in 1866 and operated until 1886 (West, 2011).

Between 1831 and 1843, 39 military schools operated in the United States. Regionally the division between the North and South was relatively equal, with the South having 17 schools and the North 19 schools. In the six years prior to the Civil War, the number of military schools in operation had climbed to 138, and regional orientation shifted to the South. The explanation for both the growth and regional shift has been largely attributed to a southern cultural orientation to militarism, and preparation for war. The sectionalism which led to southern concerns for military preparedness grew out of
divergent economic interests of the northern industrial base and the southern cotton based wealth and slave supported economy.

The two largest issues dividing the North and South grew from questions of slavery and economic policies that favored the North. Both issues were questions of state’s rights under the constitution with slavery issues that went back to at least 1784, when Thomas Jefferson proposed to Congress the prohibition of slavery in all western expansions. The subject of the expansion of slavery would divide the states; the North opposed to the western expansion of slavery and the South supported expansion. This division of opinion was for a time addressed by the Missouri Compromise in 1820, but by 1848, with the expansion of United States’ territory the crises reemerged as additional states was admitted into the Union as “slave” or “free” states. In addition to the political issues associated with slavery, the moral issue grew as the abolitionist movement in the North grained more political influence. (Simkins, 1969).

In addition to opposing views on slavery, the nation was divided by economic interests and associated tariffs. As early as 1828 with the enactment of tariffs designed to favor the manufacturing northern states, South Carolina led a crusade which became known as the Nullification Crisis. The resulting compromise, which lowered tariffs, enforced a southern attitude towards the importance of state’s rights and their place in trade and slavery issues. (Olsen, 2006). These issues grew to support the need for military preparedness in the South having “lived in a crisis atmosphere ... menaced through encirclement by a power containing elements unfriendly to its interests, elements that were growing strong enough to capture the [national] government” (Woodward, 2008, p. 62).
Other contributing factors according to Mohr (2011) that encouraged to the military school expansion in the South were southern parental concern for discipline, character development, training sound citizens and a means to provide an affordable education to less advantaged white males. The establishment of Virginia Military Institute and the Citadel in 1839 and 1841 helped meet those needs. Those schools were not established out of fear from northern encirclement.

Clearly two factors that strongly influenced the expansion of military schools in the South were Francis Smith and the Virginia Military Alumni and, to a lesser degree, the alumni of The Citadel. Thirty of the southern schools were established by alumni of those two schools. Many other schools likely employed the teachers from the two schools, and others were founded on the concepts demonstrated by the two institutions.
Chapter 6: The Civil War

There were four major impacts on military schools in the United States as a result of the Civil War. During the war and immediately following, many military schools in the South were forced to close and most did not reopen. Outside the South, the Civil War played a role in influencing northern states to transition to or establish new military schools. Military schools also participated as units in active military service and even fought as combat units. Finally, the postwar occupation of the South also limited military school activities for several years.

Between 1855 and 1860, there were at least 85 military schools operating in the South. Documentation shows that only 22–26% of these schools reopened or continued operation after the war. In 1860, the year prior to the Civil War, the Union States had only 32 military schools. By the end of the war in 1865, the number of military schools in the Union States had increased by 40%, with 15 newly established military schools.

Southern Military Faculty and Cadets Depart to be Soldiers

Many of the smaller southern military schools closed when key faculty left to join Confederate military forces. Chuckatuck Military Academy in Virginia is a good example, when President James J. Phillips left his school to recruit the Chuckatuck Light Artillery for Confederate service. For another small military school, it was a combination of the loss of their founder and enlistment of cadets that closed Shelbyville Military Academy in Tennessee. The school’s founder, Captain William H. Keiter, VMI Class of 1859, departed for military service in May of 1861. It appears his school’s leadership was taken over by Alexander McKinnery Rafter who, “within two months of the beginning of the war enlisted with all the pupils” (Miller, 1901, p. 529). Rafter and his cadets may
have been members of the Tennessee Belmont Artillery Battery and witnessed the death of Captain Keiter. In 1862, Keiter was ordered to fire what he believed to be a defective artillery piece. Against his better judgment, he followed orders and the resulting explosion killed him (Walker, 1875).

Nathan B. Webster, Norwich Class of 1839, left the Virginia Literary, Scientific and Military Academy for very different reasons. He closed his school and departed for Canada, likely for two reasons. Portsmouth, Virginia, was under Union occupation, making conduct of a military school nearly impossible, and he had conflicting loyalties, having worked in Virginia for 22 years but being born in New Hampshire and educated at Norwich University (Johnson & Brown, 1904).

Kentucky Military Institute is an example of one of the larger state military schools that closed. "When the Civil War broke out every Cadet and almost every faculty member joined one side or the other, forcing the school to close" (Stevens, 1991, p. 44). The North Carolina Military Institute in Charlotte closed in 1861, as the 1st North Carolina Infantry Regiment enlisted the faculty as the regiment’s staff officers, and the cadets were permitted to join with their parent’s permission (Clark, 1901). The Arkansas Military Institute formed the basis of Company I, 3rd Arkansas Infantry. The school’s permanent closure was sealed by Union troops in 1864, when they burned the school buildings. In Arkansas, St. John’s College cadets formed Company A (Capital Guard), 6th Arkansas Infantry. Their legacy helped inspire the reopening of the school after the war (Brown, 2009). Bowden Collegiate and Military Institute/College in Georgia closed as a military school when seven graduates and a large number of cadets formed a 130-man unit, Company B, Cobb’s Legion, under the leadership of the college president as
the captain (Eastern Digital Resources, 2011). Other colleges closed as cadets organized Confederate units, including Lynchburg Military College, where faculty and cadets formed Company E, 11th Virginia Infantry (Troiani, 2002). La Grange Military College and Academy closed in 1862, as it helped man the 35th Alabama Infantry Regiment, with their superintendent as colonel, a professor serving as lieutenant colonel, their commandant as major, the cadet adjutant as regimental adjutant, and cadets manning the majority of B Company, with representation in other companies as well (Wyeth, 1907).

King’s Mountain Military Academy closed when the founders became the commander and adjutant of the 5th South Carolina Infantry Regiment. Company I (Jasper Light Infantry) of the regiment was largely comprised of the academy’s graduates and graduating seniors (West, 2011). The school reopened after the close of the Civil War and remained open until 1886.

The Franklin Military Institute of Duplin County North Carolina formed Company E, 20th North Carolina Infantry, in 1861, with the school principal, Claudius B. Denson, elected to serve as their captain (Wynstra, 2010). Denson was a graduate of Virginia Literary, Scientific and Military Academy and employed as his co-principal Richard W. Millard, who was an associate of Nathan B. Webster, founder of the Virginia school. Besides cadet enlistments impacting military school enrollment, those schools not under state control faced the Confederate Conscription Act that provided compulsory military service for all white males 18 to 35 years of age (Baker, 1989).

Symbolic of the fate of most southern military schools, the University High School and Military Academy of Athens, Georgia, surrendered to Union forces in 1865. For southern military schools, the Civil War and the northern occupation was a major
setback. Northern occupation, with its prohibition against the issue of drill weapons and an environment of suspicion, slowed any military school recovery in the South.

**Drill Masters and Cadets in Combat**

Of the southern military schools that remained open, at least 10 set aside their academic function for a period of time and conducted military operations in support of the Confederacy. Virginia Military Institute became the most famous of these schools for its charge during the Battle of New Market. The cadets of The Citadel, University of Alabama, Georgia Military Institute, and West Florida Seminary, along with midshipmen of the Confederate Naval Academy, all engaged in combat. Several military schools including the North Carolina Military Institute, the Hillsboro Military Academy in North Carolina, Texas' Bastrop Military Institute, Louisiana Seminary of Learning and Military Academy, and others helped drill recruits in preparation for military service. Additionally, La Grange Military College and Academy initially sent one cadet company commander to help train the 16th and 27th Alabama Infantry regiments, the latter unit Cadet Captain John Smith Napier would join after graduation and become its adjutant (Wyeth, 1907).

The Hillsboro Military Academy numbered 130 cadets in 1861 when a large number of newly elected Confederate officers of North Carolinian Volunteer Regiments came to Hillsboro to ask for help. According to Cadet Captain William Cain, a company commander of the academy, "it was certainly a novel sight to see the little cadets from ages 13 years and older trampling his squad of grown and sometimes grizzled men over the parade ground" (Clark, 1901, p. 638). These new officers having no military experience took the drill instruction of their young instructors very seriously. In
hindsight, Cadet Cain saw the Hillsboro contribution as bringing order out of chaos by forming regiments with inexperienced soldiers. In fact, three months of instruction with the aid of the young cadets helped produce “well drilled and disciplined” units. (Clark, 1901, p. 638). It also resulted in the vast majority of cadets enlisting in the regiments they helped train.

The Citadel. The cadets from the Citadel were called upon numerous times during the Civil War for service in combat and to serve as drill masters for new Confederate Army recruits, as guards for storage facilities and prisoners of war, to help man fortification in the Charleston area, and in combat. In January 1861, prior to the bombardment of Fort Sumter that started the Civil War, a detachment of 50 Citadel cadets manned four 20-pounder siege guns and fired on the Star of the West, an unarmed steamer carrying reinforcements to Fort Sumter. Of the three shells fired from their position on Morris Island, two missed and one struck the ship, turning the vessel around and back to New York (Baker, 1989). Many consider this action, rather than the April bombardment of Fort Sumter, the beginning of the Civil War.

Apart from Union naval bombardment of Charleston, the cadets’ next combat came in December of 1864. The Citadel cadet battalion, comprised of both freshman from the Arsenal and upperclassmen from the Citadel, were called to active service again to fight alongside regular Confederate troops at Tulifinny Creek. The cadets proved themselves, as one veteran soldier stated “them youngsters’ll fight like hell” (Baker, 1989, p. 145) and were compared to General Hood’s Texans. This was despite going into combat with the look of “Dandy-Jim looking kids,” (Baker, 1989, p.145) unfortunately, at the cost of eight casualties including one killed. The Citadel cadets ended their
participation in the war on active duty by defending the fortifications of Charleston then retreated with Confederate forces before the city fell. In April 1865, the governor of South Carolina furloughed the upperclassmen cadets of the Citadel, and in May, the freshman cadets of the Arsenal. During the period of active service, seven additional cadets died from disease. But the last bloodshed was after the official furlough; on May 9, 1865, Cadet McKenzie Parker, in a skirmish with union troops, was killed near Anderson County (Baker, 1989). The school was burned by Union troops and would not reopen until 1882.

University of Alabama. Early in the war, University of Alabama cadets were called out of the classrooms periodically to drill newly formed Alabama regiments and to serve as wagon guards for supply trains. Like many southern schools, the University of Alabama cadets and faculty left to enlist at such a rate that in 1862, there were no graduates (Center, 1990). No cadets were called up under the Confederate Conscription Act because the school’s cadets were considered exceptions as a state-supported institution, and the school actually grew, with new cadets joining the University of Alabama’s ranks. But on at least two occasions the cadets were called on for combat operations.

In July 1864, 54 cadets, as part of a composite force called the Lockhart Battalion, were traveling by train from Montgomery to counter a Union Army Calvary advance on Auburn. The battalion detrained at Chehaw Station and began fighting from behind a rail fence. They advanced to the better protection of a ravine against Rousseau’s Union Calvary which was armed with the superior Spencer Carbine. Two University of Alabama Cadets were among the 80 Confederate casualties. Both sides claimed victory—
the Confederates because they advanced and secured Auburn, and the Union because they had suffered only 11–13 casualties (Conrad, 1997).

The final military operation for the cadets of University of Alabama started on the night of April 3, 1865, with a force of 1,500 Union cavalrymen approaching Montgomery. In the late hours the university president ordered, "Beat the long roll! The Yankees are in town!" (Center, 1990, p. 34). With that, the roll of cadet drums aroused the cadets from their barracks, and there were two brief engagements with Union cavalrymen resulting in three wounded cadets as well as their commandant, John H. Murfee, VMI Class of 1853.

As the cadets waited for dawn and the coming battle against an overwhelming Union force, the decision was made by the president of the university to abandon Montgomery and the university’s buildings. The Cadets marched out of town and entrenched themselves on high ground. The next day Union troops burned the university to the ground. The Cadets marched to Marion where a shortage of food led the commandant to place the cadets on leave to reassemble in 30 days. But four days later General Lee surrendered, and this led to the end of the war (Center, 1990). The university would not reopen until 1871, and it did so without a corps of cadets.

**West Florida Seminary.** West Florida Seminary was another southern military school whose cadets were called for combat operations late in the war. When the war began, the school had 250 cadets, but by 1865, enrollment was down to only 58 students (Conrad, 1997). The cadets were called out for the Battle of Olustee, but were relegated to guard Union prisoners, a duty they had performed on several other occasions (Cox, 2007). In March of 1865, three regiments of 1,500 Union troops landed by sea at
Apalachee Bay and marched north. The small corps of cadets of the West Florida Seminary, numbering only 34–37 cadets, was called to active duty. Twenty-five Cadets traveled by train south to Newport. In Newport, they joined the 5th Florida Cavalry Battalion by running under fire to the trench line across the Saint Marks River (Coles & Graetz, 1989).

The next day, as Union forces marched north, the cadets moved with the 5th Florida to Nature Bridge to counter the threatened river crossing there. At the location where the Saint Marks River went underground forming a land bridge, the Confederate troops and cadets entrenched and repulsed the Union assaults (Coles & Graetz, 1989). The Union troops tried eight times to cross at Natural Bridge and suffered 21 killed, 89 wounded, and 38 captured. The Union troops then withdrew and embarked by sea the next morning. The Confederate force lost four men and 22 were wounded. Cadet Tom Frazier was among the Confederate dead when he fell off the train early in the deployment (Cox, 2007). During the war, the West Florida Seminary was known as the Florida Military Collegiate Institute. It would reopen after the war as a nonmilitary school and, through several name changes, ultimately become Florida State University.

**Georgia Military Institute.** Georgia Military Institute was tasked early in the war by the governor of Georgia to train newly arrived soldiers at Camp McDonald. The Confederate Conscription Act initially threatened to close the school but, through the Governor’s protests, the policy changed and by 1863 the school was similar in size to its prewar enrollment. In 1863, the Cadets were called upon to guard a rail bridge during Colonel Abel Streight’s Union Cavalry raid. In May of the next year, the cadets were assembled and moved by train to Resaca, where the cadets were attached to Major
General William Walker's division and played a role in repulsing a Union assault. There were no cadet casualties. They were on active duty for just a few days then returned to their classrooms in Marietta (Yates, 1968).

By June, the situation for the Confederacy in Georgia had worsened and the cadets were called upon again and moved by train to West Point, Georgia. After encampment for about six weeks, they joined forces near Atlanta and participated in action at Turner's Ferry by defending that crossing on July 4th and 8th. No casualties were suffered during this period, although they came under cannon fire as they marched to Atlanta where they took up defensive positions. Life for the cadets in the trenches was both difficult and life threatening. The Battle for Atlanta cost the Georgia Military Institute five battle casualties, including one killed and six cadets who eventually died of disease. After almost two months away from their studies, the corps of cadets was moved to Milledgeville on August 20, 1864, and camped on the capitol square, attempting to resume academic work (Yates, 1968).

For all practical purposes, the Georgia Military Institute was reestablished on the capitol square and the cadets remained there until mid-November. The cadets were there when Union troops burned their building in Marietta on November 13. Soon after, the cadets departed their temporary campus in Montgomery and found themselves back in combat defending the Oconee River railroad bridge. On November 23 and 25, the cadets fought against several assaults until in the early hours of November 26, they were flanked by Union forces and withdrew under cover of darkness. During the fighting, three cadets were wounded and one was killed (Yates, 1968).
Between November 28 and December 20, the cadets defended various positions in defense of Savannah including Oliver's Station, Ogeechee Station, and the Oconee Bridge. As the rear guard of the Confederate evacuation of Savannah, the cadets suffered two wounded and one killed among their ranks. The corps of cadets was back in Milledgeville when the Confederates surrendered at Appomattox. In their final days as cadets and in the final days of the Georgia Military Institute, cadets functioned as police in Atlanta. On May 20, the cadets were paroled and the Institute was disbanded. Eight of their comrades died in southern service, three of which were killed in combat. Six others carried the wounds of war home including a missing arm and another who lost an eye (Yates, 1968).

**Virginia Military Institute.** Cadets at the Virginia Military Institute did not fire the first shots of the war, as the Citadel can claim, but they were involved in major events leading up to the Civil War. In 1859, 64 cadets escorted the governor of Virginia and provided guards for the public execution of John Brown. In the early days of the Civil War, VMI was called upon to drill assembling Confederate forces. VMI’s cadets were the first to be lost in combat. When Union forces started to advance on Manassas in July, 1861 the emergency redeployment of Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s Brigade and the 18th Virginia Infantry Regiment resulted in cadets being attached for training purposes and accompanying the units they were training. On the fields of the Battle of Bull Run, three cadets were killed and two were wounded. These were the first southern cadets to fall in combat, but far from the last from the Institute (Conrad, 1997).

In May 1862, a year later, the Institute was called to active service with Stonewall Jackson, this time not as individual cadets but the corps of cadets as a unit. During the
Battle of McDowell, they were not committed to combat but remained in the field for more than two weeks. After the battle, they collected the wounded from both sides and buried the dead. The final five days of their active service were spent marching back to Lexington in the rain. One cadet would later die of an illness caught during his service that rainy May day (Conrad, 1997).

From late April through July 1863, cadets were working as drillmasters at Camp Lee. In August 1863, the cadets of Virginia Military Institute were tasked with hunting deserters and deployed to counter a Union cavalry raid. Fifty cadets mounted on horses were sent southwest of Lexington searching for deserters; a force of two cadet companies was sent seven miles northwest to defend against a suspected Union raid. The success of the deserter hunt is unknown and the Union raid never materialized. In November, 225 cadets marched to Clifton Forge to help the Confederate Cavalry under leadership of General John Imboden repel another Union cavalry raid. Before the cadets could reach Covington, Imboden forced the Northern troops to retreat, and the cadets marched back to Lexington. On December 17, the cadets were marched out of Lexington in response to a cavalry raid, only to return on December 20 and march out again the next day. In both cases, the cadets fought against bad winter weather and encountered no Union troops (Conrad, 1997).

On May 11, 1864, the corps of cadets of Virginia Military Institute marched into events which would make their deeds the center piece of military school lore and southern tradition. Upon arrival at New Market, Confederate Commander General Breckinridge welcomed them with "Young Gentlemen, I hope there will be no occasion to use you, but if there is, I trust you will do your duty" (Conrad, 1997, p. 93). The cadet
battalion became the reserve force for Colonel Wharton, the brigade commander and a
VMI graduate. Unfortunately, Colonel Wharton did not formally brief Colonel Ship, the
Virginia Military Institute Commandant, on the situation and, as the cadets marched
down the hill into an area of relative safety, Union cannon fire caused four casualties
(Conrad, 1997).

Initially, the Virginia Military Institute functioned as an infantry reserve behind
the Confederate line. They numbered 226 cadets and faculty with three cadets being left
behind ill. An additional 32 cadets manned two cannons placed along the Confederate
artillery line. As the battle was entering a critical stage, General Breckinridge, in an
agonizing decision ordered, “Put the boys in and may God forgive me for that order”
(Davies, 1983, p. 122).

With that order, the Cadet Battalion went into the gap between the 51st Virginia
Infantry Regiment and the 62nd Virginia Infantry Mounted Regiment, the latter fighting
as dismounted infantry. Both units had already suffered heavily, and the right four
companies of the 51st Virginia had faltered under withering fire. Just the initial movement
into the line cost the cadets at least six casualties. The cadets endured heavy enemy fire
and a faint-hearted attack against the Confederate line by three Union regiments. As the
Union attack faltered, a Union artillery battery behind started preparing the horses to
withdraw their cannons from the field (Davies, 1983).

Shortly thereafter the Confederate counter attack started first to the left of the
corps of cadets with the simultaneous commands of Captain Wise, acting commandant,
and Captain Preston, one of the tactical officers. The cadets joined in charging the Union
artillery battery. The following was described by journalist beyond them:
The cadets from VMI moved forward in the charge upon the enemy’s battery. Their step was as steady as the tread of veteran soldiers. They never faltered, but went into the harvest of death as though they were accustomed to such bloody work. (Davies, 1983, p. 136)

The cadets advanced across an open muddy field, as cadets lost their footwear and ran forward barefoot. Across the field, which became known as the field of lost shoes, the cadets’ “lines well formed and continued to advance toward the battery” (Davies, 1983, pp. 138-139) up to the crest of the hill. On the right of the enemy battery, the Union 1st West Virginia Infantry retreated in disorder. The artillerymen of the 30th New York Artillery Battery retreated to the rear under fire from the cadets, leaving one 12-pounder cannon as the cadets swept the position.

In the meantime, the cadets manning the Institute’s artillery on the right of the Confederate line were ordered to prepare double-shot caster fire as the Union Cavalry was forming to attack there. The Union horsemen advanced; the Confederate artillery, with the Cadets firing their cannon, caused confusion and broke up their charge. As the Union commander ordered a withdrawal, the 22nd Virginia Infantry attacked under the command of Colonel George S. Patton, Virginia Military Institute graduate, and ensured the Union movement to the rear was a rout (Davis, 1983).¹

The battle ended in Confederate victory with the Virginia Military Institute Corps of Cadets suffering 10 killed and 47 wounded (Davis, 1983). After the battle, the Confederate Secretary of War ordered the corps of cadets to Richmond. In route they stopped in Charlottesville and crossed paths with men of the “Stonewall Brigade,” the most heralded unit of the Confederate Army. The Cadets were flattered because the

¹ Colonel Patton was the great grandfather of General George Patton who would attend VMI a year before transferring to West Point and gaining fame as a World War II commander.
hardened combat veterans had already heard of the Cadets of Virginia Military Institute at New Market. Their actions became part of the southern tradition and a testimony of military school devotion to duty. In Richmond, the corps of cadets was reviewed by Confederate President Jefferson Davis, West Point Class of 1828, and was thanked by the Confederate Congress and issued a new battle flag and Enfield Rifles (Conrad, 1997).

Ironically on June 12, 1864, at the capture of the Lexington and VMI by Union troops, Gillespie W. Henry, VMI Class of 1862, the adjutant of the 14th West Virginia Infantry, attempted unsuccessfully to convince the Union commander that it was not to burn the school (Virginia Military Institute Archives Online Historical Rosters, 2011).

**Confederate Naval Academy.** The Union States had two national academies, the United States Military Academy at West Point and the United States Naval Academy. In 1861, at the beginning of the war, the Confederacy had no national military schools. The Confederate Naval Academy’s service in the Civil War began with its opening in Richmond in July 1863. Midshipmen numbering about 60 were aboard the *CSS Patrick Henry* and moved to the location of Confederate fortifications on Drewry’s Bluff, guarding Richmond on the James River. The midshipmen studied aboard and helped man the cannon emplacements when needed.

But the first combat was seen by the eight academy midshipmen detached to augment a Confederate naval raid in Bern, North Carolina. On the evening of February 2, 1864, 40 Confederate sailors and marines, including eight midshipmen of the Confederate Naval Academy, deployed into the dark water of the Nause River in two launches and headed towards Union Navy forces believed to be downstream. In the darkness, they came upon the *USS Underwriter*, a Union gunboat with 89 crewmen and
four cannons. Boarding the vessel under fire, the Confederates fought armed with pistols, rifles, and sabers. After a brief intense action, five Confederate sailors and marines were killed, including Midshipman Saunders, who was killed with a saber wound to the head. Sixteen others were wounded, including another midshipman. The Union ship was captured with nine Union sailors killed, including the captain of the ship; 46 Union sailors were wounded and captured. The Union vessel was burned and the Confederates with their captives returned to Confederate lines (Campbell, 1998).

The Naval Academy aboard the *CSS Patrick Henry* docked at Drewry’s Bluff became endangered by the advance of Union General Butler’s troops in May of 1864. With the advance of Union troops, midshipmen were assigned temporary duties manning the cannon at Drewry’s Bluff, with 19 midshipmen on the crews of the ships of the James River Squadron, others assigned to an artillery battery north of Richmond, and several sent to ships and raiding parties in North Carolina. The fighting did not reach Drewry’s Bluff, but the squadron was engaged in limited action on June 20, with shelling on union gunboats in Trent’s Reach on the James River (Campbell, 1998). During this time, Lieutenant Hall led a group of midshipmen in several skirmishes with Union sharpshooters near Howlett House and Drewry’s Bluff (Scharf, 1887). By the end of July, most of the midshipmen had returned to duty at the academy.

In the latter part of 1864, the academy functioned as normally as possible with the “rumblings of war” heard daily. Midshipmen were often called from class to man the fortifications, participating in long-range artillery duels, some lasting for three days. At other times, details of midshipmen went downstream to lay mines and anchor spar torpedoes. In October, the *CSS Patrick Henry* moved upstream and the 60 midshipmen
and 10 officers manned trenches guarding a pontoon bridge across the James River at Wilton Farm. Shortly after their return to Drewry Bluff, the winter closed in with three to six inches of snow a common sight. Living conditions aboard ship and in winter huts deteriorated causing many midshipmen to fall ill (Campbell, 1998).

In March 1865, the midshipmen and the *CSS Patrick Henry* moved upstream closer to Richmond. They docked at Rocketts Landing, and the midshipmen lived in a tobacco warehouse. On April 2, 1865, the academy received orders to “have the Corps of Midshipmen with proper officers at the Danville depot today at 6pm” (Conrad, 2003, p. 87). Shortly after arrival and drawing equipment, they learned that Richmond was to be evacuated and the midshipmen and their officers were to guard the train containing Confederate archives, the treasury, as well as President Jefferson Davis and his wife. The trains departed that evening with the midshipmen fully armed and with three days rations. Between that time and April 13, the Confederate government was escorted by train through Virginia, North Carolina, and on to Chester, South Carolina. At Chester the treasury was moved by wagon train with gold in boxes and silver in kegs, eventually arriving in Augusta, Georgia, despite Union cavalry patrols and the chaos in a defeated South. (Scharf, 1887).

By May 2, 1865, Robert E. Lee had surrendered, Present Lincoln had been assassinated, and General Johnston had surrendered to Sherman. On that day, the Secretary of Treasury relieved the Naval Academy of responsibility for the gold and silver and ordered the academy disbanded. The midshipmen received written orders detaching them “from the Naval School and leave is granted to visit [their] home. You will report to the Secretary of the Navy as possible” (Scharf, 1887, p. 778).
Never surrendered and never paroled, the unit disbanded after executing its final mission. President Jefferson Davis traveled a different route, arrived in Augusta, and learned that the midshipmen were no longer his guard. He told Captain Parker, “I have no fault with you, but I regret Mr. Mallory [Secretary of Treasury] gave you that order” (Scharf, 1887, pp. 778–779).

Northern military schools. Prior to the first major battle of the Civil War at Manassas, Virginia, the midshipmen of the United States Naval Academy found themselves defending their institute from potential attack. Baltimore had rioted at the arrival of Union troops in April 1861, and Annapolis became both the point of embarkation for reinforcements and a target of potential Confederate attack. Cannons were placed at the front gate and the Midshipmen Battalion was repeatedly called out to defend the installation (Sweetman, 1995). Because of the unstable situation, the Academy moved its operation to Newport, Rhode Island, until 1865. In 1863, another riot, this time in New York City, brought the cadets of West Point to take arms and increase their guard as rumors of violence spread to the academy. Although some accounts say the cadets were deployed to the streets of New York, the enlisted soldiers at the academy were not the cadets.

Like the military schools of the Confederacy, Norwich University was heavily engaged in the conflict by supporting the Vermont mobilization of drillmasters with various units including the 3rd Vermont Infantry Regiment. The cadets also drilled students at Dartmouth University and Bowdoin College. The Dartmouth students and Norwich cadets eventually manned B Troop, 7th Rhode Island Cavalry. At Bowdoin College training was observed by Professor Lawrence Chamberlain, a graduate of
Whitting's Military and Classical School in Maine. Chamberlain would later rise to
general officer, receive the Medal of Honor for action at Little Round Top at Gettysburg,
and become Governor of Maine (Poirier, 1999).

The Norwich cadets were also sent to Camp Rendezvous and helped prepare the
4th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th Vermont Infantry Regiments and 1st
Light Artillery Battery. Camp Rendezvous was in Brattleboro where the Burnside
Military School was located. The school principal, Colonel Charles A. Miles, and his
cadets drilled officers of the 2nd Vermont Infantry at the beginning of the war (Poirier,
1999; Cabot, 1922). The Highland Military Academy of Worcester, Massachusetts, had
cadets function as drill masters in “neighboring towns” as the war began as well (Wilson,
1892). The Peekskill Military Academy cadets in New York drilled newly formed units
and marched with them to the war (Augustowski, 2001).

Norwich University was far from the battlefields of the South, but on October 19,
1864, southern raiders entered the town of St. Albans, Vermont, from Canada. The 21
raiders were led by Confederate Lieutenant Bennett Young. Young had been captured
earlier in the war, escaped to Canada, and returned to the South where he was assigned to
organize a company with other escaped prisoners from Canada and “create havoc along
the border” (Hamilton, 2005, p. 48). The raiders robbed St. Albans Bank, Franklin
County Bank, and the First National Bank of at least $208,000. The raiders incurred one
wounded; one town person was killed and a visitor to the town wounded (Hamilton,
2005).

Vermont’s militia had long since mobilized and left to fight on the southern
battlefield. As “the only source of organized defense was the corps of cadets” (Ellis,
1911, p. 418), the school was alerted by telegram of a potential similar “invasion” of Newport, Vermont. General Alonso Jackson, the Norwich superintendent, gathered the cadets by drum beat for roll call. The force might have been larger from Norwich, but like their southern military school counterparts the ranks of the cadets had been depleted by cadets departing the school as volunteers to fight with various units in the war. At the formation of the small corps, the cadets were instructed to step one pace forward should they wish to volunteer for active service in Newport. The result was a “complete forward movement in response” (Ellis, 1911, p. 418). The school sent a telegram to Vermont’s governor offering the services of the Cadet Corps. The governor asked what they could bring and the Corps responded, “Springfield muskets and two six pound field guns as to what arms they could bring to the fight; the state ordered the cadets to leave for Newport on the first train with artillery” (Ellis, 1911, p. 418).

Prior to commandeering a train, the order was amended to proceed without artillery. The force assembled included two faculty members including General Jackson, a Lieutenant of Cavalry, an alumni veteran, two local volunteers, and 47 Cadets for a total of 52 men. The force arrived in Newport to find the town’s people had organized a company of citizens. The Cadets marched on the wharf and received a streamer at the ready should the boat contain southern raiders. No raiders materialized and after spending the night in Newport, the Cadets marched eight miles to the Canadian border (Ellis, 1911).

An unarmed group crossed the Canadian border to find the Canadians ready to help. According to Portus Baxter, Norwich Class of 1825, who was present, the cadets had to uphold the honor of Vermont and calmed the anxiety of its citizens. The Corps
returned to Norwich never having heard a shot in anger. (Ellis, 1911). Of the 21 raiders, the Canadian Militia captured 14 and $75,000 was recovered (Hamilton, 2009).

**Alumni Contributions to the War Efforts**

The contributions of military schools to the efforts of Confederate operations have been addressed holistically by Bruce Allardice. But no attempt has been made to look at the military education of Union forces beyond works focused at West Point and Norwich University. This may be because, as Cunliffe (1973) pointed out, military schools are regarded as a southern idea and viewed as having no significance to the North.

**Military schools' contribution to the southern effort.** Allardice’s (1997) study of southern military schools in the Civil War provided an estimate of 12,000 alumni of military schools serving with the Confederate military forces. This figure was based on his estimate of 96 schools operating in the South between 1827 and 1860. This included Western Military Institute, which operated in Kentucky and Tennessee, and provided more than 1,000 officers to include two generals, 37 colonels and lieutenant colonels, and 18 majors. Virginia Military Institute contributed 1,796 officers including 20 generals, 92 colonels, 64 lieutenant colonels, and 107 majors. Georgia Military Institute had 500 alumni in gray to include two generals and 36 field-grade officers (colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors). LaGrange Military Academy in Alabama provided 176 alumni. Hillsboro Military Academy in North Carolina provided at least 250 to include two lieutenant colonels, one major, and two captains (Clark, 1901).

The Citadel’s total contribution has never been documented. The school had 209 graduates in the Confederate forces to include four generals and 48 field officers. But a total of 1,699 had attended the school by war’s end and the majority served the
Confederate cause. Kentucky Military Institute had 3,049 cadets serve in the Civil War (Allardice, 1997). That school’s alumni served in both blue and gray and their service has never been completely documented. Other southern military schools’ contributions of Confederate generals include two from Jefferson College in Mississippi, one from Georgia Military Institute, one from Raleigh Military Academy in North Carolina, one from Saint Thomas Hall in Mississippi, and one from Western Military Academy in Tennessee.

Additionally, Allardice (1997) found that at least six military schools outside West Point in the Union States contributed small numbers to the Southern cause. These schools were Kenyon College in Ohio, Mount Pleasant Military Academy in New York, Russell Military Academy in Connecticut, Mount Vernon Military Academy in New York, Norwich University in Vermont, and Starr’s Military Institute in New York.

Green (2008) estimated that 11,000 alumni of southern military schools were prepared to serve in the Confederate military. These estimates were based in part on the identification of 94 military schools in the South and North that had played a part in the education of southerners prior to the Civil War. In addition to Green’s estimates, West Point contributed 661 men of which 156 became Confederate generals. The United States Naval Academy provided 95 officers; the American Classical and Military Lyceum in Pennsylvania likely sent several; and 22 additional alumni from Norwich University, for a total of 56, served in the Confederate military (Poirier, 1999; Cowley & Guinzburg, 2002). Building on the work of Allardice and Green with an additional 26 military schools in the South, as well as West Point, the United States Naval Academy and other
northern schools almost 1,700 additional alumni are added for a total of 13,700 men from military schools serving for the Southern cause.

This contribution greatly increased the effectiveness of the Confederate war machine. Examples include the collective contribution of military school alumni to the population of Confederate staff officers, critical for planning and administration of the army. More than 15% were military school alumni, with the most from Virginia Military Institute, followed by West Point, the Citadel, and Georgia Military Institute (Krick, 2003). The representation within the field-grade officer ranks are another indicator of the military schools impact on Confederate leadership. In the Army of Northern Virginia, 285 of 1,965, or 14.5%, of the field-grade officers were products of military schools. These included 156 from Virginia Military Institute, 73 West Pointers, 37 from the Citadel, 14 from Georgia Military Institute, four from the Naval Academy, and one from La Grange Military Academy. This does not include the “qualified junior officers and noncommissioned officers” that military schools provided (McMurry, 1989, p. 99).

Military schools contributions to the Northern war effort. Very little has been written about contributions of military schools to the Union efforts apart from West Point and Norwich University. This is despite the fact that there were 54 military schools functioning between 1802 and 1860 in Union states. Additionally, there were 15 military schools established, or schools transitioned to a military format, during the Civil War in Union States.

Cunliffe (1973) addresses the question of the lack of literature on military schools in the North. First, the popularity of military schools in the South has been assumed to be equally as strong after the Civil War as before. Secondly, Cunliffe asserts the following:
Military academies have come to be regarded as a feature of the South, or rather of the idea of the South. They have hence been regarded as not-Northern, and have no significance attached to them. The men at VMI have been highly visible in the eyes of posterity; those in cadet gray at Mount Pleasant, New York or Highland Military Academy in Worcester, Massachusetts or Hamden, Connecticut have been well-nigh invisible. (p. 353)

The biggest difference between Confederate and Union military schools was that the Union States never adopted state sponsorship. The Confederacy had a series of schools such as Virginia Military Institute, the Citadel, Georgia Military Academy, and others that were supported with state funds, either wholly or partially, and had cadets attending as “State Cadets” with paid tuition. The Union states saw the federal government as fulfilling the needs of military training. Despite this, Norwich University, a private military college providing 705 alumni to the Union war effort, was far from alone (Poirier, 1999). The alumni of the two federal military academies provided the Union about 1,336 men, with 936 from West Point and 400 from the United States Naval Academy (Cowley & Guinzburg, 2002). West Point provided at least 228 generals of the 583 general officers of the Union Army (Warner, 1992). Norwich contributions included at least 12 generals, 27 colonels, 24 lieutenant colonels, and 15 majors.

Other military schools in the Union States included Russell Military Academy, which numbered 130 to 160 cadets and contributed 100 officers and likely an additional 50 enlisted soldiers. Highland Military Academy in Massachusetts contributed at least 50 alumni including one lieutenant colonel, one major, three captains, and a lieutenant. The school had 84 cadets in 1862, and likely operated with slightly fewer numbers prior to hostilities. After the school converted to a military format in 1856 and prior to 1863, an estimated number of 150 cadets were matriculated.
Mount Pleasant Military Academy in New York operated as a military school starting in 1845, and its cadet enrollment is estimated to have been 75 a year. Their contribution to the military manpower of Union forces was close to 425. Churchill Military Academy in New York was another well-respected military school. Both General Robert E. Lee and Union General William Sherman’s letters reflected a high opinion of this institution. Established in 1841, this school likely contributed 525 Union officers and soldiers, among them was Brigadier General John B. McIntosh. Another school of significant size was the American Classical and Military Lyceum in Philadelphia with an enrollment as high as 150. The school only operated from 1828 to 1835 and counted General George Meade, Commander at Gettysburg, among its contributions to the Union war effort.

With General Meade at Gettysburg was Joshua Chamberlain, Colonel of the 20th Maine Infantry at Little Round Top. Chamberlain’s association with Bowden College is well known, as is his post-war governorship of the State of Maine. Less known is that he attended Whiting’s Military and Classical School, which had operated under a West Point graduate from 1841 to 1847 in Maine. Another alumnus of this school was General James G. Blunt. Collins (2005) believes Blunt’s attendance could account for his battlefield success. “He could well have been one of the few from Kansas who had any military education when the war broke out. At the very least, Blunt knew the basics of drill, military formations and disciplined marching” (p.16). Prior to 1893, Kansas had no military schools.

Other schools with smaller cadet enrollments included Alexandria Institute with 30; Jarvis Military Academy in Connecticut, 33; Everest Military Academy in
Connecticut with 65; Starr’s Military Institute in New York with 37; Delaware Military Academy, 83; Peekskill Military Academy in New York with 85; and based on post-war enrollment figures, Yonkers Collegiate and Military Institute in New York with 40 (Weston Historical Society, 2011; Blake, 1888; Moll, 1954). In all, there were 49 military schools functioning in the northern states, three in the midwest, and one in the west.

Joining these military schools would be men from the border states’ military schools, and the South’s military schools that supported the Union military. Examples of the latter include 13 Virginia Military Institute alumni who served with the Union Army (Miller, 1996). Kentucky Military Institute’s contribution to Union military manpower has not been determined, but at least two Union generals were alumni (Warner, 1992). The resulting 4,800 military school alumni provided the Union with a much smaller cadre for their military forces; it was significant and too often forgotten.
Chapter 7: The United States Naval Academy and Maritime Academies

The first steps which led to the establishment of the United States Naval Academy, took place during the final years of congressional consideration for the establishment of a national military academy. In 1800, two years prior to the establishment of the United States Military Academy at West Point, Alexander Hamilton recommended that Secretary of War James McHenry include a provision for a School of the Navy in future national military academy plans. But as previously noted, the academy at West Point focused on the needs of the Engineer and Artillery Corps of the Army, and no naval component was included in the building plan (Marshall, 1862).

Despite this, in 1808, the Superintendent of West Point, General Jonathan Williams, recommended expansion of the school to include teaching "nautical astronomy, geography and navigation" (Marshall, 1862, p. 14). His intention was for West Point to serve both the needs of the Army as well as the Navy. This did not come to pass, although according to Marshall's (1862) History of the United States Naval Academy, during the War of 1812 "many of the cadets of the Military Academy were commissioned as midshipmen in the Navy" (p. 14).

Much of the long, slow progress towards establishing a national naval academy may have come from the traditions of the British naval midshipmen and the lack of a naval academy on the part of the allied French. The American Navy faced the British Navy in the Revolution, which was officered by men who were often schooled aboard ship as midshipmen. These young men prepared themselves for examination in their sixth year of service in seamanship and navigation in order to advance to the grade of mate. Although the Portsmouth Naval Academy (renamed the Royal Naval College in 1806)
was established in 1729 in England, only a portion of the British midshipmen studied its two-year curriculum before going to sea. Many midshipmen learned their skills while serving aboard ship and were mentored and taught by officers and crew. The allied French Navy did not establish their naval schools at Brest and Toulon until 1810 (Soley, 1880).

Prior to 1811, there were no military schools with a naval orientation in the United States. The first evidence of a movement in that direction came with the establishment of nautical subject courses. In 1798, Stephen Decatur's family hired Talbot Hamilton to tutor him in navigation prior to his appointment as a midshipman (MacKenzie, 1846). Decatur went on to become the Navy's youngest captain and hero of the Barbary Wars. Similarly, James Lawrence, a famous naval hero remembered for his dying declaration, “Don't give up the ship” in the War of 1812, was schooled in 1796, by either Samuel Webster or John Griscom (also spelled Griscomb) in navigation and naval tactics prior to his appointment (Benjamin, 1900; Prowell, 1886). In 1798, Philadelphia merchant and ship owner, John Coulter, sent his apprentice, Uriah Levy, to school for navigation and seamanship. He attended school for seven to nine months between 1807 and 1808. This school was most likely run by Talbot Hamilton in the Lower Dublin area of Philadelphia. Talbot Hamilton was identified as Scottish or English, and a former officer of the British Navy. Uriah Levy rose to become a Commodore in the United States Navy, the first Jewish officer, and was credited with ending the practice of flogging (American Jewish Historical Society, 2004). There is no documentation that these schools operated by Hamilton, Webster, or Griscom functioned as military schools with a uniformed student body.
Navigating toward a United States Naval Academy

Around the same time, the United States Navy Secretary, Robert Smith, ordered Navy Presbyterian Chaplain Robert Thompson to organize a course at Washington Navy Yard. The school was voluntary and addressed mathematics and navigation from 1802 to 1804 (Leeman, 2010). During this period, an event far from Washington spurred the desire to establish officer education. On October 31, 1803, the *USS Philadelphia* and its 307-man crew were captured by Barbary pirates (January, 2009). While in captivity in Tripoli, the U.S. midshipmen studied in preparation for qualifying exams (Leeman, 2010).

The Washington Naval Yard course ended in 1804, with Chaplain Thompson’s departure for sea duty. Upon his return in 1806, the course resumed, and in 1808 Chaplain Thompson traveled to New York and Norfolk to continue teaching. Beginning in 1811, an “informal academy” began operation at the Washington Navy Yard and had midshipmen assigned to the school. This was the first military school in the United States with a documented naval orientation, and mathematics, navigation, and astronomy were taught to midshipmen. One of the midshipmen was Josiah Tattnall who later rose to captain in the Confederate Navy (Naval Historical Center, 2001). Due to the onset of the War of 1812, the Washington Navy Yard was closed. A wartime course was conducted on Lake Ontario in New York for midshipmen and junior officers.

In 1813, a congressional act authorized the Navy to employ naval schoolmasters (Marshall, 1862). This act likely influenced Admiral William Bainbridge to establish what has been referred to as the first naval school in December 1815 at the Boston Navy Yard (Winsor, 1881). “His classroom was ship board; which was hands on training, and
the students excelled or they were requested to leave” (Williams, 2010, p. 332).

Bainbridge was said to have been an excellent teacher and the Secretary of the Navy hoped he would impact the Navy’s need for promising officers. It is unclear how long instruction continued, but by June 1815, Bainbridge and the crew of the Independence were well focused on the problems of Algiers (Williams, 2010).

The authorization of schoolmasters for the Navy helped open additional naval schools in New York as early as 1827 and in Norfolk, Virginia, in 1828. The naval school in New York received assigned midshipmen until 1844. Between 1841 and 1844, they were aboard the *USS North Carolina*. One of those midshipmen, Stephen B. Luce, would play a key role in the expansion of the military school format to a merchant fleet focus (Speelman, 2001). The Norfolk Naval School received midshipmen until as late as 1837.

Beyond the United States Navy, another naval military school was operating between 1828 and 1831 on the Brig Clio, near Nantucket, Massachusetts. The school was a product of a financial investment by British Admiral Sir Isaac Coffin and was intended to serve his former nation and American members of the Coffin family. Coffin was born in Boston in 1759 and rose to admiral in the British Navy. His personal instruction for the school leaves little doubt that it was structured to be conducted as a naval military school (Amory, 1886). The school was administered first by Lieutenant Alexander B. Pinkham who was on loan from the United States Navy. The school transitioned to shore and a nonmilitary format in 1831 due to the costs associated with supporting the ship’s operation. Before the school went to shore, it did visit Nova Scotia on cruise (Uhl, 1983).

The establishment of a central and more permanent naval academy was championed by a series of Secretaries of the Navy, Williams Jones in 1814, Samuel
Southard in 1824, and A. P. Upshur in 1841. Southard’s efforts were supported by President John Quincy Adams in 1827. But it was not until 1838 that a significant step towards a permanent naval academy was gained with the opening of the Philadelphia Naval Asylum and Academy. Apparently Philadelphia was suggested by Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy, some 28 years prior. Initially the school had an enrollment of 22 to 34 midshipmen, a curriculum of one year, and was conducted in a wing of what was a home for aged sailors. With the ascension of Professor William Chauvenet as head of instruction at the school, the course of study was extended to two years, with the content and quality of the course improving through the additions of maritime law lectures, navigation, ordnance, and gunnery (Benjamin, 1900).

The next major event in the voyage towards the establishment of the United States Naval Academy occurred far from a Philadelphia classroom or the United States Congress. It occurred at sea on the USS Somers, a brig-of-war vessel sailing from the West Indies to New York. Among the crew was Midshipman Philip Spencer who had not benefited from the education at the Philadelphia Naval Asylum and Academy. Spencer had a checkered academic career that included failing grades from Geneva College and Union College. At Union College, he established their chapter of the Chi Psi Fraternity. The young Spencer was the son of the Secretary of War, who convinced his son after a stay on a whaler ship that he should become a gentleman by way of becoming a midshipman in the Navy (Filbert & Kaufman, 1998).

Spencer’s career as a midshipman was worse than his academic endeavors and would end with his execution at sea. The young man served aboard several other ships and had a record of drunkenness. He had a fascination with piracy and apparently made a
list of potential conspirators to take over the ship. The captain and officers believed he was the ringleader of a potential mutiny to take over the ship and kill the officers, despite "evidence ...to this effect, was at best, slim" (Filbert & Kaufman, 1998, p. 9). But he and two seamen were hanged at sea on December 1, 1842, resulting in a naval leadership and public reaction that became another catalyst for professionalization of naval officer corps through the establishment of a naval academy (Filbert & Kaufman, 1998).

In 1844 the Navy had 22 professors: 14 at sea, two in Boston, one in New York, two in Norfolk, three in Philadelphia, and three on special service. George Bancroft became Secretary of the Navy in 1845 and concluded that this arrangement of education was "one of scattering schools, diffusing responsibility, and barren of good results" (Halstead, 1899, p. 101). Secretary Bancroft requested that the Board of Examiners, who reviewed midshipmen for qualification for promotion, assist "in maturing a more efficient system of instruction for the young naval officers" (Halstead, 1899, p. 101).

As early as 1826, the Maryland House of Delegates had lobbied Congress for a naval school in Annapolis. In October 1845, their long-term desire came to pass as Fort Severn was transferred to the Department of the Navy. Secretary Bancroft received the recommendation from a committee of naval commanders that Annapolis was a suitable location for a naval school. Accordingly, an academic staff was organized to include Commander Franklin Buchanan as superintendent, Lieutenant James H. Ward as executive officer and instructor of gunnery and steam, six other instructors including Professor William Chauvenet, and two others from the Philadelphia Naval Asylum and Academy (Halstead, 1899).
Despite the midshipmen tradition and naval focus, the school was not without the influence of the military schools that were flourishing in the United States at this time. A. P. Upshur, the secretary of the navy, in his desire for a naval academy, made no attempt to hide his envy of "the advantages which the Army has derived from the Academy at West Point ... proof that a similar institution for the Navy would produce like results" (Southern Literary Messenger, 1850, p. 521). Lieutenant James H. Ward served as the executive officer for two years of the newly formed Naval Academy in a duty that would later be called Commandant of Midshipmen (Halstead, 1899; Benjamin, 1900).

Lieutenant Ward was a graduate of Norwich University, class of 1823, and his influence would remain for years through the use of his *The Manual of Naval Tactics* as well as his lectures on naval ordnance and gunnery (Ellis, 1911).

Another influential faculty member was Professor Henry Hays Lockwood. He came from the Philadelphia Naval Asylum and Academy as a professor of natural philosophy and astronomy. He was an 1836 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point and a former artillery officer. His service at the United States Naval Academy spanned from 1847–1861 and 1865–1871 (Johnson & Brown, 1904).

Much to the dislike of 50 midshipmen, the academy opened on October 10, 1845, with the addition of drill and cannon crew practice to the nautical curriculum (Benjamin, 1900).

The United States Naval Academy and its alumni would also influence the expansion of the military school concept. The first expansion was the wartime establishment of the Confederate Naval Academy. In 1862 the Confederate Congress authorized the existing United States law addressing the Navy to apply to the southern
states. The Confederate Secretary of the Navy recommended a Naval Academy in February 1862. The academy was organized by William Harwar Parker to mirror the United States Naval Academy. Lieutenant Parker was an 1848 Naval Academy graduate and had served as a professor of mathematics, professor of navigation and astronomy, and instructor of seamanship and naval tactics from 1853–1857. He was appointed superintendent and served as such until the end of the Civil War. His commandant of midshipmen was Lieutenant Wilburn B. Hall who was the Naval Academy’s top graduate in 1859. The school began operation in July 1863, aboard the CSS Patrick Henry while it was anchored at the Richmond, Virginia waterfront, although the official opening of the Academy was on October 10, 1863, when it docked at Drewry’s Bluff on the James River. During the operation of the school, 124 midshipmen from 14 states were assigned to the academy. Enrollment usually numbered about 60, and their ages ranged from 14 to 17 years (Campbell, 1998). The wartime operations of the school, until the school was disbanded on May 2, 1865, were addressed in Chapter VI.

The United States Naval Academy’s reputation, along with their alumni, influenced the format and creation of 29 colleges, junior colleges, and preparatory military schools to include several that have stood the test of time and continue to operate successfully today. The accounting below provides their dates of operation as military schools with * signifying a transition rather than opening or closing. These schools with a naval theme are listed in Table 2.
Table 2

*Military Schools with a Naval Theme*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates of Operation</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863–1865</td>
<td>Confederate Naval Academy</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880–1891</td>
<td>Maryland Military and Naval Academy</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888–1995</td>
<td>Northwestern Military and Naval Academy</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905–1912</td>
<td>Lakeside Classical Institute</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910–present</td>
<td>Army and Navy Academy</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913–1920</td>
<td>Florida Military and Naval Academy</td>
<td>Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Riverside Military Academy (Riverside Military and Naval Academy)</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915–1916</td>
<td>Silver Lake Military and Naval Academy</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916–1940s</td>
<td>Talbor Academy</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Army and Navy Academy</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919–1924</td>
<td>Carolina Naval-Military Academy</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920–1941</td>
<td>Carson Military and Naval Institute</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932–1994</td>
<td>Admiral Farragut Academy</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933–1977</td>
<td>Elsimore Naval and Military School</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935–1939</td>
<td>New Jersey Naval Academy</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935–1937</td>
<td>Stonehurst Military &amp; Naval Academy</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937–1953</td>
<td>Puget Sound Naval Academy (Hill Naval Academy),</td>
<td>Washington</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stephen B. Luce and the Maritime Military Academy Movement

Stephen B. Luce, United States Naval Academy, Class of 1848, would eventually become the Father of the Maritime Military Academy Movement through his writing, lobbying, and leadership. He was born in 1827 in Albany, New York. At the age of six, he and his family moved to Washington, DC, where his father was employed as a clerk for the Treasury Department. Based on family tradition, at the age of 14, Stephen and his father visited Zachary Taylor at the White House and secured an appointment for Stephen as a midshipman in the United States Navy (Hattendorf, 1997).

His first assignment was at the U.S. Naval School, New York, aboard the USS North Carolina. The USS North Carolina served as a Navy school from 1841–1844 and
Midshipman Luce spent his first six months as a midshipman aboard. For the next six years he was at sea, first with the Frigate *USS Congress* and then with the *USS Columbus*. After nearly six years at sea he returned to join the second class at the United States Naval Academy (Hattendorf, 1997).

From April 1848 to August 1849, Midshipmen Luce attended classes and studied for his qualifying exam to become a “passed midshipmen.” Unfortunately for him, his pride in his service and the new United States Naval Academy cost him dearly. The Secretary of the Navy authorized the Naval Academy to have its midshipmen participate in the inauguration events of President Zachary Taylor. For reasons unknown, the superintendent of the Naval Academy at the time, Captain Upshur, did not approve of the action. The midshipmen’s reaction was “ringing bells, blowing loudly on horns and discharging guns” and in general, demonstrating their displeasure in a very unmilitary manner (Inkster, 1965, p. 175). The resulting punishment pushed Midshipmen Luce back 72 places on the promotion list and delayed his promotion from passed midshipmen to lieutenant by six years (Hattendorf, 1997). This was an unexpected end to the academy experience by a man who should have been considered the Father of the Maritime Academy movement.

After his graduation in 1849, Luce went to sea again aboard the *USS Vandalia*. Serving as a passed midshipman, he spent his off-duty hours in the pursuit of a self-taught liberal education. His journal reveals that among the texts he read were Milton’s *Paradise Lost*, Dickens’ *Old Curiosity Shop*, Shakespeare, Grote’s *History of Greece*, the *Bible* and Bible scholars, William Falconer, the Sailor Poet, Lord Byron, Theodor Mommsen, and James Fenimore Cooper. The *USS Vandalia* assignment was followed by
another duty that increased his professional knowledge. He served aboard several survey ships on the Atlantic Coast and then on the USS Jamestown, which included a voyage to the Central American coast. As a result of the assignment, he gained extensive additional exposure to astronomy, oceanography, cartography, and hydrography during his latter sea assignment (Hattendorf, 1997).

The depth and girth of his academic and nautical experience made him the perfect individual to return to the Naval Academy even though he left under less than stellar circumstances. From 1860 to 1861, he served as assistant commandant, followed by head of the seamanship department beginning in 1863, and commandant of midshipmen from 1865 until 1869. During that time he revised Lieutenant Parker’s book, (superintendent, Confederate Naval Academy) Instruction for Naval Artillery, but more importantly, he authored Seamanship, which was a practical guide for the nautical skills. With the end of the Civil War, Luce shifted his focus from the Naval Academy to the professionalization of the Navy and the Merchant Marines. He is best known for his efforts with the 1873 establishment of the United States Naval Institute and the Institute’s publication, Proceeding. Luce is also credited with the establishment of the United States Navy War College in 1885 (Speelman, 2001).

With regard to the Merchant Marine, Luce should also have been considered the most influential figure in the Maritime Military Academy movement. His shifting of attention beyond the Navy was incumbent on three events: the Newfoundland collision of 1854, the Mississippi River sinking of 1865, and the Georgia Hurricane sinking of 1866. The first was the nautical disaster of September 27, 1854, when the luxury vessel Arctic and the French ship Vesta collided off the coast of Newfoundland, resulting in the loss of
322 lives (Baehre, 1999). The collision was a point discussed by the Baltimore Board of Trade in February 1855. This event, like the execution of Midshipman Spencer, inspired the creation of a school to prepare young men to be better able seamen. The school was outside the federal government’s purview in the city of Baltimore (Runyun, 1987).

In 1856, the Board purchased the *USS Ontario*, a retired U.S. Navy vessel, to be their school ship. On September 14, 1857, classes started with just eight students. Uniforms were designated with a blue cap, roundabout, and trousers for winter and white for summer” (DeBow, 1859, p. 41). Students were selected to perform officer of the day duties; reading, writing, grammar, geography, algebra, geometry, navigation, and seaman duties were all part of instruction (DeBow, 1859). Enrollment grew to 139 students in 1858, and to 243 by 1860. Unfortunately, by 1865 daily attendance dropped to just five students and the school closed. The decline appears to have been the result of the Civil War’s effect on Baltimore, changing from a “commercial to an industrial city” (Runyun, 1987, p. 246).

This school was a foreshadowing of future events that would be prompted by the influence of Stephen B. Luce. The same year as the closure of the Baltimore School Ship, the Riverboat Sultana on the Mississippi River sank. The cause was a boiler explosion that took 1,500 lives, many of whom were recently freed Union prisoners of war on the way to Illinois after the Battle of Vicksburg (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).

The following year, in 1866, the steamer *Evening Star* sank after encountering a hurricane off the coast of Georgia. The resulting melee between passenger and crew cost 230 lives (Speelman, 2001). In 1874, Luce probably alluded to this very incident when he wrote that
the increasing number of marine disasters, the demoralization, becoming so
general on board our merchant vessels . . . all indicate that we can no longer
disregard with impunity the examples of other maritime countries in providing
technical education for those employed in mercantile service” (Luce, 1874, p. 34).

The same year as the Evening Star disaster in 1866, Luce wrote his article,
Nautical Schools, in the *Army and Navy Journal*. His work described the advantages of a
system of maritime education as established by Great Britain. In 1869, the Congressional
appointment of the Select Committee, which generated the *Lynch Report*, pointed out that
the British shipmaster must “pass a rather rigid examination before a board of examiners .
. . receive a certification from them . . . [and] for any misconduct or incompetency as
master, this certificate maybe suspended or taken from him” (U.S. Congress, 1870, p. 220). The national concern for the decline of the United States maritime capability was
reported in Congressional hearings and the publications of the *Lynch Report, Causes of
the Reduction of American Tonnage and Decline of Navigation Interests* in 1870, and in
the *Nimmo Report, Report to the Secretary of the Treasury: Practical Workings of our
Relations of Maritime Reciprocity* in 1871. Both reports identified Britain as the principal
competitor to United States maritime interests. The *Lynch Report* said that the American
sea captain was a combination of merchant and seaman, whereas the British counterpart
was a professional seaman who was certified and held to a higher level of competence by
a certification, examination, and strict enforcement of standards (U.S. Congress, 1870).
The *Nimmo Report* placed the focus on the need for “upbuilding of our merchant marine .
. . [in order] to protect it against British competition” (Nimmo, 1871, p. 220).

While events continued to illustrate the maritime unpreparedness, the Revenue
Cutter Service, had a minimal formal training program for its officers. In 1808, Captain
Hopley Yeaton added four young men to his Cutter New Hampshire, “so he could train them as seamen, navigators and pilots” (King, 1996, p. 154). Captain Alexander V. Fraser, between 1848 and 1849, ran an 11-month school for untrained politically appointed officers aboard his ship as duties allowed (King, 1996; Burhoe, 2010). In 1848 and 1849, Captain Alexander V. Fraser ran his Cutter Lawrence like a training ship. He identified “incompetent junior officers” who could not handle the heavy storms and required them to study and take examinations in surveying, law, seamanship, and navigation (King, 1996).

In 1869, the Revenue Cutter Service got its wake-up call for officer education when a commission was appointed to examine abuses in the officer commissioning system and discharged 39 officers as disqualified (Nicholls, 1896). At the time, there were only 200 commissioned officers, and almost 20% of the service’s officers were considered unfit. A report to Congress, dated May 26, 1870, noted that during the Civil War, officers of questionable character and professional competence had been commissioned. The report fell short of creating an academy, but regulations were reformed to require physical and professional examinations (King, 1996). The Chief of Revenue Marine Division, Department of the Treasury, Sumner I. Kimball, who had oversight of the Revenue Cutter Service, further reformed the prerequisites for officers. With the support of Chief of Instruction, George W. Moore, Superintendent of Construction, James H. Merryman, and Captain John Henrigues, Kimball influenced Congress to approve a school of officer instruction resulting in congressional approval in 1876 (King, 1996).
The Revenue Cutter School of Instruction opened in 1876 with eight cadets in New Bedford, Massachusetts, serving aboard the Cutter Dobbins. Captain John Henrigues served as the captain, superintendent, and principal instructor. He was assisted by two civilian instructors: Edwin Emery, a graduate of Bowdoin College was wounded in the Civil War, where he served as a soldier, color sergeant, and lieutenant in the 17th Maine Infantry. Emery was the main academic instructor, having taught school and served as principal (Ross, 1886). Charles E. Emery, who held an honorary Ph.D. from University of New York, was a consultant to the Revenue Service, designer of many of their cutters' engines, and guest lecturer for engineering instruction. He was a Civil War veteran, having served first as a soldier and later in the Union Navy as an assistant engineer, where he saw action with the Union blockade (American Institute of Mining Engineers, 1890).

The first class of eight cadets reported to the training ship, the Cutter Dobbins, and sailed out of Baltimore in October, arriving at their new station, New Bedford, Massachusetts in 1876. The academy would close from 1890 to 1894 when the government decided the United States Naval Academy could provide services for officers of the Cutter Service. After four years, the school reopened at New Bedford and operated until 1900 when the academy’s second training ship, the Cutter Chase, docked at Arundel Cove, Maryland. In 1910, the school moved permanently to New London, Connecticut and in 1915 was renamed the United States Coast Guard Academy (Burhoe, 2011).

Amid the increasing concerns of the United States, Luce published his article, The Manning of our Navy and Mercantile Marine, in 1874. Voicing the need for the education of naval officers and the philosophy of the means to that end, he said the model
naval officer should be highly cultured and carefully trained. The training he described, in keeping with his experience at the Naval Academy, was in step with the military school movement of the United States as addressing the “whole man, the body, the mind and the heart” (Speelman, 2001, p. 23).

His article condemned the failure of Congress to include a maritime component to the Morrill Land Grant Act, stating that the legislative halls had “not a single representative voice . . . in behalf of the Navy” (Luce, 1874, p. 28). Luce praised the legislatures of New York and Massachusetts for their passage of acts in support of maritime education. By this time, Luce was fully involved with the New York efforts to establish a maritime educational facility.

In April, the New York legislators passed *An act to authorize the Board of Education for the City and County of New York to establish a nautical school*. By August, the committee of the Board of Education charged with that task asked Luce to draft a bill for the United States Congress in support of their efforts. Luce’s efforts became House Bill 1347, sponsored by Congressmen Henry L. Dawes and Benjamin F. Butler, both of Massachusetts (Speelman, 2001). The draft called for a wide range of actions to include a system of certification of competency for masters and mates, service requirements for maritime school graduates, a national school certification and inspection, and the loan of naval ships and officers for instructional purposes to state schools (Luce, 1874). Unfortunately, the bill was watered down and passed with only an authorization for the Navy to loan ships and officers. Among those Luce had lobbied for further action were Secretary of the Navy George M. Robeson; Charles Sumner (Republican, Massachusetts); Zachariah Chandler (Republican, Michigan); William A.
Wheeler (Republican, New York); Benjamin F. Butler (Republican, Massachusetts); Boards of Commerce and Education in eastern seaports; and the President of the General Boards of U.S. Trade (Speelman, 2001).

Although the legislation that passed called for schools in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, and San Francisco, a systematic education system for maritime officers was not put into effect. Only New York carried through with actions to establish a maritime state academy. Luce was deeply involved in the establishment of several maritime military colleges, four of which still exist. The New York Merchant Marine Academy was established in 1874. Luce’s *The Young Seaman’s Manual* was published in 1875, becoming one of its principal texts. Luce would assist in the selection, outfitting, and coordination of the Academy’s delivery of the school’s first training vessel, the *St. Mary*. He further influenced the curriculum through his book by stressing lifesaving skills and drills and through his association with the school’s first superintendent, Commander Robert L. Phythain, a graduate of the Naval Academy who had worked with Luce in the 1860s at the academy (Speelman, 2001).

As the New York Merchant Marine Academy grew, Luce took command of the *USS Minnesota*. This ship, along with the *USS Saratoga, USS Pensacola, USS Monongahela, USS Supply*, and *USS Juniata*, all became training ships for boys as young as 15 years. From 1875 through 1877, the number of enrollees grew from 260 to 479, of which 258 boys were passed to the ranks of the regular enlisted Navy. This helped Luce and the Navy with concerns about the large number of foreign-born sailors; boys entering the Maritime Academy were required to be American born (Dickinson, 1884; Secretary
of the Navy, 1877). The short duration and scope of the program made it more of a seagoing transition training course than a military school, mimicking Annapolis.

With direct help from Luce, the New York Nautical School became the model for those maritime academies that would follow during the next 67 years. The administration of the school recognized their potential and stated in their 1876 Annual Report that “should this experiment be successful, the cities of Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore and San Francisco will, no doubt, follow the example of New York, and establish schools of their own” (Speelman, 2001, p. 34). Unfortunately, San Francisco, which obtained the training ship *USS Jamestown* in 1876, repeated the mistakes in Massachusetts, rather than emulating the New York Nautical School approach. In 1860, the Massachusetts State Reform School opened the Rigger *Rockall* (later renamed *Massachusetts*) in Boston, and in 1867, the Rigger *George M. Barnard*, in New Bedford, to operate as floating reform schools. The goal of the school was to teach the maritime trade to minors who had committed petty crimes. The system failed in 1872 due to the cost and lack of graduates (Speelman, 2001). Likewise, the Board of Education in San Francisco diverted from their original plan prepared by Lieutenant Commander Henry Glass, United States Naval Academy, Class of 1863. The initial class of students included male inmates of the Industrial School, a juvenile reform program (Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1878).

Commander Glass, the ship’s superintendent and captain, was immediately hampered by his new recruits and his ship gained “the appearance of a reformatory which deterred many parents from applying for the benefits . . . because of contaminating influences exerted by these wayward boys” (Chamber of Commerce of San Francisco,
Glass’s conduct and management was attacked amid student applications for discharge from the school. In February 1879, the ship was returned to the Navy, ending the San Francisco experiment and fittingly returned its students to the San Francisco Industrial School (Chamber of Commerce of San Francisco, 1892). The ship’s captain, Henry Glass, went back to the fleet and had a distinguished career, retiring in 1903 as an admiral (Stewart, 2009).

It took another 10 years before the Pennsylvania Nautical School was established in 1889. The school rightfully adopted New York’s model and experience (Speelman, 2001). This also set the pattern of future maritime academies as post-secondary, two-year, and later four-year college institutions. The Pennsylvania Nautical School president was Charles Lawrence, who had a long association with the merchant-marine industry rather than the Navy. He started as a sail maker before the Civil War and served in the Union Navy using his civilian skills. After the war, he became involved in politics and served on the Board of School Directors for Philadelphia Commons, was a member of the Vessel Owners and Captains’ Association, and was master of the Philadelphia port. In his latter role, he lobbied for the establishment of the school (Speelman, 2001). He was assisted by Commander Francis M. Green, United States Navy, who served as a training ship captain from 1889 to 1893 (Brown, 1900).

Both the New York and Pennsylvania schools relied on the traditional sail ship to provide a platform for the schools, with the New York Nautical School having the USS St. Mary, and the Pennsylvania Nautical School receiving support from the USS Saratoga. The seagoing classrooms from New York between 1877 and 1888 traveled to Lisbon, Portugal, Cádiz, Gibraltar, Tangiers, Cherbourg, Southampton in Britain, and
Queenstown, Ireland. The Pennsylvania school traveled to Europe, South America, and the West Indies as well (Speelman, 2001).

In 1891, the momentum of the merchant marine education was regenerated because of two events: the passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1891, which provided subsidies for American-owned and built vessels officered by Americans; and the establishment of the Massachusetts Nautical Training School. This school elevated the Merchant Marine Academy movement to a new level. Where the New York and Pennsylvania schools remained loyal to the sail ship as the vehicle for educating future officers, the Massachusetts school adopted a more modern, less traditional curriculum, educational philosophy, and training vessel, the bark-rigged steam gunboat Enterprise (Speelman, 2001).

The school’s first superintendent not only had a naval background, he had also been a merchant marine. Commander John F. Merry was a Merchant Marine first officer in 1862, when he was appointed an ensign in the Union Navy. He was a wounded veteran of the Civil War and served on a Navy ship with duties in the China Sea, Mediterranean, and Arctic Ocean, as well as the Great Lakes, prior to taking charge of the school. He remained at the school until December 1895 and later rose to the rank of admiral (Cutter, 1908).

With more modern vessels than the other two nautical schools, the Massachusetts Nautical Training School successfully blended academic and engineering courses with the seamanship curriculum. The other schools would follow suit as they, too, adopted vessels that were more modern. The Pennsylvania Nautical School acquired the *USS Adams*, a wooden bark-rigged steam gunboat. The New York Nautical School acquired
the *USS Newport*, a bark-rigged steam gunboat they used between 1907 and 1908. It was at this time that both the states of Washington and California contacted the New York Nautical School with interest in establishing their own programs (Speelman, 2001).

As interest grew in the Pacific states, the state of Pennsylvania closed their school in 1913, despite the loud protests of the alumni. A few years later, the dire need for a strong merchant marine program was demonstrated during World War I and would result in a third wave of nautical military schools. The Washington State Nautical School opened in 1917, the Pennsylvania State Nautical School was reestablished in 1919, and 12 years later in 1929, the California State Nautical School opened.

Upon reestablishment of the Pennsylvania State Nautical School, its operation was placed directly under the state rather than Philadelphia authorities. The school was firmly reestablished in the military school format with school regulations stating the following:

> [Student conduct will be] governed, as far as practicable, by the United States Naval Regulations and customs . . . . Formations shall be by classes and will be conducted in a military manner . . . . The rules for military etiquette on board ship are founded on custom and tradition, and their strict observance forms an important factor in the maintenance of discipline. (Speelman, 2001, pp. 118–119)

The Washington State Nautical School was patterned after the military schools of New York and Massachusetts, with a strict military conduct, two-year curriculum, and the training ship Vicksburg. However, what appeared to have been a successful model was closed in 1920 (Speelman, 2001). The justification for closure is not well documented, but the cost of ship operation was an issue with state legislatures.

According to the congressional testimony of the superintendent of the New York Nautical
School in 1921, the Washington Nautical School did not have the record of graduate success needed to continue operating the program (U.S. Congress, 1922).

The opening of the California State Nautical School in 1929, provided another step in the modernization of the Maritime Military Academy movement. The California School applied a different approach to its curriculum than the other schools. The school conducted classes and housed cadets ashore, with the first class of 56 cadets taking residence in barracks on a 50-acre compound at an old coaling station in California City (Tiburon) in March 1931. But because of lack of state funding, by the time the first class had graduated, the cadets were back on ship for both classes and housing. For the next 11 years, the school would be threatened with termination due to funding shortfalls, and cadets remained in the “Iron Mother,” as they called their home on the training ship California. It was not until 1943 that the school and the cadets resumed shore academic activities and occupied barracks at a new location, Morrow Cove (Peterson, 2004).

The curriculum at the California State Nautical School was expanded to three years. This allowed the academics to be broadened to address subjects such as meteorology, communications, ship construction, cargo handling, ship medicine, physics, and electrical engineering (Speelman, 2001). The extension of the curriculum would become part of the next wave of improvement in the expanding maritime academy movement.

The next maritime academy may have opened in Virginia if not for congressional opposition. In 1935, the State of Virginia proposed that a maritime academy be established and receive federal funds. Schuyler O. Bland helped kill the idea due to what he felt was the absurdity of its association with a “school up in the mountains” (De la
Pedraja Toman, 1994, p. 582). Congressman Bland from Virginia was a William and Mary graduate and was very influential in maritime affairs (De la Pedraja Toman, 1994). He saw little connection between maritime education and the military colleges of Virginia Tech or VMI nestled in the mountains of Virginia hundreds of miles from the ocean.

Going back as far as 1895, there had been suggestions for the establishment of a national maritime academy on par with West Point and Annapolis. Several publications voiced this opinion in 1913, as did a member of Pennsylvania Nautical School’s board of directors, Joseph C. Gabriel (Speelman, 2001). The 20th century saw a new champion emerge for the development of another movement towards a national maritime school. The maritime academy movement’s momentum would increase with the advent of World War II and result in a national academy.

Between 1929 and 1934, Richard R. McNulty, Massachusetts Nautical School class of 1919, wrote articles in the *Marine Journal, Naval Institute Proceedings*, and the *Nautical Gazette* endorsing merchant marine officer training. His concept, unlike those of Stephen B. Luce’s, depicted a national academy located at New London, Connecticut, replacing not only the state maritime academies, but also sending the Coast Guard cadets to the Naval Academy. McNulty’s proposals made him several enemies in the maritime academies, the Coast Guard, and the International Seamen Union. The state maritime academies did not like the idea of their schools being closed in favor of a federal institution, and the Coast Guard had no desire for their academy to be absorbed into the Navy’s. McNulty also was a supporter of existing maritime curriculum, with education primarily ashore augmented by training at sea. The union protested this concept, which
would devalue their members’ experience. Their position was that “the only acceptable training for merchant marine personnel was experience at sea” (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).

At the National Conference on Merchant Marine in 1930, McNulty found some allies. The chair of the Committee on the Training of Officer Personnel, Admiral Hutchinson Cone, sent out questionnaires to leaders of government, commerce, shipping labor, and education, and 6,500 were returned. These responses indorsed his proposal three to one to replace the state maritime academies with a national academy. In a 1932 article in *Naval Institute Proceedings*, McNulty gained another ally, superintendent of the New York Maritime Academy, Captain James H. Tomb (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).

Amid McNulty’s series of articles, the liner *SS Moro Castle* sank in 1934, due to crew negligence when a fire was not brought under control. Adding to the tragedy, members of the crew filled the lifeboats and 134 died including 91 passengers. Only months later, the *SS Mohawk* collided with the Norwegian freighter *Talisman* with more loss of life and accusations of crew incompetence. But in this case, the captain and all but one of his crew went down with the ship (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).

The Merchant Marine Act, passed by Congress in 1936, included two significant elements that would take the country a step closer to establishing a national merchant marine academy. The first was introduced by the Director of the Shipping Board, J. C. Peacock, to “establish a Merchant Marine Academy for the training of citizens of the U.S. as officers for service on vessels . . . of the United States” (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008, p. 46). The second significant element was the establishment of the Maritime Commission.
The Commission's personnel division, under the leadership of Rear Admiral Telfair Knight, took on the task of establishing a Merchant Marine Academy. Knight added Richard R. McNulty to his staff. The first concrete step in founding the United States Merchant Marine Academy was the establishment of the Merchant Marine Cadet Corps by order of the Maritime Commission in 1938 (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008). The sequence of accepting the cadets before having a facility for a military school was rather strange. As a result, the program for the cadets was not a maritime military school at all but a reflection of the pre-1838 idea of midshipmen receiving their education at sea at the hands of a ship master. The requirement for merchant vessels to carry cadets based on tonnage was a two-edged sword. It provided training opportunities but also brought unwanted employees on board.

McNulty took time during this period of development to uncover the problems associated with the shipmaster's disinterest in providing a true training opportunity, and he discovered cases of downright abuse of cadets by shipmasters and crew. In one case, union members assaulted an unwelcome cadet on the SS Laura without reprimand of the perpetrators. On some ships, cadets were isolated and union crew refused to work alongside them. There were sufficient examples of failure on the sea that McNulty pushed ahead with the shore establishment of the academy (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).

In October 1939, the Maritime Commission defined a four-year course for cadets and directed that shore educational facilities be established in New York, New Orleans, and San Francisco. The three maritime military schools became institutions looking for a home. Harold V. Nenery, Massachusetts Nautical School Class of 1925, and the California Nautical School facilitated the San Francisco Maritime Military School's first
home in the fall of 1939 aboard the California Nautical School’s training ship, the *SS California State*. The California Nautical School was the first of the maritime academies to establish shore facilities. Six months later, they moved to the Navy barracks ship, *SS Delta King*, and a few months later, the *SS Delta Queen*. Finally, in January 1942, the school relocated on 20 acres in San Mateo Point, north of San Francisco (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).

The New Orleans and New York schools had more success. Although the New Orleans District had no maritime academy to help them, they set up classes in the spring of 1940, at the Biloxi, Mississippi Coast Guard Station. In February 1941, the New Orleans District’s cadets moved into the Algiers Navy Yard (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008). Sixty years later, in 2011, this became the location of the public charter secondary school, the New Orleans Military Maritime Academy. Unfortunately, by November 1941 the New Orleans District Maritime School was forced to leave again. Quick action by McNulty placed them aboard a 120-foot houseboat, North Star, which by chance sought safety from a storm in Pass Christian (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).

Pass Christian, Mississippi, was no stranger to military schools. The Mississippi Military Academy operated in that location from 1852 to 1861, the Mississippi Military Institute moved there from Aberdeen, Mississippi, in 1876, and functioned there until 1887. The cadets of the North Star moored their boat beside the Hotel Inn by the Sea to avoid a storm and learned the hotel was for sale. It was not long until the spacious hotel provided an excellent location for the school (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).

The New York District Maritime School had the fewest problems, as their first shore facility was initially located at the New York Maritime Academy. They were
welcomed by Admiral Tome, the New York superintendent and longtime supporter of the national maritime academy concept. The New York contingent was split due to growth, with one group moving into quarters at the Admiral Billard Academy in New London, Connecticut (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008). The Admiral Billard Academy was a nautical military school that had opened in 1936 and would operate as a secondary school until 1953, with a focus on preparing young men for entrance into the Coast Guard Academy.

Nutley was actively searching for a place to consolidate the New York District facilities and depart the dual-location operation. In early December, 1941 the Walter P. Chrysler estate on Kings Point went up for sale. This estate was the model for East Egg in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s *The Great Gatsby*. In the last week of January 1942, the cadets of the United States Merchant Marine Academy housed at Fort Schuyler along side of the cadets of the New York Nautical School rowed in “monomoys” (long wooden rowboats) to their new home at Kings Point. When the facility was dedicated in September 1943, Admiral Tomb, US Naval Academy Class of 1899, was the first superintendent and in formation were 2,500 cadets organized into three battalions and 18 companies (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).

Admiral Tomb was a beloved figure at both the Merchant Marine Academy and at New York Nautical School where he had been superintendent since 1927. He served the United States Merchant Marine Academy long enough to see the academies establish strong foundations; in retirement, he continued to worked on behalf of the schools. Tomb was followed by Captain Giles Stedman, known as the “Clark Gable of the Seas” for his multiple daring sea rescues of stricken vessels. Although he was not the product of a nautical military school, he served in the Navy twice and captained some of the nation’s
most prestigious ships including the SS America, flagship of the U.S. Lines (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).

Among these men, the four initial pillars of the academy were established: the Kings Point Campus, the Naval Reserve status of midshipmen, the sea-going requirement for graduation, and the regimental system. The latter was in large part Stedman’s accomplishment while he served under Admiral Tomb as commandant of cadets. Stedman was a tough disciplinarian and by August 1942, under his guidance, cadets took the responsibilities of cadet officers and petty officers; the military school established a demerit system; and 24-hour watch stations were established (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).

Weeks prior to the initial occupation of Kings Point, the maritime curriculum changed to meet the demands of the war. The four-year curriculum gave way to a program of 12 weeks’ basic instruction at any one of the three locations--Kings Point, Pass Christian, or San Mateo Point--followed by six months on a merchant vessel, and then 36 months at Kings Point. This schedule of three years, 10 months, remained until 1943, when it was modified to six months of basic instruction at any of the three locations, six months aboard ship, and 24 months at Kings Point. The strength of the Cadet Corps, including those serving aboard ship, was 7,000 in 1944, but was down to 4,391 by July 1945 (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008).

In 1945, the academy superintendent Giles Stedman decided to return to his sea career and turn over the superintendent’s position to Rear Admiral Richard McNulty, who would be known as the Father of the United States Merchant Marine Academy. For such a well-deserved title, his two-year term had an “abrupt and ugly” end reminiscent of
the Alden Partridge end at West Point. According to Cruikshank and Kline (2008), McNulty was a visionary, intelligent advocate who avoided the limelight and political demands of the superintendent position. He was a shy man who had even missed the 1943 dedication at Kings Point, likely to avoid the praise that would have been given to him. McNulty’s lack of assertiveness resulted in Admiral Telfair Knight removing him from the academy to a much lesser staff position after just two years. Knight was the man who had encouraged him to take the position and called him the “guiding force” behind the academy’s establishment.

The United States Merchant Marine Academy would end the satellite facilities one by one with the last to close, Pass Christian in 1950. McNulty remained a bitter man and did not set foot on Kings Point for 22 years, until 1976 when the Alumni Association named him “Father of the Academy.” Four years later, McNulty died knowing his contributions were celebrated and appreciated (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008). After World War II, the enrollment of the academy ranged from 650 to 1,050. In 2010 there were 964 cadets enrolled.

While the United States Merchant Marine Academy was firming up their establishment, a sister institution was on its last leg. In 1940, the Pennsylvania Nautical School’s administration came under the auspices of the United States Merchant Marine Commission. As a result, the school was renamed the Pennsylvania Maritime Academy, and in 1942 the faculty and cadets transferred to the United States Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point. Pennsylvania resumed administration that September, when the training ship Seneca (renaming it Keystone State) was returned for state use. Facilities were open at Morrisville, Pennsylvania, to provide shore support. Like the United States
Merchant Marine Academy, the school was oriented to two tracks: deck cadets and engineering cadets (Independence Seaport Museum, 2006).

After the war, plans were made to increase the curriculum from two years to three years and to include two cruises. Unfortunately, the state budget review came to the legislature’s attention at the same time as allegations of poor management. Further hurting the school were inaccurate reports from the *New York Times* claiming “mutinous behavior” during a cruise. The school had already been closed twice in its history. The fact that the mutinous behavior claim was proven false after an investigation (*New York Times*, 1946, December 25) did not prevent the removal of funding and closure of the program in June 1947. The United States Merchant Marine Academy “welcomed all cadets who wanted to transfer and received a major infusion of faculty talent” (Cruikshank & Kline, 2008, p. 120).

On October 9, 1941, just two months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States into World War II, the state of Maine opened the Maine Maritime Academy with an initial 28 Cadets and an 18-month curriculum. By 1945, at the war’s end, 384 men had graduated and served at sea. After the war, the curriculum was expanded to three years and then four years (Maine Maritime Academy, 2011). In 2010, enrollment was 932 cadets.

The most recent maritime academy was established in 1962, 88 years after the founding of the first, the New York Maritime Academy. Efforts to start a maritime academy in Texas started in 1920, when the Assistant Secretary of State of Texas made three different attempts to get a bill passed in the state legislature to establish a Texas Nautical School. All of these attempts failed (Speelman, 2001). In the 1950s, Rear
Admiral Sherman Wetmore was researching the possibility of establishing a maritime academy in Galveston when he discovered a bill that was passed in 1931 establishing a charter for a nautical school but no action had taken place. In 1959, the charter came back to life and the state legislature authorized some minimal funding to support it (Dawson, 2011).

The Texas Maritime Academy was initially part of an expansion of Texas A&M, and the Texas Maritime Academy cadets came directly from the corps of cadets of Texas A&M. In 1962, the corps of cadets at Texas A&M assigned 27 cadets destined as the cadre of the Maritime Academy to Company I, 3rd Brigade, a cadet company with leadership oriented toward the United States Marine Corps. The Marine Company was an idea of the maritime academy's future superintendent who wanted the best-trained and motivated cadets for his school. The superintendent, Captain Bennett M. Dodson, had a long association with the maritime academy movement, having been the commanding officer of the United States Merchant Maritime Academy's Pass Christian cadet training facility. After that, Dodson became the superintendent of the Pennsylvania Maritime Academy and, following the closure of PMA, became the executive officer at the California Maritime Academy (Curley, 2005).

The 20 sophomore cadets in the Texas A&M uniform and a small faculty moved to the Galveston campus in 1963. There they were joined by 35 freshmen and the small organization became the corps of midshipmen of the Texas Maritime Academy (Curley, 2005). The academy maintained a close tie to Texas A&M and its Corps at College Station for many years. The maritime institution grew to become Texas A&M at
Galveston, and the Texas Merchant Marine Academy, functioned as the Texas A&M at Galveston's corps of cadets. There were 300 midshipmen in 2010.

In Texas, the maritime academy movement met and blended well with the military origins of Texas A&M. Texas A&M University formation was heavily influenced by Virginia Military Institute graduates. These graduates had been schooled by Francis Smith, who had studied with Sylvanus Thayer at West Point. West Point is an institution closely associated with Alden Partridge. The 1969 opening of the Great Lakes Maritime Academy in Michigan as a civilian institution did not sway the remaining maritime academies from the Stephen B. Luce model of a maritime academy based on a military school format.

The maritime academies had created a historical pattern of close association and cooperation. Examples in the 1940s include the New York Maritime Academy's housing of the United States Maritime Academy and the integration of cadets and faculty of Pennsylvania Maritime Academy into the United States Merchant Marine Academy when the former school closed. That pattern continued with the Texas Maritime Academy's first two cruises being conducted aboard the Empire State IV, New York Merchant Marine Academy's training vessel, and the State of Maine II, Maine Maritime Academy's vessel (Curley, 2011).
Chapter 8: The Lost Cause and General Expansion of an Educational Format

The tradition of military schools has most frequently been attributed to the Southern United States. The image of the Virginia Military Institute and The South Carolina Military Academy (The Citadel), as well as the cadets' participation in combat in the Civil War, contributed to that impression. The attraction of military education in the South has been attributed to military tradition, defense of slavery, and the appeal of the post-Civil War's Lost Cause interpretation in southern culture and education.

Between the end of the Civil War and 1898, there was a shift in the origins of the establishment of military schools. Up until the beginning of the Civil War in 1861, a total of 311 military schools had been established, with Partridge and Norwich alumni associated with the establishment of at least 23, West Point Alumni 22, Francis Smith efforts and the alumni of the Virginia Military Institute 27, and the Citadel alumni six. With an alumnus from Virginia Literary, Scientific and Military Academy who established the Franklin Military Institute in Kentucky, a total of 78 military schools established through 1861 are documented to have been established by alumni of military schools. This does not account in any way for the many teachers from military schools that staffed the newly established military schools and helped pattern them after the school traditions they knew. By the Civil War, Partridge, Thayer, and Smith had created institutions that served as models for educational institutions, and were a source of teachers particularly at the secondary level, in both the North and South. In VMI's initial 15 years, 54% of its graduates became teachers, and Norwich University listed 74 of its alumni as military school teachers prior to the Class of 1910 (Green, 2008; Ellis, 1911).
Indications are that many of West Point’s and the Citadel’s alumni also went into education. These were likely military school movement multipliers as well.

Up until the Civil War, the military format in education was significantly influenced by men who had experience with the military in an educational format. Starting after the Civil War and up to the 20th century, that pattern shifted. Men whose military experience was not in an educational setting but in the ranks of the Confederate and Union Armies became founders of many schools. The military school format was further embraced by men with no military background as both a successful business and educational vehicle.

Former Confederate soldiers and educators in the South were influenced toward the military school format through the positive image of the Civil War military service and the heroic image of southern Confederate leadership. Also associated with the Lost Cause was the manner in which the South enacted the Morrill Land Grant Acts of 1862 and 1890. This created multiple college-level military schools exclusively in the South. Finally, the various religious institutions had begun to adopt the military school format as early as 1832 and integrate it into their particular denomination’s educational goals. A modest 15 denominationally associated military schools were established prior to the Civil War. By 1898, the denominational contribution to the military school movement had reached 77 schools, and 142 military schools associated with religious denominations had been established by 2011.
The Lost Cause

Centric to the Lost Cause was the “firm connection in the minds of southerners between the martial virtues (courage, patriotism, selflessness and loyalty) and moral rectitude” (Andrews, 2001, p. 47). A symbol of those virtues is embodied on Stone Mountain outside Atlanta Georgia. The rock face mountain contains the largest bas-relief sculpture in the world. Depicted on a surface of 12,000 square meters are three mounted heroes of the Confederate lost cause: General Robert E. Lee, General Thomas "Stonewall’ Jackson and the Confederate President Jeff Davis.

These men particularly and many other Confederate military figures to a lesser extent were connected to Southern military schools. General Lee was educated at West Point, and had served as that school’s superintendent. General Stonewall Jackson likewise had been educated at West Point and served on the faculty at Virginia Military Institute. Finally, the Confederate President was also a West Point graduate. These men particularly Lee and Jackson were sainted in the South as the perfection of southern manhood.

James Morrison (2004) described growing up in Virginia amid the influences of the Lost Cause as contributing to his decision to attend the Virginia Military Institute:

Still subtle influences may have been at work, even though I was unconscious of them. My grandmothers, both of whom I adored, were daughters of Company I, 3rd Virginia Cavalry. To them, the courage and virtue of the soldiers who served in the Army of Northern Virginia were without parallel in human history, a conviction fully shared by my Great-Grandmother Morrison, the widow of a member of Company A, 12th Virginia Infantry. These ladies, along with parents, teachers, and other older people, instilled in me the belief that the aged Confederate veterans who occasionally could be seen tottering along the streets of Petersburg deserved special attention and respect. (p. 3)
Likewise, Harry Temple and his brother from Petersburg were bound for the corps of cadets at Virginia Tech. Harry spoke of his childhood memories of walking the Petersburg Battlefield with a former Confederate battery commander in his gray overcoat recounting the memory of the bloody battle. He was well versed on the part his ancestors' played in Virginia and North Carolina regiments in the Civil War, and one of their muskets hung from the wall as a constant reminder.

In Virginia Tech's second year, 1873, the literary society adopted the name of the Lee Literary Society. In doing so they stated:

We can only endeavor to emulate him [Robert E. Lee]. He was far too above us for us to hope to be like him, but if our aspirations are high and noble, we can accomplish much. Although we may not leave behind us the record which others have done, if we have endeavored to maintain the spotless reputation borne by our beloved leader, we shall have been worthy of the name Lee" (Temple, 1996, p. 66).

The Richmond dedications of the Jackson Monument in 1875, Lee Monument in 1887, and the Soldier and Sailors Monument in 1894 all reflected the central place that the Lost Cause, especially of General Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson, had for the South and its military schools. The 1875 event drew 40,000 people at Capital Square and the parade and ceremony included both VMI and Virginia Tech's corps of cadets along with Confederate veterans. The 1887 and 1894 events were attended by both the Corps of Cadets of VMI and Virginia Tech having traveled by train from their Virginia campuses in the mountains. The 1894 event had an estimated 100,000 people in attendance and a representation of 10 cadets and several officers from The Citadel (Temple, 1996).

Southern educators were said to have embraced the "traits of manly bearing, courage, loyalty, patriotism and morally correct behavior" encouraged by the military
school format (Andrew, 2001, p. 2). Between the end of the Civil War and 1897, 108 military schools were established in the South. These joined the 39 southern schools that reopened in a military school format after the war. Their cadets dressed in gray often served in annual parades and monument dedications as echoes of a valiant past.

The Lost Cause resulted in a union of religious and military virtues. Preachers commonly used the southern military leaders like Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson as examples of Christian virtue (Andrew, 2001). The military school movement and school ethos blended perfectly with the moral goals of the Lost Cause. These schools demanded moral behavior, lived by codes of obedience, and maintained their cadets as much as possible in an environment free from alcohol, the immoral distraction of the period. This is not to mention the strong religious character of many nonsectarian military schools in the requirement of church attendance.

Civilian educators who saw schools’ transition to military format in the South included Edwin P. Cater, an Oglethorpe University graduate, who in 1881 oversaw the transformation of East Florida Seminary to a military school. The college later evolved into University of Florida after 22 years as a military college. C. H. McKeen, a Washington and Lee College graduate, founded Elmington Military and Classical School in Virginia in 1872. Archibald Campbell, a Hampden-Sidney graduate, founded Wytheville Military Academy in Virginia in 1881.

But perhaps the best example of an educator of the Lost Cause influencing the establishment of southern military schools did not actually found one himself. James DeRuyter Blackwell, graduate of Randolph-Macon College and Dickinson College, joined the faculty of Bethel Academy in Virginia. Blackwell was a Confederate veteran
and poet who had among his poetic works *The Dead Drummer Boy, Our Native Land,* and *Forget not the Dead* (Blackwell, 1879). He convinced the founder of the academy, Major Albert G. Smith, a hero of Pickett’s Charge and postwar graduate of University of Virginia, to transition to a military format in 1869, and the school operated as such until it closed in 1911 (Toler, 1996).

**Morrill Land Grant Act**

Justin Smith Morrill, a congressional representative from Vermont from 1855–1867 and senator from 1867–1898, authored the Morrill Land Grant Act which became law in 1862 (U.S. Congress, 2011). Despite the fact that Morrill lived in Stafford, just 19 miles from Norwich, a relationship between him and Alden Partridge has never really been documented. In fact, Morrill was a Wig and Partridge a Democrat, so the two would not have been political allies. But between 1862 and 1863, Morrill was a member of the Board of Trustees of Norwich University (Ellis, 1911). Having been a short distance from Norwich University and becoming a member of the board of that military institution so quickly after passage of the act, suggests there must have been influence there with Partridge’s citizen-solider concept and the idea of military academies supporting the state militias.

The Morrill Act’s goal was to help fund the establishment of colleges under the oversight of the state legislatures, which would address the need for practical education of the industrial classes in agriculture and engineering. The importance of the act for this study was that it specified the teaching of military tactics (National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, 2008). The act did not dictate the manner in which
military tactics would be incorporated into the colleges, so different states and regions approached this in very different ways.

By 1890, 39 states had used federal funding under the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 (Webb, 1958). The act influenced the establishment or transition of 11 military colleges, of which four were still in operation as military schools in 2011. Between 1872 and 1914, two military colleges became associated with the Land Grant Act, six military colleges were established, and eight others converted to military while associated with the act. With the exception of two schools transitioned in the 20th century in the Western United States, all these schools were in the South. No college in the northern United States became a military school under the Morrill Land Grant Act, although military training was an element of most Land Grant Colleges to varying degrees.

In 1872, the first three military schools under the Morrill Land Grant Act were the Virginia Agriculture and Mechanical College, Agricultural and Mechanical College of Alabama, and Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute in Virginia. Hampton Institute was established in 1868, brought under the Morrill Act in 1870, and transitioned to military format around 1872. This African American, American Indian college, known today as Hampton University, will be further addressed later. Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College followed four years later in 1876 and would become Texas A&M. The Virginia Agricultural and Mechanical College, which became better known as Virginia Tech, and Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College, now Texas A&M, have maintained their military school status to this day. The stories of Virginia Tech and Texas A&M describe the changes and influences required of Morrill Land Grant Act military schools to have survived the many social changes over time. Established in 1872
and 1876 respectively, both were located in rural areas, and their leadership involved former Confederate officers and VMI graduates.

Virginia Tech’s military program almost ended a few years after the establishment of the college. The president was Charles Landon Carter Minor, a University of Virginia graduate, who had served as a Confederate staff officer in the Civil War. The professor of engineering and commandant of cadets was Brigadier General James H. Lane, VMI Class of 1854, a University of Virginia graduate who had served on the faculties of two military schools prior to the war, Armstrong Military and Classical Academy in Virginia and Hillsborro Military Academy in North Carolina.

Very different educational philosophies collided on March 23, 1877. The president led a faction of the faculty that desired a classical civilian college and General Lane naturally desired a military college. A faculty meeting fistfight resulted in both being charged with disturbing the peace. The incident was widely reported in the state newspapers and as a result, Minor left Virginia Tech. The Board of Visitors issued a statement strongly supporting the military character of the school (Temple, 1996). General Lane left the following year and took a teaching position at Auburn University. His establishment of the corps’s high standards endeared him as the Father of the Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets. However, General Lane’s altercation with Charles Minor would serve as a foreshadowing of future conflicts between the military and a future college president.

Both Virginia Tech and Texas A&M would, at the end of their first 25 years, enter periods under very popular presidents who fully supported both the military nature of the schools and evolution of the institutions toward expanded educational
opportunities. The first of the popular figures at Virginia Tech was John M. McBryde, who was president from 1891–1907 and considered the Father of Virginia Tech. He was a graduate and former president of University of South Carolina, a lawyer, and longtime professor of agriculture. Although he did not have experience with a military school, he had left the University of Virginia and fought in the Civil War as a soldier with the 1st South Carolina Infantry until struck by typhus (Temple, 1996).

The second president in the building of the military college was Julian Burruss, Virginia Tech Class of 1894, who as a cadet had been the commander of the college's elite artillery battery. After graduation, he taught at Speers-Lanford Military Institute, Searcy Female Institute, and was principal of a public school. His postgraduate work included a master's degree from Columbia and a Ph.D. from University of Chicago, magna cum laude. Prior to starting a 26-year term (1919–1945) as president of Virginia Tech, he had been president at a college that became James Madison University (Temple, 1998). He successfully integrated women as civilian students on campus. He reduced the mandatory participation in the corps of cadets to two years while at the same time endorsing the higher discipline, which helped build higher discipline and higher esprit de corps among the cadets. He is also credited with increasing the quality of the faculty and expanding the academic opportunities and reputation of the college.

Texas A&M had similar figures, among them Lawrence Sullivan (Sul) Ross served as president from 1891 until his death in 1897. Ross's résumé was impressive as the leader of a military school, despite not being a military school graduate. He was a graduate of Florence Wesleyan in Alabama, lead Indian scouts, served as a captain in the 2nd United States Cavalry, and served in the famous Texas Rangers in the pre-Civil War
period. During the Civil War, he went from private to colonel with the 6th Texas Infantry Regiment, was credited with 135 engagements. He is credited with the capture of 30 Union regimental colors. After the war, he was elected to the Texas Legislature and served two terms as Governor (Adams, 2001).

The second Texas A&M leader of note was Dr. William B. Bizzell, Baylor University graduate, and former president of the college that later became Texas Women’s University. He did not have a military background, but his contributions from 1914 to 1925 were significant with improved scholastics, expanded religious and athletic activities, improved facilities, and a moral and cooperative tone (Adams, 2001).

These men at Virginia Tech and Texas A&M set the stage for cadet corps, which by World War II numbered over 9,000. A significant difference between the two colleges was the manner in which change came to their campuses as they evolved. Texas A&M transitioned to a volunteer corps of cadets in 1963 with a popular and pro-military president, James Rudder, Texas A&M, Class of 1932. Rudder, a former major general and World War II hero of D-Day, was a beloved figure by the alumni and cadets. In its volunteer status, the corps of cadets has thrived through the years and numbered 2,177 cadets in their ranks in 2011. This is as much a reflection on the history of the campus as it is of the very conservative nature of the student body.

On the other hand, President T. Marshall Hahn at Virginia Tech was distrusted and openly disliked by many of the alumni, and likely by the corps of cadets, in his drive for the greater Virginia Tech. His goal was for the military to be reduced to the ROTC program seen at most universities. The reaction of the Virginia Tech alumni stopped him from achieving this goal but not from changing the Cadet Corps to a voluntary option.
starting in 1964. The tone and style of leadership of these two universities as they evolved militarily were very different.

Friendlier administrations would follow at Virginia Tech. First, in 1975 the alumni of the Regimental Band formed the Highty-Tighties Incorporated, under Charles Cornelison, Class of 1967, and in 1992 established the Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets Alumni Association under Henry Dekker, Class of 1944, to insure the preservation of the corps. After many years of low cadet enrollment, these two alumni organizations joined with two successive commandants, Major General Stan Musser and Major General Jerry Allen, to provide a constant, outstanding military leadership through focused leadership training programs. These efforts were backed by a growing endowment devoted to the corps, which helped grow the cadet corps to 949 cadets in 2011, the largest since 1968.

The Agricultural and Mechanical College of Alabama was established in 1856 as the East Alabama Male College in Auburn. Upon its inclusion in the Morrill Act, it changed its name and transitioned to a military school in 1872. It is now better known as Auburn University, a title not officially adopted until 1960. The school maintained its military character for 34 years until 1906. According to the 1901 catalog, the military system provided "good order, promptness and regularity in performance of academic duties" (Andrew, 2001, p. 43). In 1890, 203 of the 234 students were members of the corps of cadets. The cadets were uniformed in cadet gray and equipped with 150 Springfield rifles and two three-inch cannons. Although the corps was reported to have good discipline, this college did not have barracks and cadets lived off campus (Heyl, 1890). The lack of barracks space weakened cadet discipline and adoption of military
requirements and may have been a factor in the end of military school requirements in 1906.

In 1874, the Louisiana State University Agricultural & Mechanical College, formerly known as Louisiana Seminary of Learning and Military Academy, was brought under the Morrill Act. The school was established as a military college in 1860 with Colonel W. T. Sherman, West Point Class of 1840 and future Union general, as its president and Francis Smith, Virginia Military Institute Class of 1856, as commandant and professor of chemistry and mineralogy. The enrollment initially numbered 59 cadets and quickly grew to 80. Sherman departed the campus prior to the outbreak of the Civil War when the state authorities of Louisiana sent confiscated federal property to the academy. The Louisiana State Militia captured the federal arsenal at Baton Rouge and sent captured federal-government property for the college’s use. The war helped close the school in 1863, but it reopened after the war in 1865. By 1869, the enrollment had climbed to 133 cadets when a fire caused the college’s relocation from Alexandria to Baton Rouge. Louisiana, facing a budget crisis, cut funding to support tuition for “State Cadets” in 1873. As a result, the administration had to furlough those who could not pay full tuition and the enrollment dropped to 35 cadets (Ruffin, Jackson, & Hebert, 2006). The demise of the military system was a combination of low enrollment and a merger. Four years later the school merged with the nonmilitary Louisiana State A&M College and the military school was no more.

Another Morrill Land Grant Act college that ended its military status because of a merger with a nonmilitary school was Florida Agricultural College. This college was established in 1884 and transitioned to a military school in 1887. The college was
coeducational with 81 male cadets in 1892. It was said the cadets and faculty had an exceptional spirit of support for the military program. But in 1905, that came to an end when the Florida legislature organized the University of Florida through the merging of the college with the nonmilitary Petersburg Normal and Industrial School, the East Florida Seminary, which had ended its military school aspect in 1903, and the South Florida Military College.

Georgia was the home of three military schools, all established under the Morrill Land Grant Act and considered branches of the University of Georgia. The first was North Georgia Agricultural College (North Georgia College), established as a civilian coed institution and opened in January 1873. From the very early years, military training was conducted but the college remained organized as a civilian institution. The initial faculty included B. Palmer Gaillard as professor of mathematics and military tactics and civil engineering. Enrollment in the initial years was about 95 males and 35 females. The training was so enthusiastically received that the male students petitioned the college president to allow students to wear uniforms. In 1876, the War Department issued the school rifles and equipment to support this training and in 1877 detailed an officer (Kraus, 1978).²

The first three years of the school’s catalogs reflect a desire for a uniformed male student body and a Virginia Military Institute graduate became president in 1877. The military school concept was abandoned in 1877 but with retention of military training for male students. (North Georgia Agricultural College, 1873–1880).

² Part of the 1866 Morrill Land Grant Act was the detailing of active-duty army officers to Land Grant Colleges
In 1904, David C. Barrow, a University of Georgia graduate, became the new college president. He had nothing in his background that would lead one to believe he would convert the school to a full-military format for its male students. The new commandant in 1905 was Captain E. J. Williams who was described as “one of the most valuable officers that the institution has ever had” (Georgia Department of Education, 1906, p. 20). It appears that he designed a plan to provide officers for the Georgia National Guard and was the guiding influence in the school’s conversion. The school now required a system of discipline “military in nature” (North Georgia Agricultural college, 1905, p. 10) where “cadets [wore] uniforms at all times during the school term” (North Georgia Agricultural College, p. 48).

The work of Captain Williams received high praise from the Board of Trustees in 1908 upon his reassignment and the Board stated that the “life of a student at this institution [North Georgia Agricultural College] very closely resembles the life of a cadet at the U.S. Military Academy” (Kraus, 1978, p. 283). Unfortunately, the challenges of cadet discipline became an issue from at least 1913–1921 and as a result, in 1923, Professor Marion D. DuBose rose to the office of president of the college. The Princeton University graduate acted quickly to end “rigid military discipline.” By 1925, the alumni and the student body had mobilized against the president over their displeasure with the new change of direction for the college. First, an alumni resolution condemned the president, and second, a student petition was made to the Board of Trustees to change the president. DuBoise resigned despite a vote of confidence from the board, expressing his sentiments:
The citizens of Dahlonega desire a strict military college here. I do not approve of strict military training in an institution of college rank. Under conditions as they now exist, I do not feel that I care to remain at the head of this college. (Kraus, 1978, p. 294)

The next year, North Georgia College resumed its military college character and has retained it since, with a corps of cadets of over 700 in 2011.

The South Georgia Military and Agricultural College in Thomasville was established in 1878, a few years after North Georgia College. Officially, this school, as well as North Georgia, was a branch of the University of Georgia. Enrollment in 1885 was 85 students (Appleton, 1886). The school had a military character from the outset but, like North Georgia, was coeducational. Unlike North Georgia, South Georgia was considered a preparatory school for the University of Georgia, enabling entrance as a college freshman or sophomore there (Jones, 1889). The small military school operated until at least 1911, but was likely overshadowed by the success of North Georgia.

The final of the three Georgia land grant military schools, Middle Georgia Military & Agriculture College, opened in Milledgeville in 1880. Until 1893, the school was another feeder school for the University of Georgia. Cadets wore gray wool uniforms and female civilian students were dressed in blue or white dresses as prescribed by the college. Among the influences of the early college was the second commandant, Richard Tyler Crawford, a Citadel graduate, and Confederate General D. H. Hill, West Point, Class of 1841, who was president from 1886–1889. Barracks were not provided for cadets until 1884 (Simpson, 2008). Enrollment in 1885 was an impressive 407 cadets (Mayes, 1899). In 1900, the school was renamed Georgia Military College, and in 1931, a military junior college was added. In 1934, the school became all male and remained as
such till 1969 (Simpson, 2008). By 2010, the college had evolved with a coeducational military junior college of approximately 250 cadets and a military program of 7th–12th graders numbering 500.

The Mississippi Agricultural and Mechanical College opened in 1880 with former Confederate General Thomas D. Lee, West Point Class of 1854, as president. The school’s initial regulations were taken from Alabama Military Institute. General Lee was associated with the college, which became known as Mississippi State University, for 19 years as president and another nine years as a member of the board. The disciplinary concept at the outset of the college was to “furnish the machinery of discipline” (Kraus, 1978, p. 90).

The school from the outset appeared to have addressed the military program not as a character or leadership-development tool, but as a means to discipline the challenging student body. Reflecting on the 1902–1903 school year, the second president of the college, John C. Hardy, voiced concern about the school gaining a reputation of a place to send “bad boys” and went as far as to say “if the state wants a reformatory . . . it must build one” (Kraus, 1978, p. 95). In the first ten years of the college, the average enrollment was 314 students, with 1,832 students having attended, only 104 graduated (Mayes, 1899). Up until 1908, the percentage of returning students was never more than 45% (Mississippi Agricultural and Mechanical College, 1909). The military system was not fully supported by barracks space, with only 660 of 847 cadets housed in 1899 (Mayes, 1899). The dismal record of academic success there suggests a low level of cadet esprit de corps and bonding with the institution and their military organization. This is further reflected in the general state of discipline over the college’s first 20 years.
Kraus (1978) emphasized that the military system at the college was inconsistent, with the military department frequently undermined by the faculty. The military department set policies, such as uniform regulations and attendance to formations, while members of the faculty were empowered and active in giving exemptions to individual cadets. This resulted in a situation described in 1912 as "a lack of co-operation between the Heads of the Departments and the Commandant's office [resulting in] great abuse of privilege during the year" (p. 98). The type of privilege abuses included authorizing civilian clothing, class absences, and shirking of military duties.

To complete the picture of the military setting of the college in its first 20 years, a single set of uniforms was required of cadets and expected by policy to be worn at all times on campus. With labor and lab activities required of agriculture cadets the single uniform provided adversely impacted military discipline and uniform standards (Kraus, 1978). The new President J. C. Hardy refused to embrace the strict uniform regulations and the faculty and president had a series of confrontations (Ballard, 2008). With a questionable quality of cadets and a discipline system weakened by faculty interference, grave indications of a lack of traditional military school culture were reflected by acts very contrary to military school ethos. "The average cadet does not as a general rule, have that high sense of duty and justice to make a military system of control successful" (Kraus, 1978, p. 98). Reflective of this were the common practices of lying, theft, and even vandalism. Related to the latter was a telling comment in the 1899 annual report that described the damage from four fires on campus. "In the previous years the college had not a single fire involving any loss. This alone would indicate that the burning was incendiary" (Mississippi Agricultural and Mechanical College, 1899, p. 232).
The beginning of the end of Mississippi Agricultural and Mechanical College as a military school occurred in 1912, when the senior class presented their demands associated with the college vice president's order restricting conversations with the few female students in the school. The petition was presented at chapel and followed by the senior class walking out on the new president, George R. Hightower (Ballard, 2008). Hightower expelled 61 seniors for the walk out and 35 others for misconduct on an athletic trip to Birmingham. Some expelled cadets refused to leave campus and a college-wide strike resulted, with only 325 of 808 students attending class.

Although the dismissals broke the back of the senior revolt and the student strike, the lax military system, for the most part, continued to decay. In 1920, the War Department ended the school's classification as a military college. Ten years later the student newspaper summed up the feeling of the end of the military environment at the college in part saying that the students were finally "granted the privileges of gentlemen . . . and . . . the right to govern themselves" (Kraus, 1978, p. 108). Considering all the school's problems with cadet quality, barracks space, discipline, and uniforms, it is surprising the military school aspect of the college lasted for 30 years. But the principal problem was that the military school ethos was never embraced. Honor, duty, and leadership were not aims of the system; the military was simply a method chosen to control young male farmers. The college went on to evolve into Mississippi State University.

Clemson Agriculture College, which officially became Clemson University in 1964, was established as a military college as part of the Morrill Land Grant Act, opening in 1893 in South Carolina. The school was patterned after the Mississippi Agricultural
and Mechanical College founded 13 years prior, but its military system aim was far greater than just to discipline students. The all-male college cadets lived in barracks, except for a small number of “day cadets” from local families who were required to reside in the barracks at least six months of either freshman or sophomore year. By 1915, the military spirit at Clemson had “developed and nurtured to the best possible extent” (Kraus, 1978, p. 62). Although Kraus (1978) questioned the discipline of the corps at Clemson based on the antics of their senior privates, historically this is common with other military schools, including Virginia Military Institute and Virginia Tech. At the college level, there are many examples of those cadets not promoted beyond cadet private banding together in a fraternal group and trying their best to enjoy their senior year to the maximum extent possible.

The college catalog of 1924–25 stated the purpose of the military system: “Clemson is operated as a military school not for the purpose of making soldiers, but in order that students may learn important life lessons” (Krause, 1978, p. 65). In the 1930s, the cadets were uniformed in West Point style gray, with senior officers in riding boots and Sam Brown Belts. The corps numbered 2,359 in 1940 and peaked in 1942 at 2,364 in the first year of United States involvement in World War II. Clemson military men became well known for their quality of officer in World War II, especially as cavalry and armored officers.

But World War II was actually the catalyst of the end of Clemson as a military school. After World War II, returned veterans and new-student veterans of the conflict changed the makeup of the student body. By 1949, the corps was back to 1,740, but it was only 55% of the student body. According to Kraus (1978), the school dropped its
standards of corps discipline to reflect more of the life of a country gentleman or military fraternity and abandoned the pursuit of life lessons. Despite an enrollment of 1,583 cadets in 1954, the college felt that the changes underway, such as the enrollment of women that year, meant departure from the past, and in September 1954, the corps of cadets became voluntary. In 1955, a college-sponsored management study called for “the college to undergo normal expansion without being hampered by the military program” (Krause, 1978, p. 72). The college opened in September 1955 without the military school requirements. Unlike the reaction of the alumni and cadets of North Georgia College in the 1920s and Virginia Tech in the 1970–1990s, the change did not result in a major backlash.

Two Land Grant colleges ended their adoption of the military school requirements after a short period. One was due to the efforts of the students and the other to the actions of a new president. North Carolina College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts was established in 1889 and transitioned to a military format in 1894. Between that year and 1906, cadets wore gray uniforms, marched to chapel and meals, drilled three hours per week, and conducted periodic field training. But the military system appears to have never been completely embraced by the students. “The senior class of 1906 conducted a strike in the fall of 1905 when the president revoked senior privileges. Petitions followed to adjust all matters pertaining to discipline and liberties” (J. Baker, personal communication, December 16, 2010). The results of these actions united the trustees with the students to endorse military training but “not allow the college to become a military school like Clemson Agricultural College. Nor would they permit the administration to enforce outmoded military codes” (Reagan, 1987, p. 47).
The University of Tennessee’s history goes back as far as 1794, when it was founded as Blount College. In 1875, after being designated a Land Grant college in 1869, the school adopted a military format. The cadets were organized into a regiment, uniformed, required to hold drills and parades, and assigned a commandant. According to Dennis (2001):

The school offered dashing uniforms and taste of confederate military glory to young southerners bred on the lore of Beauregard and Lee . . . . paramilitarization of the campus suggests much about the grip of the lost cause on southern culture in practical terms, military discipline was an effective method for controlling adolescents ill prepared for university studies. (p. 94)

Charles Dabney, who became President of University of Tennessee in 1887, was a Hampden-Sydney graduate, as well as alumni of the University of Virginia and a college in Gottingen, Germany. Dabney was no stranger to the question of military school adoption to secure funding under the Morrill Land Grant Act. He had been a strong faculty supporter in Walter Barnard Hill’s fight as president of University of North Carolina to keep it from becoming another Land Grant military college. Hill’s view was that the Morrill Land Grant was intended to create a balanced approach to liberal arts and industrial training, and not meant to establish military colleges. Dabney backed that point of view with the example of General Robert E. Lee’s post-war leadership at Washington College. He took on the military school structure as being “inconsistent with true university life and work” (Dennis, 2001, p. 94). His elimination of the military aspect was like other Land Grant military colleges but unlike the reaction to change at North Georgia, Texas A&M, and Virginia Tech. An alumni observer noted “we have come to a turning point . . . where it [University of Tennessee] has outgrown the . . . barracks
system of a military academy and we must either give room for expansion or congestion will result” (Dennis, 2001, p. 94).

Eight of the 12 Land Grant military colleges’ military requirements ended in six ways. Two were by means of changes in college leadership, one through the change from traditional military male enrolled student body, two from a lack of instructional support in order to maintain the military ethos, one through the desires of the cadets, one from consolidation or reorganization with nonmilitary colleges, and one may have simply been overshadowed by a more successful military college. Of the remaining four, three continued as military colleges and one evolved into a military junior college.

Grand Army of the Republic

But the historical image of the South as the principal home of the military school calls for a closer examination when faced with the fact that New York state has had 78 military schools in its history and California has had 90. The period between the close of the Civil War and 1898 saw the military school format not only continue to expand in the northern United States but also spread west. During this period, 51 schools were established or transitioned to military format in the North, 33 in the Midwest, and eight schools in the western United States.

The Grand Army of the Republic is a generic term for the Union Army as well as the Union veteran’s organization of the post-Civil War era. It was symbolized by the May 1865 parade, where the Union armies of the East and West conducted their victory parade down Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, DC. The number of Union army veterans numbered close to 1.8 million. Like the Lost Cause of the South, former soldiers in blue
and their legacy impacted the military school movement in the North, Midwest, and Western states.

An example of an educator who returned from military service and incorporated the military into his educational philosophy was Charles Jefferson Wright. Colonel Wright was a Holbart College graduate who served in the 16th New Hampshire Infantry. He was wounded at both Fort Fisher and at the siege of Petersburg and ended the war as a brevet colonel. In 1869, he was first the principal at New York’s Peekskill Military Academy, which had been a military school since 1857. When he took charge of that school there were only seven cadets enrolled (Simberg, 1902). He turned the school around and charted a course that enabled it to operate until 1968. In 1887, Wright left the school after 18 years and founded New York Military Academy with 78 boarding cadets. Enrollment in 1980 was 516 cadets and the school was still functioning with over 100 cadets in 2011 (Rogal, 2009).

In 1894, Wright left New York Military Academy and took over as president of Matawan Military Academy in New Jersey. This was another well-established military school, having been founded in 1836 and transitioned to a military format in 1857. An article in Printer’s Ink, an advertiser’s journal, in 1902 described Wright as a man who could take a school near ruin and resurrect it. “Colonel Wright has been identified with several military schools since he left the service at the close of the Civil War, and has more than once used advertising as a stimulant for run-down establishments” (Simberg, 1902, p. 14).

Colonel Wright had a financial interest in Cayuga Lake Military Academy in New York (Rogal, 2009). He was listed as the point of contact for that school from 1891 to
1896. Churchill Military Academy, founded in 1843, was another school that would fall under the Wright influence. It changed names to St. John's School in 1869 when Rev J. Beckinridge Gibson took over the school. Reverend Beckinridge died in 1899 and enrollment waned quickly. Colonel Wright remodeled the school and advertised from Boston to San Francisco (Simberg, 1902). St. John's School continued operation until 1948.

In 1900, Wright founded the New Jersey Military Academy in Freehold. It appears he maintained a close association with the Matawan Military Academy, as he died in Matawan in 1910 (Hobart College, 1911). Prior to his death, Colonel Wright founded two military schools and was associated with the leadership of three others. New York Military Academy remains his legacy.

Captain Joseph S. Rogers enlisted as a private in the 2nd Maine Infantry and participated in the initial battles of the Civil War, including First Bull Run and the Peninsula Campaign, and received a head wound at Second Manassas, which took him out of service (All Biographies, 2011). He returned home to recover, completed his education at Bucksport Seminary in Bangor, and reenlisted as an officer with the 31st Maine Infantry (Starbuck, 1966). Rogers fought in the final battles of the war, including Petersburg and Appomattox. He received a brevet promotion from captain to major for bravery. In 1877, having stayed in uniform with the regular army after the war, he resigned to found Michigan Military Academy (All Biographies, 2011).

Another example of a returning veteran was Peter De Graff, who was first a principal at several schools before 1868, when he established the DeGraff's Military and Collegiate Institute. DeGraff had been at the Canandaigua Academy of New York before
the war as a teacher for four years and principal from 1857–1861. Enlisting in 1861 in the 33rd New York Infantry Regiment, he fought at the Battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville before mustering out of the army and returning to education (Kirk, 1883).

The DeGraff’s Military and Collegiate Institute started with 25 cadets, and in three years the cadet corps numbered 280 (University of the State of New York, 1887). The school’s stated goal was “to prepare boys to become healthy, intelligent Christian men” (Drew, 1870, p. 282). Cadets wore uniforms patterned after West Point cadets and took academics that were considered “correct preparation for college” (Drew, 1870, p. 282). Other veterans included Wilbur F. Miles, a Binghamton Commercial College graduate, who returned to Deposit, New York, after recovery from wounds while serving with the 13th New York Heavy Artillery to take charge of the Deposit Military Academy (Inter-State Publishing Company, 1882).

Northern Educators

In part, returning Union veterans explains the expanding popularity of military schools outside the southern United States, but the popularity was much wider. The School Journal was a northern-oriented education periodical (New York, Chicago, Boston), which in 1903 described the educational setting for the post-Civil War military school well:

An increasing number of secondary schools are adopting the military system as a medium for supplying in the education of boys that training which cannot be derived from books alone. The important question is, of course, whether or not the soldier’s discipline is an effective means to the desired end. Observation shows the military system, when properly used, fulfills better than any other mode of school discipline, the condition of being to character what study is to mind and exercise to physique. (Little, 1903, p. 204)
This helps explain the adoption of the military school concept by those outside the ranks of veterans. Good examples of this include Henry Harrison Culver, who in 1894, founded Culver Military Academy in Indiana. His background was largely in the stovepipe business, and he was the son of an Ohio farmer. The school stemmed from his desire to provide quality education for young men, and perhaps the school’s format was inspired by a brother’s feeling for his brother, Litellus Culver, who was killed in the Civil War (Roeder, 2004). Henry Culver, as a young man of 15 in 1855, started working with his other brother, Wallace, in St. Louis and remained in that city until 1881. A prominent educator and military school in St Louis could have been a factor which influenced Henry Culver’s future establishment of a military school.

St. Louis had a very influential educator during this period, Edward Wyman. Wyman had conducted Wyman’s English and Classical High School, a military school, from 1843 until 1853. At his second school, City University, which opened in 1861, he organized its cadet enrollment of over 600 into three full companies, known for their uniform appearance and skill at drill under arms. Supported by the school’s drum and fife corps, they marched behind the school colors emblazoned with *Palma non sine Pulverre*, meaning victory not without toil, instead of the United States flag, since many of the young men were attached by birth or sentiment to the southern cause. The school gained much attention not only on parade, but also when Wyman’s loyalty to the Union was questioned. In a gesture of loyalty to their superintendent, all the cadets including those with southern leanings unanimously concurred to parade behind the United States colors,
which afterwards was explained as their “loyalty to and love of Professor Wyman” (Hyde & Conrad, 1899, p. 2258).

Another example of a noted northern educator was Professor Orvon Graff Brown, a graduate of Mount Union College, University of Cincinnati, and University of Denver. He founded Miami Military Institute of Ohio in 1894. His philosophy matched the emerging military school culture as he sought to shape the diverse talents of his cadets in a challenging moral, physical, mental, and social school structure (Rogal, 2009). Brown’s background gives few clues to his selection of a military format. His childhood near Gettysburg Battlefield, or his familiarity with the four military schools operating in Ohio at the time, could have been factors which led him to found his school in a military style. There were two military schools in Cincinnati at the time, the Ohio Military Academy, founded in 1832, and the Ohio Military Academy, founded in 1833.

Two other northern educators who adopted the military school format were Stephen G. Wentworth and John Michael Birch. Wentworth was born in Massachusetts and home schooled. He was a businessperson in Virginia for six years then moved to Missouri, where he was a public administrator in Lafayette, and president of Farmers and later Morrison-Wentworth Banks in Lexington. Upon the death of his son, William, he opened Wentworth Military Academy as a memorial to him (Stevens, 1915). Neither Stephen Wentworth’s education nor occupation gave clues to the reasons for the military nature of his school. Lexington was the site of two Civil War battles. In the graduation address of 1899 at Wentworth, it was stated “Wentworth is a boy’s school and therefore a military school. A boy’s school without the military would be as preposterous as a military school without boys in it” (Little, 1903, p. 204). John Michael Birch, graduate of
Washington and Jefferson College in Pennsylvania, was headmaster at the Linsly School in West Virginia from 1874 to 1881, 1889 to 1890, and 1910 to 1911. In the interims, he was superintendent of public schools in Wheeling, West Virginia, and a diplomat in Japan. He converted the Linsly School to military format in 1887 and enrolled about 114 cadets through the 1890s. Although the school dropped its military school format due to Board of Trustee action in 1907 over alumni protests, the military format was returned when Birch took the school’s leadership again in 1910 (Schramm, 2003). The school continued as a military school until 1979.

One of the most dramatic and least known expansions of the military school format came about through the leadership of Enoch Henry Currier. Currier suffered an injury as a young man causing loss of sight in one eye and health problems, which delayed his education. He became a professor at the New York Institute for the Deaf because of early interests in deaf education through his interactions with Dr. Harvey P. Peet. Currier taught all grades at the institute over a 20-year period and was credited with the 1884 invention of the duplex conical hearing tube. Considered an authority on the subject of defective hearing, he was selected as the principal of the institution in 1883 (Harrison, 1900).

Shortly thereafter, he transitioned the school to become the only deaf military school in history. The deaf cadets were initially organized into three, then four companies, and a cadet band. Male faculty wore army uniforms and Currier functioned militarily as the school’s colonel, the military tactics instructor as the school’s major, and cadets as company officers. The corps were dressed in West Point-style uniforms and
marched to class and meals (Dobyns, 1908). The cadet’s silent drill was heralded from New York to Virginia.

Currier explained this concept:

[The intentions were not] to make soldiers of the boys. That is a matter of secondary importance. We do not even teach them marksmanship. The military drill was introduced because of its gymnastic value and in order to inculcate into the boys the lesson of discipline . . . . They are proud of their proficiency and compliments they have received from army experts. ("Mutes," 1900)

Currie felt the first step in education was obedience and self-control. For that purpose he felt nothing was as effective as a military environment. A further benefit was the military’s part in “character building, the basic principle of all true education, [which] is most advanced when obedience to authority is most implicit” (The Volta Review, 1911, p. 201). The school continued its military format with its cadets until 1952.

**Adoption of the Military School Format by Religious Denominations**

Of the approximately 834 military schools that have operated in The United States from 1802–2011, at least 142, or 17%, have been affiliated with various Christian denominations including the Catholic (48), Episcopal (46), Presbyterian (24), Baptist (9), Methodist (6), and other denominations (9). The association between religion and military school culture goes back to the first two military schools. Under the leadership of Thayer, West Point required weekly church attendance of cadets and “enforcement [of] rules against lying, stealing and other irregular or immoral practices” (Manning, 2003, p. 116).

Norwich University was established with a chaplain on the faculty and, from its earliest days, cadets were required to attend church services on Sundays and encouraged to read the Bible during their leisure hours afterward (Ellis, 1911). The Citadel enforced
church attendance on Sunday from its first year (Thomas, 1893). Through the personal involvement of Francis Smith and local clergy at Virginia Military Institute, religious training became an important feature for cadets (Smith, 1912).

Kraus (1976) reflects on the similarities in military colleges or schools and church-related colleges, with both having a “strong commitment to purpose, values and to tradition” (p. 438). He viewed the military-college culture as expressing the messages of the church college in a modified form. As an example, he cited the Virginia Military Institute’s 1974 planning document, which explained cadet life in terms of “conviction that the development of honor, integrity, a mature sense of values, responsibility, self-respect and physical wellbeing are essential to the development of man’s ability” (p. 439). Norwich University’s Annual Report of 1976 states “the corps is the instrumentality by which a Norwich education develops honor, patriotism, self discipline, respect for constituted authority, character and leadership” (p. 439).

In 1896 Reverend Allan L. Burleson, the first headmaster of West Texas Military Academy (later Texas Military Institute), summarized his view on military schools in his speech in San Antonio on education day: “Military training in the American schools is a great moral agency for good which tends to give us better sons, better neighbors, better citizens” (Burleson, 1896). More than 100 years later in 2002, the president of Randolph-Macon Academy summarized the church military school:

The Church . . . does a masterful job of blending three cultures: military, religion and academic. In all areas, including school literature and chapel services no student would ever have to wonder, ‘Is this a church-related school? In ministry of teaching, the environment reflects the United Methodist Church values. This is a military school, but sees the military as a part of the methodology of enforcing support, and discipline, and to give children structure. (Rogal, 2009, p. 27)
**Episcopal Church.** The Episcopal Church embraced the military format to the greatest extent by far with a total of 46 schools being established as military schools, transitioned or established by Episcopal clergy. In addition to these, other military schools characterized as nondenominational have found they were best supported by the tradition of Episcopal chaplains such as Valley Forge Military Academy and Culver Military Academy. In 1901, the Episcopal Almanac and Parochial List included 59 schools for boys. Of the 59 schools, 18 were military schools, reflecting almost 31% of the boys’ schools (Whittaker, 1901).

The first Episcopal-affiliated school to adopt a military format was that founded by Reverend Charles William Everest. Reverend Everest was the minister of both the Grace Church in Hamden and St. John’s in North Haven, Connecticut (Episcopal Church Diocese of Connecticut, 1847). In 1843, he established a school in Centerville, New Haven County, and completed its seminary building on Main Street in May 1844. The rectory school’s enrollment grew quickly from nine cadets the first year, to 21 at the end of five years, and 65 by 1853 (Blake, 1888).

Gray West Point-style uniforms were adopted from the early days of the school, and later Major James Quinn and Colonel John Arnold acted as military instructors (Blake, 1888). The cadets were armed with lances rather than rifles and were organized as a military company with a cadet captain, lieutenants, sergeants, and corporals. Drill was conducted two to three times weekly and Reverend Everest said he was “surprised to see how much can be done in so short a time by systematic work, and this too not to interfere with the school duties, but aid them” (Smyth, 1856, p. 149). Because of the military trappings, the school was often called Everest Military Academy. For several
years after Reverend Everest's death in 1877, the school operated as the Atlantic Military Institute (Stieger, 1878).

Prior to the Civil War, the Episcopal Church established seven other military schools with two Yale graduates and a West Pointer as founders: Burlington Military Academy) College, Burlington, New York (1846); St. John's Classical and Military School, South Carolina (1856); De Veaux School, Niagara Falls, New York (1857); Starrs Military Institute, New York (later known as Port Chester Commercial, Collegiate, & Military Institute) (1854); Vermont Episcopal Institute, Burlington (1854); and St. Thomas Hall Military Academy, Mississippi (1844).

In addition, two Episcopal schools converted to a military format during this period. St. Timothy Hall Military Academy, Catonsville Maryland (also known as Catonsville Military Institute) was established in 1845 and transitioned to military in 1854, and Highland Military Academy, Worcester, Massachusetts, was established in 1856 and transitioned about a year later. At a time when there was an explosion of military schools in the south, the Episcopal Church was founding them primarily in the northern states. This would continue with two additional military schools established or transitioning in Connecticut and New Jersey during the war, including Cheshire Academy, established in 1794 and transitioned to military in 1862.

Even with those additions, the real cement that brought military format to become a central character of Episcopal schools would emerge after the war through the philosophy of William Augustus Muhlenberg (1796–1877) and the actions of James Lloyd Breck (1818–1876). According to Prehn (2011), Muhlenberg established the standard for Episcopal education. This standard was not military, but it blended with the
concept of a military school well. For example, Mehlenburg felt the education of the time was focused development of “men of letters” (p. 29) and neglected the most important “formation of Christian character” (p. 29). This focus on character was not the only theme blending the military and Mehlenburg’s school concept. In terms of school discipline, Mehlenburg was a reformer and emphasized “moral education [with a] steady and firm system” (p. 19) rather than that found with corporal punishment. Both character and discipline easily translated into the military school with character central and a disciplinary system supported by demerits and associated punishments.

James Lloyd Breck was one of the Muhlenberg school-style crusaders. Prehn (2011) calls him “one of the most inspiring and romantic figures in the entire history of the Episcopal Church” (p. 39). His years working as a missionary with American Indians support this image well. Breck’s writings take the Muhlenberg philosophy a step closer to the military school concept with its “spiritual warfare and Christian knighthood” (pp. 71-72) imagery.

He worked closely with Bishop Henry Benjamin Whipple, the first bishop of Minnesota. They established the Shattuck School in 1858 and Saint Mary’s school for girls. The Shattuck School started military drill in 1866, the same year Beck went to California, and transitioned to a full-military format in 1904. Saint Mary’s became a boy’s military school from 1884–1915. Bishop Whipple also established Saint James as a military school in 1901, and it merged with the Shattuck School in 1964.

The influence of Breck’s philosophy encouraged those schools’ conversion to a military format years after he had gone. But in California, he started a military school in his first years in San Mateo County, St. Augustine Military College in Benicia in 1867. It
joined the nearby St. Matthew’s Military School, founded by Reverend Alfred Lee Brewer in 1865 (St. Matthew Parish, 2010). Reverend Brewer’s cadets, uniformed in West Point-style gray, were organized into two small cadet companies and a 14 cadet band. The school conducted field training for five or six days in May and was equipped with rifles and a Parrott field gun (Hamilton, 1897).

The Episcopal Church would continue some orientation toward military schools well into the 20th century. Prominent among those schools were Racine College in Wisconsin, founded in 1852 and transitioned to military in 1899; Bishop Scott Academy of Oregon, founded in 1852 and transitioned to military in 1887; as well as Sewanee Military Academy in Tennessee, founded in 1868 and transitioned to military in 1908.

The Bishop Scott Academy in Oregon transitioned under the leadership of Dr. J. M. Hill, a Yale graduate. The school received high praise in a survey of military schools of the Pacific Coast:

The academy is more than a preparatory school; for it fits young men for various callings of life ... graduates of this school filling with honor the highest positions of trust and responsibility in the power of corporations or communities. (Hamilton, 1897, p. 478)

Apparently this school prided itself in the degree of responsibility given its cadet officers, as they were “required to assist the faculty in enforcement of rules and regulations, and in so doing a high sense of personal honor and splendid esprit de corps” (Hamilton, 1897, p. 478). This school operated until 1904 and was replaced by the Hill Military Academy, with Dr. Hill again at the helm in 1901. The nonsectarian Hill Military Academy operated very successfully for over 60 years and closed in 1962.
The final two military schools were the S Bar H Ranch School of the Wyoming Episcopal diocese, which converted to a military format in 1938, and the Northwest Military and Naval Academy, a school established in 1888 and procured by the Episcopal Church in 1941 after it had moved from Illinois to Wisconsin. The church in 2011 could boast of no fewer than five prominent, thriving military prep schools: Texas Military Institute (TMI), established in 1893; Saint John’s Military School in Kansas, established 1887; Saint John’s Northwestern Military Academy, Wisconsin established in 1884; Howe Military School in Indiana, transitioned to a military school in 1884; and St. John’s Military School in Kansas, established in 1887.

The Texas Military Institute in San Antonio is a military school that became coeducational in the 1970s. The school evolved into an Episcopal prep school with two student bodies attending the same classes, one military and one civilian. Between 2000 and 2006, the enrollment for cadets grew from 86 to 121. St. John's Northwestern Military Academy in Wisconsin is the consolidation of St. John’s Military Academy, established in 1884, and Northwestern Military and Naval Academy, established in 1888. The two schools combined in 1995 and took the St. John’s Military Academy campus in Delafield, Wisconsin. The school is all male, grades seven through 12. Enrollment has grown considerably in recent years, from 104–120 in the 1990s to 294 in 2010 (Rogal, 2006). Howe Military School in Indiana is a coeducational boarding school with enrollment of around 200. The school has both a high school and grades five through eight. St. John's Military School is a boarding school with grades six through 12 and an enrollment of 193 in 2010.
### Table 3

**Episcopal Military Schools**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opened or *Transition</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>Bordentown Military Institute</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897*</td>
<td>Burlington Military (Academy) College</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887*</td>
<td>Bishop Scott Academy</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>Cambridge Military Academy</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854*</td>
<td>Catonsville Military Institute/St Timothy Hall Military Academy</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862*</td>
<td>Cheshire Military Academy</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>Croton Military Academy</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Harvard Military School (purchased by church 1911)</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>De Veaux School</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>Epworth Military Academy</td>
<td>Iowa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843</td>
<td>Everest Military Academy</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Garden Military Academy</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857*</td>
<td>Highland Military Academy</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907*</td>
<td>Hitchcock Military School/Military Academy</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895*</td>
<td>Howe Military School</td>
<td>Indiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>Jarvis Hall Military</td>
<td>Colorado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898*</td>
<td>Kearney Military Academy</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>Kemper Hall Military Academy</td>
<td>Iowa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>School Name</td>
<td>State</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>Kenyon Military Academy/College Preparatory School</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Midwest Junior School</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>Northwestern Military Academy (Church assumed control 1911)</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891*</td>
<td>Porter Military Academy</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899*</td>
<td>Racine Military School &amp; College</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938*</td>
<td>S Bar H Ranch School for Boys</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>St Alban's School</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>St Augustine Military College</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892*</td>
<td>St. Austin's Military School</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>St Alban's Academy</td>
<td>Kentucky</td>
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<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>St Paul's Military School</td>
<td>New York</td>
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<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>St James Military Academy</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
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<td>1901</td>
<td>St James School</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>Saint John's Military School</td>
<td>Kansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856*</td>
<td>St. John's Classical and Military School</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>St John's Military Academy</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>St John's Military Academy</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879*</td>
<td>St John's Military School</td>
<td>New York</td>
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<tr>
<td>1889*</td>
<td>St John's College</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>St Matthew's Military School</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894*</td>
<td>St Mary's Hall</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Institution Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>St Thomas Hall Military Academy</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904*</td>
<td>Shattuck Hall Military School</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908*</td>
<td>Sewanee Military Academy</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>Starks Military Institute (later known as Port Chester Commercial, Collegiate, &amp; Military Institute)</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>Vermont Episcopal Institute</td>
<td>Vermont</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>Worrall Hall Military Academy</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Catholic Church.** The Catholic Church has contributed 49 military schools to the military school movement since 1847. The church’s association with military schools in the United States was a much slower process in the 19th century than that of the Episcopal Church. This was likely due to the early makeup of the U.S. population, as well as the timing of the surge in immigration of Catholics particularly from Ireland. St. John’s Academy was founded in 1833, in Alexandria, Virginia, when the Catholic education movement in the United States was in its infancy. Mob violence against the Catholics and their associated immigration occurred between 1834 and 1854 in Massachusetts, resulting in the death of a nun and the destruction of a convent and two churches. In 1842, riots also occurred in New York, and in 1844, a Philadelphia riot caused 13 deaths and five Catholic churches were torched (National Catholic Educational Association, 2011; Condon, 1910).

But Alexandria, Virginia, was a cosmopolitan port town with four Methodist churches, three Episcopal churches, two African American churches, a Baptist church, and Quaker congregation. Reverend John Smith, a Jesuit and a “eloquent, whole souled
Irishman" (Hurst, 1991, p. 54) established St. John’s Academy, which functioned until 1841. Whether it was a military school from the start is unclear, although at least two of the school’s alumni served in the Mexican War (Robbins, 1983).

The school was military when it reopened in 1847. That change may have been under the parish’s stewardship of Reverend Joseph M. Finotti, an Italian Jesuit who had studied to be an officer in the Austrian Army. Among his publications were *Diary of a Soldier* (1861), and *The French Zouave* (1863) (Wilson & Fiske, 1888). Or it may have been the school’s principal, Richard L. Carney, who had been a student at the school prior to its closure. Carney expanded the school from seven students to 72 in four years. The extensive curriculum included Greek, Latin, French, and English. Carney’s brother served as mathematics professor (Robbins, 1983). With more than 70 cadets in 1853, the mayor of Alexandria had complaints about the school’s use of the streets, likely for drill. He regretted writing Carney, but this led to the school looking into the purchase of the lot next door for drill (Alexandria Library Special Collection, 1853, Alexandria City records Box 019II).

In 1861, “the cry of battle resounded through the land . . . a hundred St. John’s men armed the Gray” (Alexandria Library Special Collection, 1883, Saint John’s Academy fiftieth anniversary speech). Close to one hundred alumni and students enlisted in the 17th Virginia Infantry, and at least eight died in service. With the advent of the Civil War, Alexandria was occupied by Union Troops. Whether the school maintained its military character with “cadet gray coat and pants trimmed in black” (Robbins, 1983, p. 28) and blue cap with “SJA” is not known, but the school remained open during the war.
Enrollment swelled as many schools in Alexandria closed and new students included the sons of Union officers including two Union military governors.

The school was the only Catholic military school in the United States for over 30 years. In its initial class in the 1830s were the Civil War commander of the Mount Vernon Guards, Company E 17th Virginia, and Congressman Bernard G. Caulfield. Caulfield had left Virginia for Chicago in 1852. He became part of the Sons of Liberty plot during the Civil War to liberate 7,000 Confederate prisoners of war at Camp Douglas and eventually take Illinois into the southern cause. Caulfield fled Illinois after the plot was discovered by the Secret Service and remained with Confederate exiles in Mexico until 1867. Upon returning to the United States, he served as a U.S. Senator from Illinois twice and was one of the founders of the Chicago Democratic Party.

St. John’s Academy also conducted an elementary school while maintaining the military requirements for the older cadets. St. John’s Academy claimed to be the oldest boarding school in Virginia and the only military school providing cadets with full field equipment, which they started using on summer trips by the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal to Shepherdstown and Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, 1873–1877. The cadets were present at the dedication of the Washington Monument in 1885. Richard L. Carney led St. John’s Academy for 45 years and in 1892, upon the death of Carney’s wife, he left the school and became a priest. Turning administration over to Captain William H. Sweeny appeared to be a fatal error for the school as it closed in 1895 with only seven students (Robbins, 1983). St. John’s Academy would be the only Catholic military school until Xavier Military High School in New York City converted to a military format in 1898.
By the time St. John’s Academy had closed, four additional Catholic military schools had been established. Among those was St. Leo Military Academy/College of Florida, one of the only two Catholic military colleges ever established, founded in 1880 by the Benedictines. The school functioned as a military college for 23 years consecutively, after which it adopted that orientation for only short periods, the first from 1908–1909 and the second from 1918–1920 due to World War I.

The other college was Spring Hill College in Mobile, Alabama, which adopted the military format from 1918 to 1920 due to the war. “The colleges yielded to the army bugle, and dining rooms were transformed into mess halls” (Kenney, 1931, p. 348). This action was done at the same time the Department of the Army authorized the college to have a Student Army Training Corps (SATC) unit and later an ROTC on campus. But the college took the additional step of requiring every student to be in uniform at all times while on college grounds and emphasized military discipline during defined periods. This included the school’s high school students, who were organized into a cadet company, as well as college students who were physically able to pass the ROTC requirements. (Spring Hill College, 1918). In 1920, the school enrollment was down to 103 and declining enrollment caused a loss of army support for ROTC, so the college reverted to its prior nonmilitary format (R. Weaver, personal communication, March 9, 2011).

The All Hallows College was a secondary military school established in the Mormon-dominated Salt Lake City in 1886 by the Catholic Bishop, Lawrence Scanlan. It was meant to serve not only Catholic boys of the city, but also the growing Catholic population of ranchers and miners in Utah. The first year, the gray-clad cadets numbered 115, of which 49 were boarders. Within three years, the school almost failed when an
outbreak of diphtheria struck 30 to 35 cadets and hospitalized eight to 10 cadets. The school quickly recovered and, with the support of the Society of Mary (Marist Order), grew to 225 cadets in 1909 with about half of those being boarders. The college was not only known for the superior military training of its cadets, but also for its athletics, where it did very well against other prep schools and universities (Harris, 1909).

The circumstance of the school’s closure appears to have been a combination of competition and discord between the Diocese and the Marist Order. By 1915, other western states had established a number of boarding schools which drew off many potential boarding students from Montana, Oregon, Washington, and Colorado. The next year the Diocese wanted to purchase the school that was under the corporate ownership of the Marist Order (Harris, 1909). They wanted to weather the declining student population crisis, but it appears the financial burden shared between the two church organizations was never resolved satisfactorily and the school closed.

The Marist Order would later establish Marist Military School for Boys in Georgia in 1901. The cadets numbered 125 in 1917 and were uniformed in gray, with military drill and discipline an essential part of the school. The foundation of the school was “the principle that religion is the primary element of life, and that without religion as a fundamental education in the ordinary sense has little moral efficiency” (Knight, 1917, p. 2499). This school successfully operated as a military school until it became coeducational and demilitarized in the 1970s.

The Society of Mary (Marianists) as opposed to the Marist Order converted their boys’ secondary boarding school in San Antonio, Texas, Saint Mary’s College, to a military format in 1919. The school would continue as a military school in a city, which
had at one time four other military schools, until 1932. That year the school became Central Catholic High School, which, although no longer a military school, maintains a very strong JROTC program.

The remaining schools founded in the late 19th century were all located in New York and founded by Christian Brothers. That order would embrace the military format more than any other, with the establishment of seven schools. Their first military school was La Salle Institute of Troy which transitioned to a military format in 1891. This school was followed by Christian Brother Academy in Albany which transitioned in 1892, and Sacred Heart Military Academy in Brooklyn which transitioned in 1898.

La Salle Military Academy was established to meet the demand for a Catholic boarding school near New York City in 1883 and was known then as the Westchester Institute. Three years later, the school was renamed the Sacred Heart Academy. In 1898, amid the patriotic emotion of the Spanish American War, Brother Hilarion, a Civil War veteran, and Captain T. Moynihan started military training and the school converted to a military school. In 1903, the name was changed to Clason Point Military Academy. With the cadet corps reaching 225, the school moved to new facilities in Oakland, New York, and was renamed La Salle Military Academy. During the cultural upheaval of the 1960s, enrollment suffered but Brother Louis DeThomasis, Class of 1958, took over the leadership from 1977 to 1984, and revived academic and military standards. The resulting increased enrollment required the organization of a sixth cadet company. Unfortunately, after his departure, subsequent administrations did not show the same devotion to the school. Military became optional in 1999, and the school closed in 2001 (Dans, 2009).
New York’s last Christian Brothers’ military school, Cardinal Farley Military Academy, was established during World War II in Rhinecliff. Outside New York, the order founded the De La Salle Military Academy in Kansas City in 1910. They transitioned Saint John’s College High School in Washington, DC, in 1915; Christian Brothers College Military High School in Missouri in 1936; and Cretin (Military) High School in Minnesota during the First World War.

In many ways, the most successful in the establishment of lasting Catholic military schools were the Benedictines. They established three military schools, Benedictine Military School/High School in Georgia in 1902, Benedictine High School in Virginia in 1911, and Marmion Military Academy in Illinois in 1935. Marmion’s military program became optional in 1993, and with it, the habitual wearing of military uniforms requirement ended, although a strong JROTC program continues. Both Benedictine Military School/High School and Benedictine High School continue today as military day schools with single-sex education. The Georgia school’s military program is mandatory for freshman and sophomores. It not only continues as a military school, but also maintains over 90% as cadets. Benedictine High School in Richmond, Virginia, enrollment has been around 278 cadets and will open a new 50-acre campus in the fall of 2012 (Benedictine High School, 2011).

The Brothers of the Holy Cross established Sacred Heart Military Academy in New York in 1883, and much later, Sacred Heart Military Academy in Wisconsin in 1955. The latter school was moved to Indiana and renamed Le Mans Academy, where it functioned until 2003 (Rogal, 2009).
Leonard Hall was established by the Xaverian Order as a Catholic college preparatory school for boys. Destroyed by fire in 1920, the school was expanded to include a space for boarding students, but the Great Depression almost destroyed the school financially and moved its focus to elementary education. Perhaps as a means of attracting more students, the school became a unique combination of Catholic and military junior naval school on the eve of the United States' entry into World War II in 1941. In 1968, enrollment had grown to 200, with 160 as boarders. The antimilitary culture of the 1960s quickly took its toll, and in 1972, the Xaverians closed the school (Leonard Hall Junior Naval Academy, 2011).

But the Leonard Hall story did not end because the day students’ parents banded together and formed a corporation that opened the school the following September, and the Leonard Hall Junior Naval Academy continued in operation as a private school (Leonard Hall Junior Naval Academy, 2011). In 2010, the school had a modest 51 cadets, Grades 6 through 12. Supervised militarily by a retired noncommissioned officer, students carried on its traditions in their naval-style uniforms.

The story of the Catholic military school would not be complete without a description of the continued contribution of various orders of nuns. Eight orders established military schools. The Benedictine Sisters established Linton Hall Military School in Virginia in 1922. The school discarded the military aspect for a few years in the 1930s but returned to the military format until 1989. The Sisters of Divine Providence established the Moye Military School (Academy) in Texas in 1938, and operated it as a military school until 1959. The Sisters of Mercy opened St. John's Military Academy in Los Angeles in 1905 and it remained open until 1968. The Sisters of the Blessed
Sacrament opened St. Emma Military School as the St Emma Industrial and Agricultural College in Virginia in 1895. It operated as an African American military school until closing in 1972. The Dominican Sisters converted Bishop Quarter Junior Military Academy, Illinois to military in 1936, and it operated until closing in 1968. In 1945, the Pallottine Sisters established the boy’s boarding school, St. Patrick’s Military Academy in New York, and it operated until 1983 or 1986.

The Sisters of St. Francis of Penance and Christian Charity to this day maintain an association with the military school concept. They operate one of only two exclusively grade school-orientated military schools in the country, St. Catherine's Military Academy in California, established in 1889 as a Catholic girls’ school. In 1894, the school transformed to a boys’ orphanage. By 1916, the number of orphans had decreased to the point where the sisters hired male teachers as positive role models and changed the focus to a Catholic male day school. In 1923, Captain D. M. Healy was hired as Commandant of Cadets and the transition began to create the St. Catherine’s Military School. This transition was undertaken after the sisters had conducted “extensive research” (St. Catherine’s Military School, 2010, History). In 2010, the school had 150 male cadets, Grades 4–8.

Historically, the order had also founded St. Aloysius Academy and Military School in New Lexington, Ohio, in 1915, and St. Aloysius Military Academy, Fayetteville, Ohio, in 1938. The schools operated until the 1960s and 1980s respectively. The Stella Niagara Cadet School of New York was founded in 1908 and operated as a military school until 1971. Enrollment ranged from 91 in 1937 all the way to 300 in 1963 (Dietz & Freiermuth, 2010; Rogal, 2009).
The Sisters of St. Joseph established the final Catholic military school in 1952 when they transitioned the Nazareth Hall Cadet School in New York. The Sisters felt that the military format "provides an excellent incentive and practical means for the realization of the ideals which inspired the school's foundation. Sister Marie Paulus explained that Nazareth Hall's program differs from that of a military academy because "a military academy is run thinking of war. Our cadet program is to train the boys in leadership and discipline, give them the opportunity of responsibility, and to maintain high scholastic standards" (K. Urbanic, personnel communications, October, 21, 2011).

Another motivation was linked to the influence of the threat of Communism during the Cold War. Mother Rose Miriam Smyth, head of the congregation, wrote to all the Sisters in January 1951:

The world crisis alarms all who think. We have an obligation to help to the utmost of our ability. If we remember that whatever is in the mind and heart of a zealous teacher will be in the minds and hearts of her pupils, we will not dare to fail our hourly and momentous opportunities. (K. Urbanic, personal communication, October 19, 2011)

Table 4

Catholic Military Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opened or Transition</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Location</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>All Hallows College</td>
<td>Utah</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941*</td>
<td>Barbour Hall Junior Military</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Benedictine Military School/High School</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Benedictine High School</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936*</td>
<td>Bishop Quarter Junior Military Academy</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>School Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Cardinal Farley Military Academy</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894*</td>
<td>Christian Brother Academy</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936*</td>
<td>Christian Brothers College Military High School</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917*</td>
<td>Cretin (Military) High School</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>De LaSalle Military Academy</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891*</td>
<td>La Salle Institute</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898*</td>
<td>La Salle Military Academy (Clason Point Military Academy)</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Hall of the Divine Child</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
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<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Linton Hall Military School</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941*</td>
<td>Leonard Hall Naval Academy</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Marist Military School for Boys</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Marmion Military Academy</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Marymount Military Academy</td>
<td>Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Mount St Joseph Semi-Military Academy</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Moye Military School (Academy)</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935*</td>
<td>Nazareth (Nasareth) Hall Military School</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952*</td>
<td>Nazareth Hall Cadet School</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Sacred Heart Military Academy</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>Sacred Heart Military Academy</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>St Patrick’s Military Academy</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
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<td>1913*</td>
<td>St Mary’s College (Institute)</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>School Name</td>
<td>State</td>
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<td>-------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>St Catherine’s Military Academy</td>
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<tr>
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<td>St Clement Military School</td>
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<td>1937</td>
<td>St Joseph Junior Military School</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>St Aloysius Academy</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>St Aloysius Academy and Military School</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
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<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Saint Joseph’s College and Military Academy</td>
<td>Kansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>College of Saint Thomas</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Saint John’s College High School</td>
<td>Washington DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>St John’s Military Academy</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>St Joseph's Military Academy</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>St Joseph Junior Military School</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>St John’s Academy</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>St Emma Military School</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>St. Leo Military Academy/College</td>
<td>Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>St Thomas Military Academy</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Mount St Joseph Semi-Military Academy</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>St Edwards Military Academy</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>St Patrick Military Academy</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Stella Niagara Cadet School</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Spring Hill College</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Xavier Military High School</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Presbyterian. The Presbyterians established 24 military schools including two which opened prior to the Civil War (Webb, 1958). The oldest among them was the Classical and Mathematical Academy of Bedford, Pennsylvania. This school was opened by Reverend Baynard R. Hall in about 1834, and it operated for about five years (Hunter, 1937).

The next Presbyterian military school was the Alexander Military Institute in New York which was described as a “Classical, Commercial, and Military Boarding School” (Steiger, 1878, p. 62) with a capacity for 30 cadets. It was first opened in 1845 under the direction of William S. Hall and was known as the Alexander Institute until 1857. General Munson I. Lockwood, former commander 7th Brigade New York State Militia, ran the school after that for six years under the name Hampton Military Institute. In 1863, Mr. Oliver R. Willis took charge and the school was again officially renamed the Alexander Institute, although it was often called the Alexander Military Academy. The school was a short distance from the Presbyterian Church and provided, as part of its curriculum, military drill and all courses needed to enable its cadets to continue to college (Steiger, 1878). The school would continue until at least 1919.

The other pre-Civil War school was the Yonkers Collegiate and Military Institute in New York. This school was established sometime between 1852 and 1854 by Dr. Washington Hasbook. He was followed by a series of superintendents to include M. N. Wiseman and Frederick Norton Freeman, an 1856 Norwich graduate, who would later lead Englewood Military and Collegiate Institute of Perth Amboy, New Jersey (Theta Chi Fraternity, 1927). Benjamin Mason was the principal from about 1863 through at least 1879. The school may have closed for a time starting in 1880 but reopened and had an
enrollment of 40 cadets in the early 1890s under the direction of Colonel H. S. Farley (Hamilton, 1897).

During the Civil War, the Warring’s Military Boarding School was established in Poughkeepsie, New York, by Dr. C. B. Warring, PhD. Enrollment in 1879 was 37 boys and 2 girls (United States Congress, 1880). The school operated at least as late 1903. In the closing days of the Civil War, Reverend David McClure opened the California Military Academy in Oakland with the help of his brother, Major Stewart McClure. The school was very successful and enrollment reached 125 cadets the year prior to the September 1873 fire which destroyed the school. The McClures rebuilt and by 1875, the school employed nine professors and had 176 cadets (Commissioner of Education, 1875). The Cadet Corps was even large enough to maintain a small cadet band by 1873.

Ownership passed to a long-time professor, Colonel W. H. Obrien, in 1884, and the school operated until at least 1908 (Baker, 1914).

Ten more Presbyterian military schools were established in the 19th century: Montrose Classical & Military School, New York, 1871; Sweetwater Military College, Tennessee, 1874; Suffolk Military Academy, Virginia, 1875; French Camp Military Academy, Mississippi, 1885; Danville Military Institute, Virginia, 1890; Putnam Military Academy, Ohio, 1890; Clinton Liberal Institute established a military prep school, New York, 1891; Tamalpais Military Academy, California, transitioned in 1892; Chamberlain-Hunt Academy, Mississippi, transitioned in 1895; and Hoge (Memorial) Military Academy, Virginia, transitioned in 1895.

The Clinton Liberal Institute in Fort Plain, New York was actually four schools in one: Fitting School, School of Fine Arts, School of Business, and the Fort Plain Military
School. The military school was a boys’ prep school associated with the college under the direction of a regular army officer, Lieutenant Harry L. Hawthorne. Hawthorne was a hero in the Indian Wars and detailed to support the school (Secretary of War, 1892). The school opened in 1891 and was fully equipped with 150 rifles and all the associated equipment. The military school functioned until it was destroyed by fire in 1900 (Fort Plain Museum, 2010).

Reverend Arthur Crosby founded the Tamalpais Academy in 1890 and transitioned it in 1892 to a military format. His objective was “to instill in boys those habits which alone insure success in whatever walk of life they may wander” (Hamilton, 1897, pp. 476-477). Enrollment in the late 1890s was approximately 60 cadets, who were uniformed in West Point style and equipped not only for armed drill, but also had two cannons for training. The school conducted an annual encampment and training supported by an active-duty Army artillery lieutenant. The school was identified in 1897 as one of the two best military prep schools on the West Coast (Hamilton, 1897).

In the 20th century, the remaining seven military schools were established including the final Presbyterian military school, Schreiner Institute in Texas. Schreiner was founded in 1879 and transitioned to a military format in 1923 with 95 cadets. Under the new military format, the school had over 300 cadets by 1933. The school expanded to include both a high school and junior-college military programs. As the United States entered World War II, there were 74 high school cadets and 293 college cadets. Schreiner Institute would continue as a military school and peak in enrollment at 505 in 1946, but with enrollment challenges, they dropped the military school environment in 1972 (Hedgpeth, 1998).
Table 5

*Presbyterian Military Schools*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Alabama Military Institute</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Anniston University School</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Alabama Presbyterian School for Boys</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863*</td>
<td>Alexander Military Institute</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Auburn Military Seminary</td>
<td>Kentucky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1834</td>
<td>Classical and Mathematical Academy</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>California Military Academy</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895*</td>
<td>Chamberlain - Hunt Academy</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>Clinton Liberal Institute and Military Academy</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890*</td>
<td>Danville Military Institute, VA</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>Hoge (Memorial) Military Academy</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Montrose Classical &amp; Military School</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>French Camp Military Academy</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
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<td>1891*</td>
<td>Greenbrier Military School</td>
<td>West Virginia</td>
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<td>1917*</td>
<td>McCallie School</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
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<td>1892*</td>
<td>Mount Tamalpais Military Academy</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1917</td>
<td>Onarga Military School</td>
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<td>1890</td>
<td>Putnam Military Academy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923*</td>
<td>Schriener Institute</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1874  Sweetwater Military College  Tennessee
1875  Suffolk Military Academy  Virginia
1863  Warring's Military Boarding School  New York
1880  Wentworth Military Academy and Junior College  Missouri
      (Under control of church 1919)
1854  Yonkers Collegiate and Military Institute  New York

**Baptist.** The Baptist Church has had associations with nine military schools. The oldest was the Vermont Academy, founded as a “direct instrumentality” (Croker, 1913, p. 503) of the Baptist Convention in 1871. The school converted to a military format in 1885, and an active-duty officer was assigned to the school in September 1891. Enrollment in 1882 was 138 students, of which 62 were cadets and 76 nonmilitary females. The cadets were organized into two companies. They wore blue uniforms and were reported to have good moral character (U.S. War Department, 1892). The school continued to function as a military school until 1908.

Howard College of Alabama was established in 1841 in Marion. Colonel John H. Murfee, a VMI graduate and former commandant of cadets at the University of Alabama who was wounded while leading his cadets in Civil War combat, took leadership of the college in 1871. Murfee quickly adapted the college to a military format much like the two institutions with which he was most familiar. He was no stranger to the conversion of schools to a military format, having done so at Westwood Military Academy and Lynchburg College. His charm and energy captured the people of Marion, and he earned
their loyalty through his delivery of “discipline, methods of instruction, moral culture, and practical education” (Sean Flynt, personal communication, February 9, 2010).

The Baptist Convention of Alabama did not see the justification of divinity students having to live the life of a military school cadet and relations soured. In 1884, a group of divinity students moved off campus. When the convention demanded the college support their academic needs, Murfee refused and was backed by the board of trustees. The Baptist Convention resigned its relationship with the college in protest. The military college continued until 1887, when the Baptist Convention, after meeting in the economically booming Birmingham, found a way to get around Murfee and hold on to the college. They moved the school to Birmingham.

Murfee would not move and Marion embraced him and his plan to continue the school as the Marion Military Institute. The school kept almost its entire faculty and an unknown number of its cadets and was still open in 2011 as one of the nation’s five military junior colleges with enrollment of 400. By contrast, Howard College’s corps of cadets continued and operated as a military school with a voluntary corps of cadets, but numbers waned. In 1913, the new President James H. Shelburne, stating the program competed with athletics, ended the Corps in 1913 (Sean Flynt, personal communication, February 9, 2010).

Fork Union Military Academy in Virginia, established in 1898, converted to military school requirements in 1903. The school still operates as a military school, educating sixth through 12th graders and offering a fifth year of high school. In 2010, it had 535 cadets in a very rural location with a very Baptist foundation.
Table 6

_Baptist Military Schools_

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opened or</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>Bailey Military Academy</td>
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<td>Bethel College</td>
<td>Kentucky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>Buie's Creek Academy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903*</td>
<td>Fork Union Military Academy</td>
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<td>1887*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919*</td>
<td>Locust Grove Institute</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911/20*</td>
<td>Pillsbury Academy</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>San Marcos Baptist Academy</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Vermont Military Academy</td>
<td>Vermont</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Methodist.* The Methodist Church became involved with military schools very early and primarily in the South. The first of seven military schools was St. Charles Military College in St. Charles, Missouri. It was established in 1832 and operated until at least 1916. The first president was Reverend John Hunter Fielding (1796–1844), Trinity College of Dublin, Ireland graduate, who was a Methodist minister who taught and served as president of the Methodist Madison College in Pennsylvania. He taught at Augusta College in Kentucky as professor of mathematics. In May 1835, Fielding resigned his position at Augusta College to become the first president of St. Charles
College, a position he held until his death in 1844 (Olson, 1961; Fielding, February 1, 1834).

The population of St. Charles County was almost equally divided between those with southern sympathies and those siding with the North, primarily German immigrants (National Historical Company, 1885). On May 17, 1861, a regiment of Union troops occupied St. Charles and disarmed the cadets at St. Charles Military College. The town had organized a company 11 days earlier, the Dixie Guards, which became G Company, 2nd Missouri Volunteer Militia for Confederate service. Union control of the county fell into the hands of a regiment recruited by Colonel Arnold Krekel, who was also a county judge. His regiment, St. Charles County Regiment of Home Guards (Krekel’s Dutch) “stood a dread menace to active southern element[s]” (National Historical Company, 1885, p. 182).

St. Charles Military College closed and Reverend Tyson Dines and his family occupied the school for safekeeping. In December 1862, Krekel, who had also been curator of the college, converted the school into a prison for southern sympathizers. How long the school remained closed is unclear. After the war, the former Missourians associated with the school laid claim to the school against the wishes of the former board members and Methodist Church. The situation was addressed by the state supreme court in 1868, the property returned to the Methodist Church, and the school reopened (Leftwich, 1870). The occupation and use of the school by the army became an issue in 1902 during the 57th Congress. Records indicate that the United States treasury paid the school reparations (U.S. Congress, 1903).
The school did reopen and continued under the Methodist Church into the 20th century, enrolling an average of about 70 cadets annually. In early 1900s, its president was Reverend George W. Brice, followed by Colonel Herbert F. Walter. Colonel Walter served as president for seven years and was a graduate of Southwestern University in Texas but had also been a cadet at Texas A&M for a year.

As the Civil War approached, two other Methodist military schools of note were established. The first, Lynchburg Military College in Lynchburg Virginia, was a direct result of the coming conflict and sectional divide that even affected the church. Madison College was established in Uniontown, Pennsylvania in 1830. By 1855, it had evolved into a Methodist college with a southern faculty, a northern board of trustees, and a student body split between the two regional factions. As tensions rose between the faculty and board, there was a student fight between a young man from Ohio and the Bailey brothers from the South. The resulting hard feelings spread to the faculty and caused a rift with the trustees that never healed (Hadden, 1913).

At the 1855 commencement, the college president announced plans to open a Methodist College in Virginia the following September. The entire faculty resigned along with 85 of 90 southern students, or about half the student body. Madison College had military training where students wore uniforms at drill, but the new school was a military school down to the design of its building (Hadden, 1913). The resulting college in Lynchburg, Virginia, was housed in a castle-like structure much like Virginia Military Institute (Potter, 2007). The president, Samuel Cox, a Yale graduate, used his old natural-science teacher, James Thomas Murfee, VMI Class of 1853, to function also as commandant of cadets. Also joining the faculty as both a member of the mathematics and
military departments was another VMI alumni, James E. Blankenship. Captain Blankenship would enlist his cadets into the 11th Virginia Infantry Regiment at the beginning of the war.

Lynchburg College’s first commandant, James Thomas Murfee, had a long association as a distinguished educator in military schools. After two or three years in Lynchburg, he became the co-principal of Westwood Academy in Lynchburg and transitioned that school to a military format. In 1860, he became the commandant of cadets at the University of Alabama and led its cadets in combat during the war. After the war, he continued as commandant there until taking the presidency of Howard College, as described earlier in the Baptist military schools section.

The other Methodist military school that opened with the approach of the Civil War was Bastrop Military Institute in Bastrop, Texas. The school opened in 1851 as the Bastrop Academy under Reverend Martin Ruther, a Methodist, and with the support of the Bastrop Educational Society. The academy’s coeducational enrollment declined to 94 male and female students with the advent of the “Common School System” offering nearly free education. Colonel Robert Thomas Pritchard Allen, a West Point graduate, the founder of the Kentucky Military Academy in 1845 left that institution in 1854 due to poor health, and went to Bastrop (Bastrop County Museum, 1975).

In 1857, he converted the male department of the school into a military school. Initially the academy occupied the first floor of the school building and the Bastrop Female Institute the second floor. The attraction of a military school took the male enrollment to 92 the first year. So successful was the military institute that the cadets enrolled from as far away as Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi in 1859. The cadets
carried rifles while on dress parade every evening of the weekdays. The uniform was blue with brass buttons and red-striped pants. The academics were demanding with a four-year course which included calculus, natural history, botany, mineralogy, survey, mechanics, and Latin (Kesselus, 1987).

During the Civil War, the school struggled as Colonel Allen departed to command the 17th Texas Infantry and was replaced by his brother Robert Allen. Although many of the older boys left for military service, the school continued with declining enrollment until 1864 (Kesselus, 1987). The school remained closed until 1867 and operated for one year as a nonmilitary school. In September 1868, under the leadership of John Garland James, VMI Class of 1866, as president and his brother, Fleming Wills James, VMI Class of 1868, as commandant, the school was renamed the Texas Military Institute. The brothers had fought as cadets with Virginia Military Institute at the Battle of New Market. In 1870, the school moved to Austin atop a hill in a castle-like structure. There it operated as a nonsectarian school with enrollments of 100 cadets until 1879. That year the school closed as a result of the establishment of Texas A&M, where the faculty departed for employment along with John Garland James as Texas A&M’s second president (McKeithan, 2011; Virginia Military Institute Archives Online Historical Rosters, 2011; Young, 2011).

With the commencement of the Civil War, Randolph Macon College, Boydton, Virginia, had severely declining enrollment. “So great was the depletion in the number of students, and so great the excitement that prevailed throughout the country, that the College authorities deemed it inexpedient to hold the regular commencement exercises [early].” (Irby, 1894, p. 153). The college hoped to prepare its students for military duties
and survive as an institution by reinventing itself as a military school. "A regular uniform was prescribed; drills were daily observed, and other things of a similar character were enjoined, all looking to the preparation of the student for the duties that awaited him in defense of his country." (Irby, 1894, p. 155).

The college president, Reverend William A. Smith, was appointed as colonel, and James E. Blankenship, previously mentioned with Lynchburg College, was appointed as major professor of mathematics and military science (Irby, 1894). At the Battle of First Manassas, Major Blankenship's short-lived service in the field proved that he was a better asset in a school environment than in leading troops in combat. The college functioned on a military footing from 1861 to 1863, with enrollment down to 56 cadets when the school closed.

When the college reopened in 1866, it did so without its military trappings. But with the popularity of the military school concept, particularly in Virginia boarding schools, two of the college's associated prep schools, Randolph-Macon Academy in Bedford established in 1890 and Randolph-Macon Academy in Front Royal, transitioned to military schools in 1920 and 1910 respectively. Although Randolph-Macon Academy in Bedford closed in 1934, Randolph-Macon Academy in Front Royal remains a military school to this day. The school has a nonmilitary lower school and a military upper school with grades nine through 12, which numbered 305 cadets in 2010.

The final Methodist military school was established in 1919, when Carlisle School, Bamberg, South Carolina, founded in 1892, became an all-male military school. The Carlisle School merged with Camden Military Academy in 1977 and was no longer associated with the Methodist Church. Camden Military Academy's website states that
the school incorporates the traditions of Carlisle Military School, whose students, which had numbered close to 300, transferred with the merger (Rogal, 2009).

Table 7

*Methodist Military Schools*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opened or *Transition</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1857* Bastrop Military Institute (Texas Military Institute)</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>Lynchburg Military College</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920* Randolph-Macon Academy, Bedford</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910* Randolph-Macon Academy, Front Royal</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861* Randolph-Macon College</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>St Charles Military College</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Other denominations.* The Congregational Church established four military schools starting with the transition of the Betts Military Academy of Stamford, Connecticut, in 1860. This school operated until 1908, but in the meantime, the Congregationalists converted Bunker Hill Military Academy in Illinois under Reverend Samuel L. Stiver to a military format in 1883. The school prospered with the change to a military format and in 1913 had 65 cadets from Grades 6 through 12. Also converted to military format by the Congregational Church were the Kamehameha School in Hawaii in 1914 and the Allen-Chamber School of Massachusetts in 1917.

The Reform Church established two military schools including Massanutten Military Academy, still in operation in Virginia in 2011. Massanutten Military Academy
was established by the church in 1899 and converted to the military format in 1917 during the First World War. The school's coeducational enrollment of sixth through twelfth graders has varied from 236 to 158 between 2000 and 2010. The other Reform Church military school was Riverview Military Academy in Poughkeepsie, New York. This school also converted during a time of war in 1862 and operated until 1920.

The Lutherans established the Collegiate Institute, in Mount Pleasant, North Carolina, prior to the Civil War as a nonmilitary school. After being closed for two years, Reverend L. E. Busby reopened it, and five years later the school adopted military uniforms and discipline. The school continued until financial problems brought on by the Great Depression caused its closure in 1933 (North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, 1962, Mount Pleasant Collegiate Institute).

The Moravian Church had two military schools both in Pennsylvania. The first was the Nazareth Hall Military Academy, a very old school established between 1743 and 1759. In 1861, the first year of the Civil War, the school adopted a military format. The school was said to develop “all that is best in discipline and training, while even teaching the doctrine of peace” (Mannering, 1914, p. 914). The cadets were organized into two companies and their drill was said to be to such “perfection . . . even the most ardent peace advocate could not help applauding the military proficiency and the manly, alert appearance” (Mannering, 1914, p. 914). The school operated until at least 1929. Their second school was Gettysburg Military Academy and was in operation in 1918, but little more is known (Webb, 1958).
### Table 8

**Congregational, Reform Church, Moravian, and Lutheran Military Schools**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>*Transition School Location</th>
<th>Congregational Church Military Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1917* Allen-Chamber School Massachusetts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 Betts Military Academy Connecticut</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883* Bunker Hill Military Academy Illinois</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914* Kamehameha School Hawaii</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reform Church Military Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917* Massanutten Military Academy Virginia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862* Riverview Military Academy New York</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moravian Church Military Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861* Nazareth Hall Military Academy Pennsylvania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918 Gettysburg Military Academy Pennsylvania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lutheran Military School</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908* The Collegiate Institute North Carolina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**African American Military Schools**

Although military training was conducted at several African American colleges, there were two schools that adopted a military school format. Both were established in the period between the closing of the Civil War and the start of the Spanish American War. Both schools were located in Virginia and were founded by Caucasian former
Union Army officers. The first school was established by General Samuel C. Armstrong as Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute in 1868. General Armstrong was a graduate of Williams College and had served with the 125th New York Infantry at Gettysburg prior to commanding the 9th Regiment of United States Color Troops in the final battles of the Civil War (Lindsey, 1995).

By 1872, the school had transitioned to a military format for its male students. Male cadets drilled at five in the morning, followed by breakfast and a day devoted to academics. Cadets were uniformed in military blue and marched to the noon meal. In 1901, the male students were organized into a battalion of six companies: two companies of day students, three companies of boarding students, and one company of boarding American Indians. The barracks were regularly subject to room inspections (Cooley, 1901). The battalion was supported by a 25-cadet band. There were also extensive periods devoted to religion and Bible study, with church attendance required daily, and each cadet assigned a specific seat (Spivey, 1978).

Army officers from nearby Fort Monroe supported military training, although their repeated requests for rifles were consistently rejected. In 1892, school discipline included conduct court martials, fines, extra drills, and confinement. The cadet routine included two company-drill periods daily, inspections, and morning and evening formations (Bailey, A.M., 1892 May). The next year, General Armstrong died and was buried on campus. The military system appears to have continued until sometime after 1901. The Hampton legacy included 90% of its graduates, including Booker T. Washington, becoming teachers and playing important roles in the education of African Americans and the historical Black Hampton University (Spivey, 1978).
The second African American military school was founded as Saint Emma’s Military School in Powhatan, Virginia. The school opened in January 1895 as the St. Emma Industrial and Agricultural College. In its first eight months there were only 19 male students. The military requirements were always an integral part of the school (Smith, 1949). Possible influences include the benefactors, Colonel and Mrs. Edward Morrell of Philadelphia. Colonel Morrell was a Civil War veteran who enlisted as a private and rose to lieutenant in the 5th New York Cavalry. He was a Union College graduate and after the war worked as a professor of Greek and Latin at Fort Edward Collegiate Institute in New York. By 1898, he had been promoted up through brigadier general in the Pennsylvania militia.

The second influence was the success of the Hampton Institute. That school’s popularity, along with that of Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, made them a model for educational efforts with African American youth (Smith, 1949). The third influence was that of the Catholic Church’s successful adoption of the military school format as previously explored. By 1907, the cadet corps was described as being clothed in regulation cadet uniforms and drilled regularly. Also, the corps by that time had a brass band as part of its organization. ("St. Emma’s," 1907). The enrollment continued to grow with 150 cadets in 1929. The curriculum, at least up until the late 1940s, was focused on cannery, farming, equipment repair, engineering, accounting, and management. As the only other agricultural school in Virginia, St. Emma’s was second only to Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech).

In 1919 after a War Department inspection, the school gained federal funding through inclusion of an ROTC unit. In 1947 under the Holy Ghost Fathers, the trade
school became a more academically oriented military high school where college
preparation and military bearing were central. In keeping with this, the school officially
became St. Emma’s Military School. With Father Egbert J. Figaro leading the school,
enrollment peaked at 370 cadets in 1964 (Chenevert, 2011). The corps included African
Americans from across the nation, as well as cadets from Africa and the Caribbean. A
demanding new cadet-training program demanded uniform excellence in their gray
jackets with white caps and trousers. Equipped with M1 rifles, the cadet battalion
included a band. But by 1972, declining enrollment forced the school to close, not
because of antimilitary sentiment, but as a result of school desegregation and an
increasing number of African American families choosing to enroll their sons in
integrated schools (Smith, 2011).
Chapter 9: The Spirit of 1898 and Peak of Military School Representation

The period between the Spanish American War and the Great Depression coincided with a peak in the popularity of the military school format and the initial development of a significant opposition to both military schools and military training in schools. Much of the motivation of the latter grew from the high cost of human life from the First World War. On the other hand, the Spanish American War was a period of enthusiastic unification. It was a time when the divided nation came together for what was promoted by journalists as a noble cause. The mood in the United States was very patriotic and supportive of the military school concept. The image of former Confederate General Joseph Wheeler, West Point graduate, and General William R. Shafter, Union Medal of Honor recipient recalled to active military service in Cuba, serving side-by-side increased patriotic feelings for a nation seeking reconciliation.

As the war with Spain approached, the midshipmen of the United States Naval Academy, who graduated early in April 1898, and cadets from a southern military college proclaimed they were “all sons of Johnny Rebs . . . ready to march in six hours” (Temple, 1996, p. 486). Several military colleges, including the Virginia Military Institute and Virginia Tech, volunteered their service as they had done in the Civil War:

We hereby tender to the Governor of Virginia the services of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute [Virginia Tech] Corps of Cadets, consisting of four companies of infantry, one light battery of artillery, commissioned and noncommissioned, staff and band for the defense of our country in the event of war. (Temple, 1996, p. 489)

Despite the fact that both Virginia Tech and Virginia Military Institute’s corps of cadets were members of the state’s active militia, the requests were turned down. Perhaps the memory of the deaths of young cadets of Virginia Military Institute on the field
during the Battle of New Market played a part in the governor's decision. But back on campus, the atmosphere was affected:

The spirit of war was everywhere. There was a vague uncertainty, an indefinable something in the air. Among the cadets there was a listless longing for the end of the academic session. Many resigned from college and joined the armed forces.” It was a ripe recruiting ground at military colleges. When Sergeant Loving came to Virginia Tech, he left with six recruits for Company G, 2nd Virginia Regiment, and six more followed later. (Temple, 1996, p. 492).

As the volunteers mobilized for war, the 2nd Virginia Infantry lacked its authorized band. In response, the band director at Virginia Tech resigned from the college and enlisted 25 men to fill the regiment’s need. These men included 15 Virginia Tech Cadet Band members from the classes of 1898 through 1903, five former members of the Glade Cornet Band, a town organization that supported the corps until it organized its own band in 1893, and four alumni (Temple, 1996). Although the 2nd Virginia Infantry Regiment did not see action, the cadet’s service was reflective of the military spirit of the time and a legacy carried on proudly more than 100 years later by wearing the drum major’s baldric (sash) of Virginia Tech Regimental Band.

The spirit of 1898 extended well into the next decade. Then in 1916 the Mexican border crisis associated with Poncho Villa resulted in an American incursion into Mexico as part of the Punitive Expedition under General John Pershing, occurred. On June 30, the First Squadron began several weeks’ training for deployment to the Mexican border. This training ended the summer vacations for Norwich Cadets as they were an integral part of the Vermont National Guard and constituted the First Squadron of the 1st Vermont Calvary Regiment. Norwich’s president, Colonel Ira L. Reeves, as the regimental commander, and his cadets and members of the faculty, as the First Squadron, were
called to active duty. Despite Colonel Reeves' best efforts to send his regiment to the border, the War Department sent the cadets back to Norwich University and they were demobilized (Guinn, 1966).

Peak of Military School Representation

The Spanish American War brought on a patriotic resurgence in the United States, which helped expand the military school concept. In the years between 1898 and 1907, approximately 83 military schools were founded or existing nonmilitary schools were converted to the military format. Between 1903 and 1926, no fewer than 278 to 280 military schools operated in the United States. This was the peak for the number of military schools in the United States. It was a period when the military uniform and military concept of school was favored throughout the country.

The patriotic feelings of the period were even manifested through children dressed in a style called Dewey suits, which hailed Admiral Dewey, famous for his defeat of the Spanish fleet in the Philippines in 1898. One of the children dressed in the Dewey manner was the son of Wesley Peacock, the headmaster of Peacock School for Boys established in 1894 in San Antonio (Peacock, 2000). Between 1894 and 1900, the Peacock School for Boys grew from 20 students to more than 100, and two new buildings were constructed. In 1900, Wesley Peacock began transitioning to a military school format. Peacock added a military department, with the addition of Virginia Military Institute alumni on his staff, required the upper school students to wear uniforms, and officially changed the school format and name to the Peacock Military College (Academy) (Peacock, 1990).
The 1900 presidential campaign included militarism as a major issue. The Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan, took a dim view of the fact that the United States, with no prior tradition of a large standing army, expanded the army from 25,000 soldiers in 1896, to 275,000 soldiers during the Spanish American War. President McKinley, on the other hand, advocated military reforms and expansion of American influence, which required expansion of the regular Army, greater control of the state’s National Guards, and pacification and protection of the gains the United States made in the Spanish American War (Possner, 2009). The mood of Americas helped defeat Bryan and ensured the election of McKinley along with his war-hero running mate, Theodore Roosevelt.

**War Department Instructors and the Establishment of ROTC**

The limited detailing of active-duty army officers under the 1866 Morrill Land Grant Act to Land Grant Colleges expanded. In 1888, this was extended to schools and colleges providing a stipulated level of enrollment and military training. The Act also provided these schools with arms and equipment to support the training. Where the Act of 1866 detailed 20 officers, in 1870 the number was increased to 30, and through a series of increases, the total in 1892 was 100 Army officers and 10 Navy officers (Hadley, 1999). These officers joined faculties with full pay and allowances at no cost to the school. Later, in 1893, the schools that did not recruit an active-duty officer could request the assignment of a retired officer by assuming the responsibility to pay him the difference between active-duty pay and a retired pension (Gignilliat, 1916).

Further benefiting military schools that secured an officer, the officers could request to teach other subjects (Penn, 1916). One of the schools that took advantage of
the military offer and transitioned to a military format was the Fairfield Seminary in New York. Established in Fairfield in 1885, the school was a coeducational, private, boarding, nonmilitary school with an enrollment of 207. The school was a private college preparatory school and included prelaw and premedical courses. But with public education’s expansion in New York state, and students having the ability to stay at home and attend public school, enrollment suffered and placed the future of the school in doubt (Dieffenbacker, 1996).

The headmaster, Frank Warne, used his political connections to help the school secure the 1891 assignment of Captain George R. Burnett, a wounded Indian War veteran, and later another retired officer, Lieutenant Warren R. Dunton, and the seminary became the Fairfield Seminary and Military Academy. The change gave the school’s small faculty an addition to the staff with minimal expense and gave the school a unique feature over the public schools. In 1892, the school operated with 51 male cadets and 43 females and would continue operating until 1901 (Dieffenbacker, 1996).

In 1916, the National Defense Act established the ROTC. By 1926, there were 118 colleges and 100 secondary schools with these military-training units. Not all military schools had Reserve Officer Training Corps, but this vastly expanded the military representation and funding from the federal government for those schools that did (U.S Congress, 1926). Prior to World War I, the ROTC peaked at 191 institutions, but “due in part to the antiwar [antimilitary] movement during the 1930s, a number of institutions discontinued ROTC training” (Cardozier, 1993, p. 16).
The Impact of the Pacifist Movement

“In these days, pacifist propaganda attempted to undermine every institution with the name military attached” (Terry, 1934, p. 9). This was a reflection of the time provided by the Illinois Military Academy in the 1930s. The period between 1923 and 1933 was when the post-World War I pacifist movement started to make a negative impact on military schools and their reputation (Hadley, 1999).

This movement really started the momentum just after the Spanish American War, during the same time as the Philippine insurrection from 1899 to 1902. The Anti-Imperialist League functioned from 1898 to 1921 and included among its 30,000 members the former President of the United States, Grover Cleveland, journalists, labor leaders, and educators. Their platform was the opposition to annexing Hawaii and the Philippines, as well as increases in the power and size of the federal government including the institutionalization of large-standing armed forces (Tucker, 2009).

Among the educators in the pacifist movement was Paul B. Barringer, president of Virginia Tech from 1907 to 1913. Dr. Barringer was also the vice president of the Anti-Imperialist League of Virginia. While president of Virginia Tech, he recommended that military requirements at Virginia Tech be abolished for juniors and seniors. Both recommendations were rejected and he resigned and returned to his medical practice (Andrew, 2001).

World War I, with its incredible human toll prompted young Americans to rethink those patriotic feelings of 1898. Young people of the period had acquired a more independent point of view in contrast to that of those raised in the 1890s. “A potent factor in the disillusionment of youth was the World War” (Calkins, 1932, p. 52). Nack (2005)
described the post-World War I feelings in the United States as "a growing sense of disillusionment that would swell throughout the 1920s and ... define public sentiment toward the Great War" (p. 2). The growing antimilitary sentiment was reflected in the literature of the "Lost Generation," college student's protests, popular cinema and congressional actions.

The "Lost Generation" is a term which describing a generation "uprooted by Word War I and subjected, as a result to intense philosophic despair and disillusionment with traditional ideals and beliefs, especially the values of prewar middle class America" (Hamblin, & Peek, 1999, p. 234). Among the generation's authors who highlighted the futility of armed conflicted were John Dos Passos in his work *Three Soldiers*, published in 1921 and the 1929 publication of Ernest Hemingway's, *A Farewell to Arms*. These works and others provided an image for those who had not fought in the war, the ugly truth of war and a "catalyst for the public to develop "peace consciousness" (Nack, 2005, p. 9).

In the late 1920s students at Midwestern civilian universities voted to abolish mandatory military training; similar protests occurred at eastern civilian colleges as well. In 1927, the American Federation of Youth, an umbrella for approximately 50 groups called for resistance against being "drafted as cannon-fodder for future imperialistic wars" (Peterson, 2005, p. 137). In 1934 a nation-wide student strike was conducted involving 25,000 college students. Three years later a similar strike involved 50,000 students. Further contributing factors to a growing antimilitary climate were films highlighted by the classic *All Quiet on the Western Front*. This film won the Academy
Award for best picture and best director, as well as nominations for cinematography and script in 1930 (Cormack, 1994).

Amid the antiwar feelings, the United States government withdrew the United States Marines from Nicaragua in 1927, and Congress passed the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1937. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was ratified by the United States and 61 other nations by 1928 calling for outlawing war. The Neutrality Acts addressed prohibitions against merchant and the munitions industry that supported belligerent nations (Nank, 2005).

As a result of the antimilitary feelings in the United States, military schools were viewed by many as part of a program to "hoodwink youth which must furnish the raw material for adult wars. . . . The soldier mentality is utterly inconsistent with the spirit of modern youth" (Calkins, 1932, p. 52). Among the many groups that challenged the military school movement was the Committee on Militarism in Education (CME) established in 1925:

[Its purpose was] to combat military training requirements at public schools and universities. The CME fought to remove military training, in the form of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), from high schools and to eliminate compulsory ROTC service at state universities. Throughout its fifteen years of existence, the CME endeavored to oppose militarism in all institutions dealing with youth. (Swarthmore College Peace Collection, 2011)

In 1926, Congressional hearings were held to consider the abolishment of compulsory military training at public schools and state colleges. The focus of this hearing was not military schools, but those schools that were not essentially military and had adopted a mandatory military-training requirement. The danger that faced the military school movement was twofold. Part of the goal of the proponents was to limit the
funding to provide active-duty Army trainers for programs, particularly at the high school level. The second danger lay with the attacks on the positive attributes that the military school movement claimed was provided by their format of education. Although a great deal of testimony included the concern for the general militarization of public education, there were attacks on the very image of the military school. Among the accusations was that the War Department was “making goose steppers out of school boys” (U.S. Congress, 1926, p. 17). The CME characterized military training in school as both murderous and un-Christian:

An army exists to kill men, when ordered, in the nation’s quarrel regardless of its justice; it should train men to that single end. If we object to any of our citizens, those specializing in murderous and un-Christian activities, we should abolish the Army. If we want an Army, we should recognize it for what it is. We should not tell lies about it being a school of citizenship or manual training, not cluttered up its drill grounds with disciplines of these irrelevant arts. (U.S. Congress, 1926, p. 18)

Articles that questioned the positive elements of military school education became more frequent. In a 1928 edition of the Rotarian Magazine, Reverend Ernest Title called for a nationwide protest against the expansion of military training and the philosophy of militarism. He saw the increase of military training not only in military schools, but through the institution of ROTC as “raising a generation . . . impregnated with the idea that war is inevitable” (Davies, 1983, p. 91). The 1930 Outlook Magazine article was more focused on military schools. The author, Archibald Rutledge, was the head of the English department of the nonmilitary Mercersburg Academy and portrayed military schools as “summer camps . . . where much is made of uniforms, drills, discipline and horseback riding” (p. 91). His view of military school discipline was that it was “necessary of course for an army but it is abnormal for children” (p. 92). In summary,
Rutledge thought the military school concept was an attempt to combine "true education" with military training resulting in a combination of "mating beauty with the beast" (p. 91).

In 1931, the Prevention of War Council called on the legislature of Oklahoma to end support of ROTC as a "costly waste." This action may have been inspired in part by the establishment of the Oklahoma Military Academy, which was supported by both state and federal funds and served initially as a secondary preparatory school that later expanded to include a junior college (Rogers State University, 2009, History). The fact that Oklahoma Military Academy was a public institution made it an important target for the Prevention of War Council as it received both federal and state funding for military training at the high school level.

The criticism of the relevance of military schools inspired administrators to look internally to ensure they offered a quality education. This further focused the military schools to strive at the secondary level to send their cadets on to college well prepared for college and careers outside the military. An excellent example in 1927 was Culver Military Academy's Committee for Academic Improvement. Under the leadership of Leigh R. Gignilliat and Alexander F. Fleet, the committee helped improved Culver's academic administrative organization, procedures for faculty selection, stricter academic standards, and a broadened curriculum (Davies, 1983).

Also involved with the defense of the military format was Professor Michael V. O'Shea, a well-known educator of the period. Despite encouragement from his associates to condemn the military school format, he assisted in the format's defense. He supported military schools for the education of boys as a student-focused effort, rather than crushing
individuality. He saw the “military schooling setting as requiring the child to work in a
group to achieve a social, rather than an individual goal [and providing a vehicle for]
achievement into wider interest and achievement demanded by wider social life” (p. 97).

Fire

Clyde R. Terry, an Ohio Wesleyan graduate and former World War I Army
chaplain opened Kansas Military Academy in 1919 (Rogal, 2009). On the night of
January 10, 1927, the fire at the Kansas Military Academy trapped Cadet J. Kenneth
Lum, an eight-year-old boy, on the second floor. When the fire chief called his men back
to beat the flames from the second floor room, Colonel Clyde Terry climbed the ladder to
the window and entered the room. The dense smoke and burning ceiling and walls made
it impossible to see. Crawling into the room, Terry felt his way to the bed. Carrying
Cadet Lum as far as the window, the Colonel passed out as he tried to push the boy out
the window. Observing the attempted rescue, the firefighters pulled the two from the
burning building. They were unable to revive the young cadet, but saved Terry who had
suffered serious burns (Carnegie Foundation, 1919).

Fire, particularly in the early 20th century, was a real danger for boarding schools.
Unlike most schools that suffered major fires, the Kansas Military Academy did not
close. Terry took five of his teachers and 44 cadets by train to Aledo, Illinois, and with
the financial help of the Aledo businesspeople, they reopened the school under the name
Illinois Military Academy (Guinn, 2008). Within seven years, the school grew to include
first through twelfth grades, a 13-member faculty that included a United States Naval
Academy graduate as commandant, and enrollment of 100 cadets to include a small
junior college (Terry, 1934).
Terry’s good fortune with support in his newfound home in Illinois, demonstrates the importance of strong community support for private military schools. In September 1896, a fire at another military school, Missouri Military Academy, closed the school. All 86 cadets escaped, and in October, the founder, Colonel Alexander F. Fleet, with five staff and 72 cadets, traveled by train to Culver Military Academy in Indiana where there was dormitory space (Davies, 1983). Although Colonel Fleet never returned to Missouri, the Business Association of Mexico, Missouri, along with the superintendent from the closed Alabama Military Institute (due to fire), rebuilt Missouri Military Academy and reopened it in 1900 (Missouri Military Academy, 2011, History). Other schools would survive their fires and rebuild including Chamberlain Military Institute in 1911, Horner Military Academy in 1914, Randolph Macon Academy, Front Royal, Virginia in 1927, and Valley Forge Military Academy in 1929 in Pennsylvania.

A tragic fire occurred in 1906 that burned North Hall, Milner Hall, and the school Annex of Kenyon Military Academy in Ohio. The early morning fire occurred while 85 cadets slept. At role call formation, several cadets were missing and the falling walls of the burning building nearly made victims of their rescuers. The bodies of three cadets were found in the debris: Cadets James Fuller, 18 years of age, Everett Henderson, 18, and Winfield Kunkel, just 15. The Kenyon Military Academy closed the next year. Major fires ended many associated schools (“Three students die,” 1908).

Rogal (2009), in his book on American precollege military prep schools, named fire as the “traditional demon of military schools” (p. 67). The following examples of military schools that closed as a result of fires in the early 20th century confirm Rogal’s statement.
Table 9

*Military School Closings Due to Fire*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Fire</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>Maryland Military Institute</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>Pullman Military Academy</td>
<td>Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Worthington Military Academy</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Clinton Liberal Institute</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Alabama Military Institute</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Claverack College and Hudson River Institute</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Rockland Military School in New Hampshire</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Betts Military Academy</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Nebraska Military Academy</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Wilson Military Academy</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Rock River Military Academy</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Tupelo Military Institute</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After 1908, the number of fires decreased partly because of safety measures enacted following the major tragedy at the Lakeview Elementary School in Collinswood, Ohio. On March 4, 1908, the public elementary school caught fire due to an overheated steam pipe and killed 172 children and two teachers. National reaction resulted in reforms including outward opening doors, fire inspections, and stricter laws associated with safety and fire prevention (Neil, 1998). As a result, there was a new awareness about safety
issues and new construction for military schools included fireproof barracks. Examples of schools with new improved construction after the 1908 tragedy included Staunton Military Academy, Blee’s Military Academy, Culver Military Academy, Northwestern Military and Naval Academy, Tennessee Military Institute, Texas Military Institute in San Antonio, and Augusta Military Academy. Missouri Military Academy advertised that their buildings destroyed by fire were replaced by fireproof ones. New York Military Academy claimed in 1912 to have “the most complete fire-proof military school in the United States” (Cosmopolitan, 1912, p. 26).

The Great Depression and Other Challenges

The Great Depression took its toll on the military school movement. Particularly hard hit were the smaller military schools that had little endowment to fall back on and, with declining enrollments, became insolvent and closed (Trousdale, 2007). The Great Depression started in 1929, and reached its depth in 1933 and extended into the onset of World War II 1939–1941. During that period construction, which had peaked in 1925, had fallen 47% by 1932. By 1933 the Consumer Price Index had fallen 18% from 1929 levels and the Gross National Product fallen by 29%. Unemployment rose from 3.2% to 24.9% at a time when only eight states had any type of unemployment compensation and these were totally inadequate (McElvaine, 2009).

Between 1929 and 1938, discounting the military schools that transitioned to nonmilitary schools, 51 military schools closed. Those schools that survived took a variety of actions to remain economically viable. Carlisle Military School in South Carolina had a steady decline in enrollment from 110 to about 50. Despite cutting the tuition from $470 to $380 per year, the Methodist Church withdrew support and was
forced to lease out the school. What steps James F. Risher took after leasing the school were not documented, but he took the school back to 100 cadets in 1936 and, as the depression ended, there were 150 cadets for the school year 1938–1939 (Rogal, 2006).

Enrollment at Culver Military Academy in Indiana dropped from 695 cadets in 1929 to a low of 335 in 1934. In an effort to encourage enrollment, tuition was decreased from $1,500 to $1,100 per year. There was a net profit of $30 per cadet in 1929, but by 1934 the school took a loss of $60 per student. In 1932, two teachers were offered free room and board as payment. From 1932 to 1938, the economic crisis caused the school to make a significant reduction in teaching staff. In 1932 and 1933, staff or faculty positions were reduced by ten; between 1934 and 1936, faculty decreased by an additional 40, leaving a total of 73 faculty. Before summer enrollment in 1935, the school tried to increase its income and reduce costs by reducing salaries (Davies, 1983).

It is no wonder that so many small military schools were forced to close. From 1932 to 1933, private schools had one of the smallest enrollment numbers in history. Despite this, administrators such as Colonel L. R. Gignilliat of Culver and James Risher from Carlisle Military School took the actions required to save their schools from financial ruin. The top 25 private military boarding schools in 1932 were still able to attract 8,069 cadets with an average enrollment of 323 (Stearns, 1934). Those that survived the depression did so through determined fiscal management.

**Legal challenge.** In 1922, there was a major legal challenge to private military schools. That year, the State of Oregon Compulsory Education Act amended the state constitution, passing by a vote of 115,000 to 101,000. This act required children ages eight to 16 to attend public school. At the time, there were two private military schools in
the state, Hill Military Academy and the Oregon Military Academy. The preliminary campaign to amend the state constitution was undertaken by a committee of the Scottish Rite Masons. They stressed the importance of “children being democratically trained in the common schools” (O’Hara, 1923, p. 484). The Ku-Klux Klan was an open supporter of the act and could produce 14,000 members in the state. Fighting against the act were the Catholics, Lutherans, Seventh Day Adventists, Episcopalians, and at least 20 well-known Presbyterian ministers. The law required 10,000 private and parochial school students to transfer to public schools. Such a law could have become a challenge to the majority of nation-wide military schools as other states adopted similar laws (O’Hara, 1923).

The Sisters of the Holy Names, representing their elementary and high schools, along with Hill Military School, challenged the law in court. By the time the court challenge reached the United States Supreme Court in 1926, the Oregon Military Academy had closed. The Sisters argued that the act was a violation of a “parents’ choice of school, rights of schools and teachers rights to engage in a useful business profession” (Imber & Van Geel, 2010, p. 20). Hill Military Academy claimed the act “violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution against deprivation of their property without due process” (Imber & Van Geel, 2010, p. 20). The Supreme Court sided against the state and in favor of Hill Military Academy and the Sisters of the Holy Name (“Pierce v. Society,” 1926).

**Public education.** Between 1879 and 1886, enrollment in private school plummeted from 73% to 32%; in 1889, it was down to 18% and 11% in 1910 (Hadley, 1999). This was due to expansion of the availability of public education at the primary
and secondary levels. The expansion of public education did not incorporate, for the most part, the military school format. Many smaller military boarding schools and most nonboarding military schools were faced with challenges in enrollment as their cadets and potential cadets were incorporated into free public education. This forced many military schools to close, and a number of their administrators took positions in public school district leadership. City University’s founder, Professor Edward Wyman, of St. Louis School became President of the Board of Directors of Public Schools, and St. John’s Academy’s Reverend Richard L. Carney became superintendent of public schools in Alexandria, Virginia (Catholic Educational Review, 1911).

The dramatic decline of private schools, along with an expansion of public education, came at a time of heightened post-Civil War patriotic spirit. The advent of public education resulted in the closure of many smaller nonboarding military schools with their functions absorbed into public education. At the same time, the patriotic feelings of the period helped increase private boarding military schools, resulting in military schools occupying a larger portion of the total private school population. A few years prior to the First World War, military schools and preparatory departments of private colleges accounted for 73% of private school enrollment (Hadley, 1999).

**World War I**

Military schools again contributed to the military efforts of the United States in another war, World War I. The Supreme Allied Commander during the war, French General Ferdinand Foch, visited the United States after the war and said there were two things he was most impressed with: the size of the country and the widespread network of
military schools. Although no nationwide accounting of World War I military school contributions has been made, there are individual examples.

Table 10

*Examples of Military School Contributions to World War I Effort*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World War Service</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,686</td>
<td>Culver Military Academy</td>
<td>Indiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,297</td>
<td>Virginia Tech</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,217</td>
<td>Texas A&amp;M</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>Clemson</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>Virginia Military Institute</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800</td>
<td>Pennsylvania Maritime Academy</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>710</td>
<td>New Mexico Military Institute</td>
<td>New Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>495</td>
<td>Norwich University</td>
<td>Vermont</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450</td>
<td>Gordon Military College</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450</td>
<td>Massachusetts Maritime Academy</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>371</td>
<td>North Georgia College</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350</td>
<td>Pennsylvania Military Institute</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>316</td>
<td>The Citadel</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>New York Maritime Academy</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>Linsey Military Academy (School)</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One Hundred and Twenty Years of Growth in Military Schools Ends

From 1898 to 1926 was a period in educational history of the United States in which the military school format was generally accepted as a positive force for the education of young boys and men. For 116 years, from 1802 to 1926, the number of military schools had grown and peaked. But after that time, there was first a growing questioning of the military nature of schools that slowed growth, and then the Great Depression and the advance of public education that would cause the first decrease in the number of military schools in the United States.
Chapter 10: The Second World War through the 1950s

During the period between 1903 and 1926, the number of military schools in operation was approximately 278 to 280. In the 12 years from 1939 and 1950, that number had decreased by 50 military schools to 228. Despite the demise of more than 50 military schools, military school enrollment was the highest in history. The reason for this was threefold. Cadets enrolled in the Land Grant colleges outnumbered West Point enrollment. The surviving military schools' enrollments were increasing with a recovering economy and a national change in attitude towards military schools, which coincided with the approach and advent of World War II and the involvement of the United States.

In 1935, the enrollment at West Point was authorized to increase to 1,960 cadets. But seven years later in 1942, the cadet enrollment at the three Land Grant military colleges each exceeded 2,000, Texas A&M having 6,543 cadets, Clemson 2,364, and Virginia Tech 2,490, for a total of 11,397 cadets. Since their establishment, the Land Grant military colleges were steadily increasing their cadet enrollment. Their combined enrollment in 1938, prior to the war in Europe, was significant at 9,044. By 1942, the military colleges were also experiencing their largest enrollments to date. The Citadel had 1,980 cadets, Virginia Military Institute 761, North Georgia College 536, Norwich 528, and Pennsylvania Military Institute 232 cadets.

The popularity of military education at the college level was indicated by its growth. In 1923, when Virginia Tech made participation in the corps voluntary for juniors and seniors, the vast majority of returning junior and senior cadets remained with their classmates in the barracks and with their cadet company. Their experience in the
corps produced cadets who were devoted and felt "close camaraderie fused with self-discipline, personal honor, respect and fidelity" (Temple, 1996, p. viii). Virginia Tech's president, Paul Barringer, contrasted it with his experience as a University of Virginia graduate. "At the University [of Virginia] we had an academic like affection, but here it is like a personal matter if you touch the Virginia Polytechnic Institute [Virginia Tech]. It is like a loyalty I have never seen" (Temple, 1996, p. viii).

From 1938 to 1942, there were 10 military junior colleges offering one or two years of college, six maritime academies, and several primarily secondary military schools. The military junior colleges functioning at the time were Gordon Military College in Georgia; Georgia Military College; Kemper Military Academy in Missouri; Marion Military Institute in Alabama; New Mexico Military Institute; North Texas Agricultural College; Valley Forge Military Academy & College in Pennsylvania; Wentworth Military Academy and College in Missouri; Schreiner Institute in Kerrville, Texas; and Texas Military College in San Antonio. Together these schools and colleges had approximately 2,100 college-level cadets.

In 1942, the six maritime academies, including the new federal United States Maritime Academy, had a combined enrollment of approximately 2,500. This number includes the Maine Maritime Academy, established with just 28 cadets, and the other four academies, including Pennsylvania Maritime Academy, California Maritime Academy, New York Maritime Academy, and Massachusetts Maritime Academy. These maritime academies had an enrollment of approximately 3,175 cadets and midshipmen. There were also schools that were primarily secondary in nature but offered one or two years of military programming. These colleges included Allen Military Academy (one year),
Edwards Military Institute in North Carolina, and the Oklahoma Military Academy with a college enrollment of approximately 200 cadets.

With the 2,496 cadets authorized for West Point in 1942, a similar number authorized for the Naval Academy, and the Coast Guard Academy with 219 cadets, the total military school enrollment at the college level was approximately 26,100. In 1942, the United States had 172 military schools and military junior colleges with a combined enrollment of approximately 34,800 cadets at the primary and secondary school levels. The total enrollment of military schools in the United States in 1942 was approximately 61,000 cadets and midshipmen enrolled in primary, secondary, and college-level education.

As the United States involvement in World War II approached and the Great Depression receded, antimilitary sentiment by the pacifist movement weakened. The onset of World War II created a “common bond, a shared purpose, and a spirit that cemented relationships and concern for one another. There was conflict among individuals and groups as there always had been, but dedication to winning the war took precedence over all concerns” (Cardozier, 1993, p. IX). The changing social attitude toward the military and military schools was mirrored by Hollywood’s themes.

**Hollywood’s Promotion of Military School Image**

One of the first indications that Hollywood was reflecting a positive image of military schools was a series of films addressing the United States Naval Academy. The first in 1933, *Midshipman Jack*, was followed by three films in 1935, *Annapolis Farewell, Shipmates Forever*, and *Annapolis Salute*. Soon after the premier of these films, *Navy Blue and Gold* focused on the Navy football team and, like other movies, was
a positive story of military school life. In fact, a New York film critic commented that he wondered how the academy recruited their midshipmen “before Hollywood took up its pious burden of glorifying it” (Suid, 1996, p. 31).

In 1938, *Brother Rat* with Ronald Reagan and Eddy Albert was released. This film was about the Virginia Military Institute and much of it was filmed on location. The theme emphasized the institute’s honor code, its military heroes, and “ideals and unbending honor” (Vaughn, 1994, p. 97). In 1939, a positive image complete with the popular Jackie Cooper was set and filmed at Culver Military Academy, *The Spirit of Culver*. After the war started, *The Major and the Minor* was released in 1942, and starred Ginger Rogers. The movie was set in a military secondary prep school and was heralded as “one of the year’s freshest and funniest movies” (*The Major and the Minor*, 1942).

Also in 1942, *Ten Gentlemen from West Point* was released, and it was a historical look at one of West Point’s early classes (Umphlett, 1984). *We Never Been Licked* was filmed in 1942 on the Texas A&M campus. The setting for an espionage plot was filmed around the military traditions of the “Aggie Corps.”

After World War II, Hollywood movies through the 1950s continued to reflect the positive attitude in the United States regarding military schools. The *Spirit of West Point*, released in 1947, was a football story but featured two cadets who were tempted to turn their professional choices of service over self. The film emphasized the academy’s honor code and ethical and gentlemanly conduct (Herbeck, 2003). James Cagney and Doris Day stared in *The West Point Story*, a musical that featured a Broadway director trying to help West Point cadets put on their annual show (Lockhart, 1951).
In the 1950s, there were a number of films depicting military schools in a positive, light-hearted manner. In 1952, Donald O'Connor starred in a comical series with a West Point theme, *Francis Goes to West Point*. In 1955, *The Private War of Major Benson* starred Charlton Heston as a hardened combat veteran who softens to the needs of his cadets (Budahn, 2000). The same year, *The Long Gray Line* starring Tyrone Powers and Maureen O'Hara told the story of a positive relationship between an Irish sergeant athletic coach and his family. It featured generations of cadets including MacArthur, Bradley, and Eisenhower (Umphlett, 1984). The films produced in the 1930s through the 1960s supported the public positive sentiment toward the American military school.

**Military School Associations**

Between 1914 and 1950, two associations were formed among military schools. The first was formed in 1914 by military school owners and administrators. Educational associations were not a new concept at the time. The National Educational Association was established in 1861 and Maine Educational Association in 1866. The Patterson’s American Educational Directory in 1918 listed 117 associations representing various types of schools, teachers, and administrators.

The Association of Military Colleges and Schools of the United States was formed through the efforts of Colonel J. C. Woodward of Georgia Military College. He contacted each of the military colleges, military junior colleges, and military secondary schools and invited them to attend a conference in December 1913 in Washington, DC. As a motivation, the colonel proposed two questions. He asked if their institutions were not performing a “far greater service for education in general, and training of our citizen soldiers in particular, than is generally known? Why have we so long labored without
more definitely organizing effort" (Hadley, 1999, pp. 20-21). Colonel Woodward alluded to the need for an organization to promote "national policy, relationship to the War Department, obtaining more assistance from the Government and gaining more public interest" (Hadley, 1999, p. 21).

The meeting was conducted in the Ebbit House in Washington, DC. Attendees included representatives of Augusta Military Academy in Virginia, Culver Military Academy of Indiana, New Mexico Military Institute, Virginia Military Institute, and Virginia Tech. As a result of the meeting, the association was established the next year in 1914. This was just in time to make a significant long-term impact not only for military schools, but military training in schools in general.

In 1916, the Congressional Committee on Military Affairs held hearings on a bill to "increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States" (U.S. Congress, 1916, p. 1). At that time, Europe was deep into the First World War and defense was paramount in the minds of the government. Sebastian C. Jones, the second president of the Association, led the delegation to the hearings. Jones was the Superintendent of New York Military Institute. He described the association as having grown to membership of 42 military schools with 10,000 cadets, several colleges with enrollments of 1,000, private schools with enrollments of 300 to 450, and several other schools with enrollments of 150 to 175 (U.S. Congress, 1916). The hearings included testimony not only from Jones, but also by representatives from the following association military schools: Columbia Military Academy of Tennessee, Culver Military Academy of Indiana, Georgia Military Academy, St. John's College of Maryland, and Virginia Military Institute. The hearings and the resulting congressional action established the
ROTC programs, and the act included advantageous support and recognition for military colleges and schools.

The second military association established was the National Association of Military Schools in 1950. At its height of membership, it represented 126 schools. The founder was Colonel W. C. Tommy Atkinson, a long-time superintendent for the Army and Navy Academy in California. The original members of the association were Army and Navy Academy, Colorado Military School, McCallie School in Tennessee, and Roosevelt Military Academy in Illinois (Hadley, 1999).

Beginning in 1956, membership which had been limited exclusively to military schools was expanded to include both private and public schools and public school districts that had Junior ROTC or National Defense Cadet Corps programs. The National Defense Cadet Corps is an organization that is similar to JROTC but does not receive funding for instructors. The purpose of this association was comparable to the Association of Military Colleges and Schools of the United States in that their goal was to provide a united voice for obtaining federal support of its associated membership (Hadley, 1999).

The National Association of Military Schools was successful in its mission, but with declining enrollments of military schools in the 1960s and many schools transitioning to a civilian format, the association encouraged amalgamation with the Association of Military Colleges and Schools of the United States. The president of the National Association of Military Schools, Colonel Keith Duckers, from St. John’s Military School in Kansas, and Colonel Charles Stribling of Missouri Military Academy, president of the Association of Military Colleges and Schools of the United States, were
personal friends, which helped to facilitate combining organizations. In 1972, the same year that Colonel Atkinson, the founder of the Association of Military Colleges and Schools of the United States (AMCSUS) retired from the leadership of the Army and Navy Academy, the National Association of Military Schools merged into AMCSUS (Hadley, 1999).

The Association of Military Colleges and Schools of the United States maintained its membership as military schools. The membership consisted of military colleges and universities, including maritime academies, junior military colleges, and private military schools. In 2011, the members included 26 private military schools, five junior colleges, and nine military colleges or universities including the maritime academies. Oakland Military Institute College Preparatory Academy was the first public educational school to be admitted in the association. Since 1914, the association successfully advocated for a variety of issues associated with common themes of interest. Between 1923 and 1995, there were 133 topics addressed at the association's annual meetings. Examples of topics addressed include administration, advantages of military schools, alumni publications, asbestos problems, athletics, difficult cadets, business/financial management, coeducation in military schools, cooperation among military schools, development/fund raising, ethical relations among schools, faculty, federal military inspection ratings, the honor system, insurance, military training, private schools compared to military schools, and the value of military education. The topics reflect the challenges faced primarily by the private secondary schools, which comprised the majority of the member schools.
The War Department on Campus

West Point’s continuity was heavily impacted during World War I, with the Class of 1918 graduating in November 1917, the Class of 1918 in August 1917, and the Class of 1919 in June 1918. To make matters worse, the losses in casualties among officers in France resulted in the sophomore and junior class who were presented to be new cadets on November 1, 1918, were all commissioned as lieutenants for service in France (Cowley & Guinzberg, 2002). West Point, like all military colleges, depended on a class system that ran smoothly, and the First World War prevented that transition.

After the war, General Douglas MacArthur became the superintendent of West Point and made positive changes that resulted in his being named the Father of Modern West Point. MacArthur was an alumni of both West Point and Texas of Military Institute (called West Texas Military Academy prior to 1926). He moved to outlaw hazing, expand the sports program, establish senior privileges, and modernize both academic and military training (Cowley & Guinzberg, 2002).

In the Army’s quest to avoid the mistakes of the World War I disruption, West Point, at the onset of World War II, established a more orderly three-year curriculum. The Class of 1943 graduated in January 1943 and the Class of 1944 in June 1943. The traditional four-year curriculum would not be reestablished until September 1945 (Cowley & Guinzberg, 2002). Likewise, the United States Naval Academy accelerated their program and the Class of 1941 graduated in February 1941, the Class of 1942 in December 1941, and the school converted to a three-year curriculum with additional academies conducted in the summer that included 88% of the four-year curriculum’s academic instruction (Sweetman, 1995).
The Land Grant military colleges were not offered an orderly alternative but seen as an almost immediate source of soldiers in World War II. In 1918, most of the older cadets in the Land Grant military schools were enlisted in the Army’s Student Army Training Corps. These cadets became part of the enlisted military force of the Army or Navy and in 1919 were intended to feed officers into the Army. The Land Grant military colleges and other military college campuses had both an Army unit that included former cadets and a corps of cadets. Because the war ended in November 1918, the Army quickly demobilized due to the Spanish flu epidemic, and the war had little impact on the Land Grant military schools with the exception of enlistments from the ranks of many of their faculty and cadets.

During World War II, the profile for military colleges was very different from prior decades. After 1942 until the end of the war in 1945, many college-level military schools experienced a repeat of the situation that beset many southern military schools during the Civil War. The enrollment of the Cadets Corps at the Citadel, Clemson, Pennsylvania Military Academy, Texas A&M, Virginia Military Institute, and Virginia Tech declined in enrollment an average of 75% between 1942 and 1945. The cadet enrollment in 1945 was down to 427 at the Citadel, 757 at Clemson, 93 at North Georgia College, 134 at Norwich, and 27 cadets at Pennsylvania Military Academy. There were 1,992 cadets at Texas A&M, 207 at Virginia Military Institute, and 211 at Virginia Tech.

Virginia Tech’s experience was similar to that of the other Land Grant military colleges. In 1942, the corps of cadets at Virginia Tech was 2,640 strong. They were organized into a brigade of two regiments totaling five battalions with each oriented to a particular branch of the Army: one infantry, one engineer, and three coast artillery. By
1945, the Corps was reduced to a cadet battalion of two companies numbering only 211 cadets. Most of the underclassmen were 18 years or younger and many of the upper classmen were either classified as "4 F" and rejected from military service or awaiting report dates for active military training (Coulter, 2000).

What transpired at Virginia Tech was similar to what happened at West Point during World War I. The curriculum was accelerated and class loads were heavy. Seniors were called to active duty, followed by juniors (McCormick, Newberry, & Jumper, 2004). In most cases, these cadets were commissioned as officers. As the war accelerated, many cadets simply enlisted. By February 1943, the vast majority of senior and junior cadets had departed, and those remaining were assigned to the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), which had been activated on campus. Before the war ended, 3,387 men passed through the ASTP at Virginia Tech, the vast majority of them not former students.

The Army Specialized Training Program was established to train soldiers for technical skills associated with engineering, communications, medicine, dentistry, personnel psychology, and foreign languages (Keefer, 2011). The commandant supervised active-duty organizations of the armed forces, including the ASTP, a Specialized Training and Reassignment Unit (STAR), and an Army Specialized Reserve Training Program Unit (ASTRP) composed of 296, 17-year-old high school graduates and a naval preflight unit (Coulter, 2000). Those still in the ASTP in February 1944 regardless of their training were assigned as riflemen in the hard-hit infantry divisions in the European theater after heavy losses in Italy and France.
The war reduced the collegiate level of military school enrollment outside the federal military academies and maritime academies by about 75%. Cadets were replaced by soldiers, and after a short time, those soldiers were no longer former cadets, but men who had no knowledge of the military traditions or military school ethos of those institutions. A small number of younger cadets and upper classmen labeled unfit for active duty maintained the institutes' traditions as best they could. A greater challenge to those traditions would emerge after the war.

**World War II**

The contributions of military schools to the war efforts in World War II have never been completely documented. In 1944, Colonel R. L. Jackson, superintendent of Western Military Academy, calculated the contribution of military secondary schools and military junior colleges to the war effort. General Melton G. Baker of Valley Forge Military Academy in Pennsylvania estimated that in 1941, military schools provided 50,000 officers for the war effort in 1944 (Hadley, 1999). Using these numbers as a starting point, and adding the officers of the maritime academies and federal military academies, along with officers produced by military schools late in the war the total number of officers contributed to World War II by military schools probably approached 95,500 individuals.
Events of the 1960s along with the Vietnam War changed the perception of military schools and the military in general. The idealism reflected in President John F. Kennedy's "ask not what your country can do for you" speech died a slow death with his assassination, Robert Kennedy's murder, Reverend Martin Luther King's violent death, and the Vietnam War protests. Replacing patriotic idealism was a youth counterculture associated with long hair, rebellious dress and behavior, and political activism. All these behaviors ran counter to the military school ethos.

In 1975, *Newsweek Magazine* contrasted earlier decades:

The nation's military academies regularly turned out battalions of neat, generally well-disciplined lads, whose handsome uniforms were often the envy of their civilian peers, and whose patriotism and values were for the most part mirror images of those that had been imparted to them by their parents and their military instructors (Hadley, 1999, p. 148).

The article went on to say that military schools fell from favor due to "national frustrations over the War in Vietnam" (Hadley, 1999, p. 148). This was a period where soldiers returning from Vietnam would change from their uniform when they arrived at the airport, because military dress was greeted with insults and degradation. The increasingly antimilitary national mood was reflected in a "public anathema toward military education" (Hadley, 1999, p. 124).

Young people diminished the value of a military school education and questioned the most basic of the military school ethos. Dr. Wiley Lee Umphlett, who has written extensively for the film industry, purports that movie themes and messages in the 1940s reflect sociocultural changes in social behavior and the mood of America. He stated that the "displaying of a code of honor and standard of behavior that are no longer credible,
the spirit theme of movies like the *Spirit of West Point* is as old fashioned today as the patriotic mood that inspired it” (Umphlett, 1984, p. 96). This comment says as much about that earlier period as it does of the post-Vietnam War period and its attitudes toward the military school ethos.

The 1960s and 1970s and, to a lesser degree, even the early 1980s were heavily influenced by the anti-establishment generation. Originating in the latter part of the 1950s, Beat or Beatnik culture and its influence inspired youthful rebellion against traditional values that characterized the military school culture. A series of events pushed the countercultural movement to expand and touch the lives of millions. This influence played heavily on high school and college-age students.

During the 12-year period between 1966 and 1978, 73 military schools closed or transitioned to nonmilitary format. At least 33 of these schools that made the transition also dropped JROTC. For those schools still operating in 2011, there was little or no mention in their publications that they had functioned as military schools in the past. During the same 12 years, only five military schools were newly established. Three of these schools were associated with Puerto Rico or the heavily Cuban-influenced population of Miami. The Caguas Military Academy, established in 1975, is one of seven military schools in Puerto Rico in operation in 2011. Both the Miami Aerospace Academy and the Inter American Military Academy operated in Miami, Florida, during the 1970s and into the 1980s. The other two schools that opened during this period of low popularity of military schools were General MacArthur Military Academy in New Jersey, which operated from 1966 to 1975, and the Penn Military Academy, Hesperia, California, which was active around 1968 until 1970. The state of California offers an excellent
example of how the educational landscape changed for military schools in a very short
period of time.

In 1963 there were 20 military schools operating in California. Fourteen years
later in 1979, California only had four military schools: Army and Navy Academy,
California Maritime Academy, St. Catherine's Military Academy, and Southern
California Military Academy. Only Army and Navy Academy was a secondary boarding
military school. The military schools in California that closed during that period had
operated for an average of 42 years. Mount Tamalpais Military Academy closed after
operating for 80 years from 1892 to 1971.

Some military schools attempted to adjust their programs accordingly to survive.
Examples of schools that were successful included Texas Military Institute in Texas and
St. John's College High School in Washington, DC. In 1972, Texas Military Institute
(TMI) admitted females then allowed them the option to be cadets. Two years later, TMI
made the Corps of Cadet optional for male students (Coulter, 2002). With a military
school format that harbored dual students bodies, civilian and cadet, the school continued
to be successful.

One school that made adjustments unsuccessfully was Columbia Military
Academy in Tennessee. Established in 1905, the school was a victim of three social
changes: the antimilitary feeling associated with the Vietnam War, desegregation, and the
changing attitudes of young students. The antimilitary feeling during the 1960s made it
difficult to recruit cadets to enroll willfully in a military boarding school. Another factor
also came into play. With the desegregation of public schools in the early 1960s, local
day academies opened across the country. These schools were additional competition to military boarding schools that were already finding it difficult to retain cadets.

Columbia tried to transition from a military boarding school to a military day school. They admitted females in 1969 that were offered the option to participate in the military program. By 1978, too few male students wanted to participate in the military program, indicating that the “discipline and rigor of military training . . . central to the success and pride” had lost its appeal and the school closed. (Columbia Military Academy Alumni Association, 2011, History).

Apparently it was not only the students who no longer saw the utility of military schools, but the parents as well. Western Military Academy of Illinois was established in 1868 and transitioned to military in 1892. In 1972, declining enrollment caused the school to close. The closure was attributed to parents who did not want to send their children to military schools (Soloman, 1998).

The 1960s and 1970s were an intense period of antimilitary feelings in the United States. Military secondary schools, as well as junior colleges and military colleges, suffered declining enrollments and closed. Three military colleges were particularly hard hit. Norwich University suffered the indirect effect of declining freshman classes as fewer young men chose to enroll in military colleges. Norwich, a private college, found itself faced with a financial crisis. Between 1966 and 1975, cadet enrollment at the university dropped from 1,292 to 914. The decline in enrollment contributed to the operating deficit of the university. Financial support decreased from $426,091 in 1970, to $81,856 in 1974 (Kraus, 1978). Had it not been for endowments and increased
enrollment beginning in 1975, the university’s future might have gone the same way of so many other military secondary schools.

The antimilitary movement also impacted Pennsylvania Military College and Virginia Tech. Neither of these schools was protected by the isolation provided by a purely military campus. Pennsylvania Military College was established in 1853 by Theodore Hyatt. He transitioned the prep school into the Delaware Military Academy in 1858. The school moved to Pennsylvania in 1862 and adopted its Pennsylvania designation. Like Norwich, the school was privately owned by the Hyatt Family. By the 1960s, the location of Chester, Pennsylvania, had become an urban environment, complete with flames of petroleum refineries and the Delaware River shipyards close by. Just five miles away from Chester was Swarthmore College, which had a pacifist tradition and therefore supported an active antiwar movement.

Between 1962 and 1966, Pennsylvania Military College (PMC) started an evolution from a military college dominated by a uniformed cadet corps into a college of two student bodies, with the civilian numbers overshadowing the military. The school enrolled veterans as civilian male students, but in 1966, the administration opened enrollment to other male students including “students whose educational and career objectives do not coincide with cadet living” (Kraus, 1978, p. 178). In 1967, the school began enrolling female students.

Amid the urban environment, hostile students from Swarthmore College, and a growing nonmilitary population at PMC, the corps of cadets numbers dwindled. According to the Pennsylvania Military College president, this was because of “the antimilitary climate of the nation” (Kraus, 1978, p. 184). The Citadel, Virginia Military
Institute, and North Georgia College began to experience modest gains in enrollment in 1971, while Pennsylvania Military College reached its lowest cadet enrollment. Those three military colleges that saw gains were isolated from many of the direct social effects because of their rural environments and military campus, unlike Pennsylvania Military College.

In 1960, Pennsylvania Military College had 650 cadets making up 65% of the total enrollment. As the environment at military colleges deteriorated through external and internal influences and administrative enrollment decisions, cadet enrollment decreased in 1966 to 590, in 1969 to 450, and in 1970 to 331 cadets. In 1971, cadet enrollment was 277, just 18% of total enrollment. Furthermore, the demise of the military college was also attributed to Philadelphia's influential Quaker pacifist tradition, which faced a cadet alumni population that was largely socioeconomically blue collar and did not have the political influence to counter their desires (Kraus, 1978).

Declining cadet enrollment was not only a matter of smaller incoming freshmen classes, but also the defection of upper classmen cadets. In 1969, 22% of cadets chose not to return to the school. The 1969 yearbook described a civilian college and praised the college president as he “had placed the past in proper perspective and had given emphasis to the today and tomorrow of Pennsylvania Military College” (Kraus, 1978, p. 181). In 1972, the school changed its name to Widener College and disbanded its corps of cadets. The school followed the recommendation of a management study and buried its 113-year military tradition as a “good marketing decision” (Kraus, 1978, p. 181). The alumni and remaining cadets, now civilian students, became highly embittered.
Until 1970, Virginia Tech seemed to be isolated from the antiwar and countercultural movement because it was “located in the Appalachian Mountains of Southwest Virginia in a region known for its cultural isolation and social and political conservatism” (Virginia Tech, 2011, Context). The civilian student body was characterized by antiwar activists as “apathetic” and a “lousy cow college . . . [where] nobody cares” (MacGregor, 1970, p. 3). There were few, if any, activities at Virginia Tech during the 1969 nationwide campus protests, known as the “Moratorium against the Vietnam War.” Like Texas A&M, where a handful of students conducted a short march, Virginia Tech was known as a conservative school focused on academics, coupled with a strong military tradition. In 1970, a small group of civilian students at the university would threaten the campus tranquility.

With the invasion of Cambodia in April and a growing dissatisfaction among some students with the administration’s conservative Student Life Policies, the signs of an antiwar and counterculture movement began to emerge. In 1970, Virginia Tech had a student population of 11,000 civilians and 973 cadets. The cadets were housed in military barracks and were uniformed for class in their gray class uniforms or blue dress uniforms in a style similar to the West Point cut.

On April 14, 1970, protesters gathered to disrupt Tuesday afternoon cadet corps drill as the corps marched off the upper quadrangle to the centrally located drill field. Company A, the lead unit, was diverted from its destination in an effort to avoid physical confrontation. Company B and the other companies of the corps arrived at their drill location to see Company I surrounded by protesters. They were forced to march and push their way through the gauntlet of chants and attempts at humiliation; protesters had
toy guns, an upside-down American flag, and a large plastic pig. Members of the civilian student government attempted to get the protestors to end their activities to no avail. The last company marching off the drill field was surrounded, and only through the maintenance of cadet discipline and assistance from a few civilian students were leaders and cadet senior-staff officers able to march the company back to their barracks, avoiding violence.

The event resulted in a closing of ranks among the cadets coupled with feelings of isolation in the upper quad. The university administration acted quickly, suspending 10 student-demonstration leaders and obtaining a court injunction against further action. After a 200-person student march on the main administration building in response to the demonstration, the campus returned to normal.

But the following month at Kent State in Ohio, four students were shot and killed by National Guard soldiers. At Virginia Tech, demonstrators occupied Cowgill Hall, which disrupted classes, but the occupation ended quietly. Williams Hall was then occupied by 168 demonstrators. The state police responded to administration requests and demonstrators were forcibly removed; all were loaded on tractor trailers for their trip to the jail. The 107 students involved were suspended (Virginia Tech, 2011, Evidence).

"The campus climate, once serene, became polarizing. Students found themselves forced to make a stand on both campus and national events" (Virginia Tech, 2011, Evidence). The result was that enrollment in the corps declined from 541 in 1972 to 355 in 1977. The negative civilian image of the campus, along with a less conducive environment, made recruiting cadets a difficult task. It would take many years of
concerted efforts and a united front of alumni, cadets, and the commandant's office to increase enrollment of Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets.

Following the Vietnam War, Hollywood portrayed through their films a poor image of military education. Films released in the 1980s included three films portraying military schools in a bad light. In 1980, *The Lords of Discipline* depicted a military college as an institution of bigotry where an African American cadet had to be protected from death threats. *Taps*, released in 1981, was particularly demeaning as it addressed the closing of a military school and the devoted cadets who threatened violence to sustain the institution. These films were followed in 1986 by a two-part miniseries made for television. *Dress Gray* depicted a military college where the murder of a freshman cadet is covered up by administration. The 1980s films depicted military schools "as dehumanizing institutions, where nonconformity was severely punished" (Prunier, 2005, p. 5).

The antiwar movement and rebellious-youth culture enforced by Hollywood's representation of military education helped to diminish the number of military schools to levels not seen since the 1840s. In 1980, only 81 military schools remained in the United States, and that level would further decrease until 1998 when there were only 74 military schools.

Coeducation and a Court Case

Prior to the 1970s, documentation of the existence of female members of a corps of cadets at military schools is difficult to find and perhaps does not exist. Several schools' female students functioned as auxiliary organizations but did not appear to be under military requirements. There is some documentation that at two schools, their
auxiliary function may have included military-style uniforms and some elements of participation in the corps of cadets well prior to the 1970s. The Fairfield Seminary & Military Academy, a private secondary military school in New York in the late 20th century, and the Atlantic Air Academy in New Hampshire, which functioned from 1945 until 1949 or 1953, may have had female cadets, but the research has yet to be discovered.

In the 1970s, among declining enrollment, many all-male military schools not only enrolled female students but also offered female membership in the schools’ corps of cadets. Among the schools that opened its military programs to female cadets at the secondary school level were Lyman Ward Military Academy in Alabama in 1973, Texas Military Institute in 1974, New York Military Academy in 1975, San Marcos Baptist Academy in Texas in 1975, and Leonard Hall Junior Naval Academy in Maryland in 1976. At the college level in 1973, two military junior colleges, Kemper Military School in Missouri and Valley Forge Military Academy in Pennsylvania, began enrolling female cadets. The same year, the corps of cadets at Virginia Tech organized an all-female company, L Squadron. The following year in 1974, the United States Merchant Marine Academy and Norwich University enrolled female cadets, as did Texas A&M with its organization of the all-female Company W-1. These changes did not receive a great deal of press coverage, but what press was received was positive in nature.

The remaining federal military academies followed with enrollment of female cadets and midshipmen at West Point, United States Naval Academy, United States Air Force, and the Coast Guard Academy in 1976. This change gained a great deal of positive attention in the press. On the other hand, the legal battles to keep two state-supported
military colleges all male did not reflect well on military schools in general. In 1989 Virginia Military Institute, and in 1990 the Citadel, rejected applications from females based on their all-male policy (Amstein, 1997).

In 1993, federal courts ordered the last state-supported military colleges to enroll female cadets. Both the Citadel and Virginia Military Institute, with heavy alumni support, fought the order in court and raised funds to create alternative, all-female military college programs in their respective states. Through Virginia Military Institute’s efforts, the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership was established in 1995 with 42 female cadets at the all-female Mary Baldwin College. Neither the Citadel-proposed alternative female military college nor Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership satisfied federal courts.

The Citadel enrolled a single female cadet in the fall of 1994. With college personnel unprepared and the male corps of cadets hostile, the first experience failed. Four more female cadets were enrolled the next year and the misconduct associated with harassment from underclassmen resulted in two departing and disciplinary action against a male cadet. The Virginia Military Institute learned from the Citadel’s mistakes, and according to Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, former superintendent of the Air Force Academy, “no other military college had done so much to prepare for the arrival of women” (Brodie, 2000, p. v). VMI enrolled 30 women along with 430 male cadets in their 1997 incoming class. The college also obtained nine female upper class cadets from Norwich University and Texas A&M (Rosenberg, 1997). The Virginia Military Institute’s president, General Josiah Bunting, felt the larger number and the steps with the faculty would create a “genuine cohort . . . to form a support system” (Amico, 1999, p.
This approach was successful, and the same year the Citadel, learning from there prior experiences, enrolled 27 female cadets to join the two female upperclassmen remaining from the prior year. Part of the success there was due to one of the two remaining cadets being the daughter of the newly assigned commandant of cadets, General Emory Mace (Campbell & D'Amico, 1999). In 2010, the United States Naval Academy had 16% female cadets, West Point 15%, Norwich University’s corps of cadets 14.4%, Virginia Tech’s corps of cadets 14%, Texas A&M 11%, Virginia Military Institute 9%, and the Citadel 8%.
Chapter 12: Resurgence of an Old Educational Tradition

During the 1960s and early 1970s, a period of strong antimilitary sentiment, the focus of education was on the social and emotional growth of students and equality of education. Society voiced concern with the quality of education and its impact on the preparation of graduates for careers (Hoy & Miskel, 2008). This was a period of increased federal influence and desegregation. In response to concerns about the quality of education was the emergence of the magnet school concept. The first magnet schools emerged in the early 1970s with specialized curricular or instructional themes. To achieve racial balance, as well as meet the demands of urban parental pressure, federal grants were established to open magnet schools. By 1982 one third of urban districts had magnet schools (Murphy & Shiffman, 2002; Blank, 1990). Amid the growing dissatisfaction with public education and the search for alternatives, military public schools started to appear as magnet public schools with minimal notice from the public.

In 1980, Richmond, Virginia, public schools opened Franklin Military School, an inner-city high school. Richmond was not without a precedent for this, as the John Marshall High School, also in Richmond, became a military school within a public high school in 1915. The influence of Virginia Military Institute and Virginia Tech graduates in the Richmond area were likely a factor. In 1915, male students were given the option to be members of the John Marshall High School Corps of Cadets, which operated far beyond its JROTC requirements. Cadets drilled and marched in conducted formations daily and were routinely uniformed in Virginia Military Institute-style uniforms. The strict military program at Marshall continued until 1971 when declining numbers and antimilitary feelings caused its demise. Franklin Military School, when it opened in 1980,
received some attention but no public protest. The same relatively quiet opening occurred for Cleveland Junior Naval Academy in St. Louis, Missouri, and Marine Academy of Science and Technology in Highlands, New Jersey, in 1982.

The 1983 Report from the National Commission on Excellence in Education began what Hoy and Miskel (2008) called the “first wave” in educational reform (p. 293). The report, published under the Reagan Administration, alarmed the public with a list of comparisons of United States education with other countries. Statistics placed the effectiveness of the U.S. educational system in question. Among the most alarming findings were that the functional illiteracy rate was approximately 13% for 17-year-old students and was as high as 40% for minorities. Standardized test scores were the lowest in 26 years; the College Board's Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SAT) had been in a continual decline since 1963. Students in the United States, when compared to other industrialized nations, never placed first, or second, and were last in seven of the 19 academic tests. Among the recommendations from the 1983 reports was to incorporate the use of standardized achievement to certify advancement, identify needs for remedial help, and identify eligibility for advanced courses (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983).

The political mood of the United States regarding school effectiveness was voiced by President Reagan and the National Governor's Association. In his 1984 inaugural address, the President called for more competition among schools, promoted by high academic standards because without them, he stated, there could be “no excellence in education” (Fitzharris, 1993, p. 112). Despite these concerns, there were no new public military schools for almost 10 years until 1993, when the Murray-Wright Junior Naval
Academy opened in Detroit. Four years later in 1997, the Kenosha Military Academy in Wisconsin opened with no or little opposition.

In 1993, a military school in Detroit opened as another movement in education was in its early stages: the charter military school. In 1993, the military school in Detroit opened as another movement in education was in its early stages: the charter military school. The first of these schools was the Willamette Leadership Academy, originally opened as the Pioneer Youth Corps School in Oregon. The charter school movement began just two years prior in Minnesota in 1991. By 2000, there were 2,306 charter schools in 34 states. By 2007, that number had grown to 4,132 charter schools serving 1.1 million students (Johnson, 2009). Charter schools would become a significant factor in the resurgence of military schools.

The six public and charter military schools established between 1980 and 1997 were important not because they started the resurgence of military schools but because they were the prelude to a movement in military public education that would accelerate dramatically beginning in 1999. Several prominent educators and politicians moved to the forefront as proponents of public military schools and others as anti-military and educational groups opposing them.

**Military School Proponents**

There are five individuals whose efforts played an essential role in the increase of public military and charter schools. Four of these individuals are associated with multiple school establishments: Mayor Richard Daley and Arne Duncan established schools in Chicago; Paul Gust Vallas established schools in Chicago, Philadelphia, and New Orleans; Bert L. Bershon, with the Charter Military School Development Corporation in
Florida, founded three military schools in that state; and Governor Jerry Brown of California founded a military school in Oakland. The governor used his public prominence to wage the fight to establish the Oakland Military Institute College Preparatory Academy in Oakland.

The two most prominent figures, Mayor Richard Daley and Governor Jerry Brown, have little in their backgrounds which would lead one to predict they would be champions of military schools. Both Mayor Richard Daley and Governor Jerry Brown are attorneys, have served in their respective state Senates, and are from prominent political families. Mayor Daley's father, Richard J. Daley, was the mayor of Chicago from 1955 until his death in 1976. Richard Daley was also head of the Daley "political machine," which played a critical role in the election of John F. Kennedy to the Presidency. Governor Brown is the son of Pat Brown, who served as governor of California from 1959 to 1967.

Mayor Daley had no military background and did not attend a military school. In spite of this, he became a leader of the military school movement not only in Chicago, but also in California through vocal support of Governor Brown's efforts there. From 1999 until the end of his term as mayor in 2010, a total of six public military high schools were established in Chicago: Chicago Military Academy in 1999, George Washington Carver Military Academy in 2000, Phoenix Military Academy in 2000, Admiral Hyman George Rickover Naval Academy in 2005, Marine Math and Science Academy in 2006, and the Air Force Academy High School in 2009. Chicago has the largest concentration of military schools, public or private, of any city in the United States.
Governor Brown was another unlikely candidate to be a proponent of military schools. As a California State Senator and California Secretary of State, he was a strong critic of the Vietnam War. He ran for the Democratic nomination for President against William Jefferson Clinton and was successful in the state primaries of Maine, Colorado, Vermont, Connecticut, Utah, and Nevada. Two of his biggest supporters were Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden, both well known for their anti-military feelings. He is both the youngest California governor, having served as such from 1975 to 1983, and the oldest governor, elected at age 72 in 2010 (Brown for Governor, 2010).

From 1998 to 2008, while serving as Mayor of Oakland, Jerry Brown became a strong military school proponent. His only military background was as a high school JROTC cadet. In Oakland, Mayor Jerry Brown unsuccessfully fought the Oakland School Board for the establishment of the Oakland Military Academy. He then went to the State of California Department of Education, which authorized the formation of Oakland Military Academy as a charter school (Associated Press, 2000).

The military school concept garnered support from Senator Diane Feinstein, who had been mayor of San Francisco “when it still had the reputation as a sort of urban theme park of the left,” in the words of the New Democratic Leadership Council (DLC). Senator Feinstein hailed Governor Brown’s efforts to establish a charter military school as the “Idea of the Week” in December of 2000 (Democratic Leadership Council, 2000, p. 1). The governor of California at the time was Gary Davis, a graduate of Hollywood Military Academy, a private military school that closed in 1969. Also publically supporting Brown’s efforts to establish military schools was Mayor Richard Daley.
In 2010 Jerry Brown was elected as the 39th governor of California, having served previously as the 34th governor. On the platform of his victory speech were several cadets from Oakland Military Academy. On October 8, 2011, he signed California Senate Bill No. 537 California Cadet Corps. Among the provisions in the bill was that

The Adjutant General may enter into a cooperative agreement with the governing board of a school district or a county office of education for the purpose of establishing, pursuant to existing statutory authority in the Education Code, a military academy to be operated as a charter school, pursuant to Part 26.8 (commencing with Section 47600) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Education Code, or as one of the existing alternative education options, available under the Education Code. The program would provide a structured, disciplined environment that would be conducive to learning in a college preparatory environment. In addition to academic skills, students would develop leadership, self-esteem, and a strong sense of community. An academy established pursuant to this section shall comply with the Education Code. (California Senate, 2011)

This action may lead to the opening of more military charter schools in California in addition to the four already operating in 2012. Steps taken in late 2011 to establish a military charter school in Riverside County support this conclusion (Jacobsen, 2011).

Two professional educators also associated with pushing the military school movement into public education were Paul G. Vallas and Arne Duncan. Vallas, as Chicago Superintendent of Public Schools, opened the Chicago Military Academy in 1999. This school signaled the beginning of a resurgence of military schools in the United States (Palmer, 2001). During his tenure as school superintendent in Chicago, Paul Vallas opened two additional public military high schools. He left Chicago in 2001 to become Superintendent of Public Schools in Philadelphia. Among the many changes he made as superintendent there was the establishment of the Philadelphia Military Academy at Leeds in 2004 and the Philadelphia Military Academy at Elverson in 2005.
In 2007, in the wake of hurricane Katrina, Vallas took over the Recovery School District of New Orleans (Ruth, 2010). Prior to his departure in 2010, he laid the groundwork for the opening of a sixth military school. The New Orleans Military Maritime Academy opened in the fall of 2011 as a charter military secondary school (Purpura, 2010). While Vallas had previously served as an officer in the Illinois National Guard for 12 years, his replacement in Chicago had no experience in the military that might indicate continued support of the military school format.

Vallas was replaced in Chicago in 2001 by Arne Duncan, who in 2009 became the United States Secretary of Education. Duncan, a Harvard graduate, played professional basketball in Australia and worked for many years as the director of the Ariel Education Initiative, a nonprofit educational foundation. Duncan served as the superintendent of Chicago Public Schools until 2008, becoming the longest serving big-city superintendent in the country. His actions were credited with an all-time high in elementary students meeting or exceeding state reading and mathematics scores, high school student gains on American College Testing (ACT), Advance Placement Course passage, and an increase in college scholarships. During his tenure, another three military schools were opened (U.S. Department of Education, 2010).

More so than any of the other proponents mentioned, Burt L. Bershon’s background in the military most likely led him to champion the military school movement. He was a graduate of Culver Military Academy, a prominent private high school in Indiana; he also graduated from the Wharton School of Finance and served in the Air Force. Bershon was the founder and president of the Charter Military Schools Development Corporation, which successfully established the Sarasota Military Academy
in Florida in 2003. In 2010, this school had 723 cadets and the best academic indicators in Sarasota County. Bershon unsuccessfully tried to establish a charter military school in Cincinnati, Ohio, but was thwarted by a coalition of anti-military groups and the teachers’ union. He shifted his attention back to Florida and helped establish a charter military school in Palm Beach. The school failed, but in 2008 he helped open the Francis Marion Military Academy in Ocala, which prospered and graduated their first senior class in the 2010–2011 school year. (B. L. Bershon, personal communications, November 4, 2009). His plans for an additional eight schools ended with his death in 2011. His goal was to achieve the admission of a charter military school into the Association of Military Colleges and Schools of the United States. Oakland Military Institute College Preparatory Academy joined the association the year he died.

The condition of public education in California and across the country led to a search for alternatives to the failing education system. That search led to the return of the American tradition of military schools among other strategies. While serving as Mayor of Oakland, Jerry Brown referred to his city’s public schools as a “disaster” (Brown, 2001, p. 1). Only 1,660 of Oakland’s 3,757 students graduated in the Class of 2000 and only 377 were prepared for college (Brown). Proponents of public and charter military schools in various parts of the United States declared three principal advantages to their offering the military format: a positive education environment, charter development, and expanded opportunities.

Jerry Brown (2001), focused on the establishment of a positive educational environment as his motivation for the establishment of the Oakland Military Academy. Brown believed that the military school environment is one that fosters an “environment
where creativity, leadership and intellectual curiosity are deeply respected” (p. 2). Governor Brown’s experience in a Catholic high school with its JROTC program gave him the inspiration to seek a similar alternative. Noting that a religious public school could not be established because of the First Amendment of the Constitution, his alternative was a military school “with its emphasis on ceremony, discipline, inspiration and leadership training” (p. 1). Brown saw the military school as a perfectly legal alternative to help concentrate on building character and discipline in order to create an environment to prepare students for college attendance.

This similarity between the religious and military school’s environment was also echoed in Kraus (1978), The Civilian Military Colleges in the Twentieth Century. According to Krause, both religious and military schools are characterized as having “a strong commitment to purpose, values and traditions” (p. 438), and religious concepts and beliefs are similarly emphasized in military schools through “honor, integrity . . . responsibility, self-respect and physical well-being” (p. 439).

The positive educational environment that Jerry Brown spoke of is visible in the structure of the Philadelphia Military Academy at Leeds. Cadets follow strict rules, wear cadet uniforms, student leaders control movement between classes, and the educational process is free from disruption or danger. Furthermore, the military system “fosters peer pressure to behave and positions the most accomplished upper-classmen as role models and authority figures” (Price, 2008, p. 31). The secret to success, according to Price (2008), is cadets having a positive peer group, a strong focus on motivation and self-discipline, close supervision, accountability and consequences, structure and rewards, and a safe and secure environment.
The second principal advantage espoused by public charter military school proponents is the school's function is character development of its cadets. The Western New York Maritime Academy, a charter school established in 2004, places that concept up front as their mission statement: “Leadership and character development are the inherent cornerstones of the school” (Western New York Maritime Academy, 2011). Likewise, the Public Safety Academy of California, another charter military school, uses the terms “leadership and character development” (Public Safety Academy, 2010) in its mission statement, and the public Philadelphia Military Academy at Leeds mission contains the terms “leadership education and character” (Philadelphia Military Academy, 2011). Maryland’s public Forestville Military Academy mission describes graduates as “leader[s] of character committed to the values of truth, honor, knowledge and service” (Forestville Military Academy, 2011). Other schools address the same concept through the identification of core values as does California Military Institute, as well as General John Vessey, Leadership Academy in Minnesota. Other military schools use the same concept by the identification of specific character traits such as integrity, ethics, self-discipline, citizenship, and moral ideas. This pattern is essentially a numeration of characters and is character centric.

The final advantage espoused by proponents includes expanded opportunities that must be divided into three themes. Jerry Brown approached the subject initially in broad terms: “The principle here is the freedom of parents to educate their children as they see fit” (Imber & Van Geel, 2010, p. 20). He cited the United States Supreme Court case Pierce v. Society of Sisters [this case involved the Hill Military Academy in 1925] as a guarantee that parents do not have to accept instruction from public teachers. His
agreement then closed with "these families who want an outstanding education for their children have every right to choose among a wide array of educational philosophies, including an academic school operated in collaboration with the California National Guard" (Brown, 2001, p. 2).

The desire to provide special training orientated toward law enforcement or emergency services influenced the establishment of a few military schools. For example, Southeast Academy High School and Public Safety Academy in California state that their programs help cadets who are seeking "careers in police or military science or public safety" (Southeast Academy High School, 2011) and "law enforcement, fire emergency medical services" (Public Safety Academy, 2009) respectively. Most public or charter military schools would rather take Jerry Brown's view: "The goal here is to become leaders in business, government, and the arts. It's not engaging debates on Star Wars, or whether to go to the Gulf War" (Goodman, 2002, p. 2). This reflects the evolution secondary military schools made away from preparing cadets for combat and toward preparation for leadership in the civil sector.

For the most part, the "expanded opportunity" claims avoid the controversial subject of military training and recruitment. Opportunities are framed in terms of greater academic success. In his congratulatory letter from Mayor Daley to Jerry Brown on the opening of the Oakland Military Academy, Daley (2001) stated that his first graduating class from the Chicago Military Academy had a 40% higher city-wide average in reading and a 30% higher than average score in mathematics. A few years later, similar claims were made on behalf of all military schools, citing the Chicago Military Academy again as having better performance than the rest of the city by 11% in reading and 32% in
mathematics. In Philadelphia, their first military academy touted attendance rates 8% above the district average and teacher absentee rates 7% lower (Price, 2008).

Opportunities are not framed by potential advancement upon enlistment in the military, but rather in terms of military school productivity.

**Military School Opponents**

The scale of opposition to military schools in public education grew quickly beginning in 1999, when steps were taken to establish public military high schools in Chicago, and in 2000, when a charter military high school in Oakland, California, was being founded. Since then, the controversy has grown, and opposition to a military component in public schools has been adopted by various groups. Among the national opposition to military schools in public education are the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Coalition for Alternatives to Militarism in our Schools (CAMS), Military Families Speak Out (MFSO), Iraq Veterans Against War, American Friends Service Committee-Quakers, Code Pink, and Gold Star Families. On a local level, groups such as Orange County Peace Coalition and Orange County Green Party in California, Committee for High School Options & Information on Careers, Education & Self Improvement (CHOICES) in Washington, DC, the Chicago Teacher’s Union, and local school boards have risen to dissuade the establishment of additional military schools and have been successful in several cases (Shahfari, 2007).

Excellent sources to better understand the various objections to the military school concept are Brooke Johnson (2009), *From School Ground to Battle Ground: A Qualitative Study of a Military-Style Charter School*, a dissertation from the University of California, Riverside; and American Civil Liberties Union (2008), *Soldiers of*
Misfortune: Abusive U.S. Military Recruitment and Failure to Protect Child Soldiers.

Johnson’s qualitative study was conducted in a California charter military school between 2004 and 2008. Johnson was active in the antiwar movement in the United States and abroad and became interested in a military charter high school when she was “shocked to learn that 11 and 12-year-olds were attending a military-style school that was publically funded” (p. 16).

The central theme of her analysis served as a guidepost to curb the influence and advancement of militarism in U.S. public education and described four methods to fight militarism in public schools. Johnson (2009) called for

halting the march of militarism in public education and returning the schoolhouse to a place for growth and learning, as a way to reduce structural inequality in education, and level the unequal opportunities of the most vulnerable U.S. citizens, youth. (p. 152)

Johnson (2009) viewed the charter and public military schools in the context of the nexus of neoliberalism and militarism. According to Saltman (2007), neoliberalism’s “economic and political doctrine insists upon the virtues of privatization and liberalization of trade, while concomitantly places its faith in the discipline [in education] for the resolution of all social and individual problems” (p. 2). He saw militarized public schooling “in terms of the enforcement of globalization through implementation of all the policies and reforms that are guided by neoliberal ideal” (p. 3). Johnson agreed and called “the military the literal strong-arm of U.S. global and domestic neoliberal policies focused on the logic of free markets and bigger profits” (p. 60). He further cited that there is an overrepresentation of ethnic minorities within the U.S. military due to poverty,
joblessness, and increased militarism present in public schools (pp. 60–63). The latter statement is best exemplified by public military high schools.

Johnson (2009) argued that neoliberalism has encouraged school choices, including charter and magnet schools, and that accountability and efficiency brought by the No Child Left Behind Act have increased militarism in school structure and curriculum. According to Johnson, the “military-style schools . . . are a new and flourishing trend in public education” (p. 25) and “structural inequalities in the local school district and in the community push parents and students towards [military schools] . . . while discipline and uniforms pull in student enrollment” (p. 137). He claimed that military schools “socialize students into a culture of militarism and war . . . [resulting in] viewing the military as an equally beneficial choice as attending college” (p. 137).

Finally, he described military school culture as dominated by masculine authoritarianism: “Hegemonic military masculinity is exemplified at the [military school studied] through condoning violence and the warrior hero archetype” (p. 134).

Johnson (2009) illustrated the three most common objections to the establishment of military schools: military recruitment, culture of violence and masculinity, and violation of the United Nations’ Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The military school environment with its uniforms, rituals, and vocabulary, socializes cadets to accept militarism as both a “rite of passage” and as “beneficial to their life chances,” according to Johnson (p. 109). This vulnerability to the acceptance of military service has its opponents on two levels. First are the objections to the United States’ foreign policy and the military as a national institution and the military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.
"The increasing militarism of the U.S. public education system needs to be understood in relation to the growing influence of neoliberalism and "the enforcement of global corporate imperatives as they expand markets through the material and symbolic violence of war and education" (Saltman, 2007, p. 1).

This point of view is not limited to the establishment of military charter and public schools. In 2006, the San Francisco School Board voted to ban the operation of Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps (JROTC) from district schools. The board declared its opposition to military recruiting in 2005. In the words of the JROTC Must Go Coalition, “As this country enters its sixth year of the illegal occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, it's time for the school board to go back to its original decision to kick the military out of our schools” (Enteen & Mecca, 2008, p. 1).

The second level of objection to military recruitment through the establishment of military schools is that the military is targeting the “poor and working class youth of color” (Johnson, 2009, p. 151) and “military-style schools are being established overwhelmingly in poor and working class communities of color” (p. 141). The location and cadet populations of at least 10 of the 29 public or charter military schools in 2011 supports the assumption that these programs were located in poor and working-class areas. This action is seen as a detriment because young people are lured into service with the promise of money for college and career skills. In many cases, according to Johnson (2009), minority veterans never use the money for college and gain nontransferable skills. The view of those opposed to military schools is, in many cases, that the military experience “thwarts life chances rather than expanding the options and opportunities for these disadvantaged youth” (Johnson, 2009, p. 141).
The next area of objections to charter and public military schools includes the military's hegemonic military masculine culture, which Johnson claims condones violence and marginalizes women. The military school culture with its uniforms, rituals, and warrior heroes are seen as legitimizing violence by the glorification of the military culture and, in some cases with marksmanship training providing an introduction to the use of guns. The military school culture is seen as emphasizing the military and marginalizing those cadets, particularly female, who do not take on a tomboy "female masculinity" (Johnson, 2009, p. 131).

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has become the leading opponent of military schools, citing the United Nation Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 2002, and in 2005, the United States submitted a binding declaration of the minimum age for voluntary recruitment to 17 (a year older than required by the treaty) (American Civil Liberties Union, 2008).

The ACLU position is that the JROTC program is a violation of the recruitment prohibitions of the treaty. Their view of the program is that JROTC is a military recruiting tool that promotes "children's perceptions of a career in the military and enhances military recruiting efforts" (ACLU, 2008, p. 13). The ACLU identified three Chicago public military schools where 18% of graduates enter the military. The point of contention with JROTC in military schools is that they expose children to recruitment (not induction) in violation of the treaty. Recruitment should be genuinely voluntary with individuals fully informed of the duties involved in the military, which is not the case for young cadets, and the ACLU contends that this is a clear violation (ACLU, 2008).
Military Schools are a Viable Alternative

The objections to the military school in public education centered on three issues: military recruitment, a culture of violence and masculinity, and violation of the United Nations' Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. Objections against military recruitment centered on the unfair burden it places on minorities, and the recruitment of ill-informed young people. Among the public military schools in Chicago, where minority enrollment was high, the military option was selected by 18% of graduates one year. The burdens of military service in 2012 can be illustrated by comparing it with Chicago's high murder rate, Afghanistan military service was 19 times more likely to result in being killed (Server, 2012).

But the casualty figures for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan did not support the conclusion that military recruitment resulted in an unfair burden of national defense being placed on the minorities. American military deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan through September 2010, numbered 5,670 of which 9.1% were African American and 9.9% were Hispanics (Fischer, 2010). The proportion of casualties for African Americans was far less than their percent of the population at 15.4%, while casualties for the Hispanics were very close to the population at 9.7% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).

In 2009, the legality of military recruitment in public schools was tested in federal court. The statues of Arcata and Eureka California prohibiting military recruiters from contacting minors were overturned (Stannard, June 19, 2009). Military schools by exposing their cadets to the military culture with uniforms, titles, ceremonies and vocabulary, provided eighteen year old graduating cadets the opportunity to make a better informed decision regarding their future.
Those who enlist after graduation from a military school benefit from Junior Reserve Training Corps (JROTC) which provides incentives including, in the army, rapid promotion to rank of corporal with a significant associated pay increase. Other benefits are intrinsic to military service and include job skills based on military specialty selected, job security, structured environment, certification of a work ethic desired by employers and educational benefits which carry over to post service opportunities. Military school cadets are better prepared to make an informed decision in regard to enlistment and benefits from the preparation provided to them in school.

The objections to military schools as promoting a culture of violence and masculinity were not supported by Hajjar’s (2005) study of a public military high school. Rather than violence, Hajjar found an environment which promoted civility. The military schools “through comprehensive academy mores and codes, cadets learn and develop etiquette, trust, mutual respect, duty and tolerance for others that enhances their civility; an important life skill” (p. 49). This type of behavior was found to be stronger among those who had been at the academy for a longer period of time.

Rather than marginalizing female cadets, toleration and behavior echoed “treating others well and being polite, respectful” was more apparent among cadets (p. 50). The military school in which Hajjar conducted his study had as its cadet commander a female cadet who embraced her leadership role and was far from marginalized. The author’s experience in private secondary military school and a senior military college found female cadets occupied critical leadership positions far beyond their proposition of the cadet population. The Johnson (2009) critical view of the military schools impact on female cadet development was heavily influenced by a political agenda that viewed the
military an evil tool of “strong-arm of U.S. global and domestic neoliberal policies” (p.60).

Objections to military schools as violations of the United Nation Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and the Convention on the Rights of the Child centered on the military school as a violation of the recruitment prohibitions of the treaty. The opponents of military schools see cadets’ exposure to the military culture as recruitment of children and not voluntary with adults fully informed of the duties involved in the military service. But membership in a military school does not constitute membership in any of the armed forces of the United States. Further, the United States meets the requirements of the Protocol in that:

- the minimum age at which the United States permits voluntary recruitment into the Armed Forces of the United States is 17 years of age; the United States has established safeguards to ensure that such recruitment is not forced or coerced, including a requirement in section 505(a) of title 10, United States Code, that no person under 18 years of age may be originally enlisted in the Armed Forces of the United States without the written consent of the person's parent or guardian, if the parent or guardian is entitled to the person's custody and control; each person recruited into the Armed Forces of the United States receives a comprehensive briefing and must sign an enlistment contract that, taken together, specify the duties involved in military service; and all persons recruited into the Armed Forces of the United States must provide reliable proof of age before their entry into military service (United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2010, p. 2).

Hajjar (2005) concluded that the “unique military subculture builds solidarity, which in turn develops students’ propensity for education, discipline, civility, leadership skills and agency.” Overall, students at a public military school “develop critical life skills and accrue forms of social capital, which should increase their chances of achieving upward mobility” (p. 45). This educational propensity at was reflected by cadets’
intention to attend college with 85% of sophomores and juniors desiring to go on to college. Among the student population where 74% are considered poor or at risk based on fee or reduced school lunch programs and 90% from minority African American or Hispanic backgrounds, military school graduates’ propensity for advanced education was bared out by the 2006 statistics for Chicago high schools in which graduates of the city’s public schools averaged 48% continuing on to college as opposed to 81.5% for the city’s public military academies. (Chicago Public Schools, 2007 & Chicago Public Schools, 2006).

Hajjar (2005) concluded that the military school subculture builds leadership competencies. “Cadets acquire leadership schemata, repertoires, and skills through classroom lessons and firsthand experience” (p. 51). Tarrant (1982) findings support this conclusion when he compared private military schools with public high schools that attendance at the military schools increased the student’s leadership values.

Hajjar defined agency as the capacity to transpose and extend schemas to new context. Agency entails an ability to coordinate ones’ actions with and against others, to form collective projects, to persuade, coerce, and monitor the simultaneous efforts of one’s own and others’ activities (p. 52). His conclusion that military schools enhanced these skill sets was also supported by Tarrant (1982) which found military schools supported the development of skills related to technical information such as having a broad outlook and well-rounded knowledge, managing groups, seeing the larger picture in relation to own activity. Among Hajjars’ examples of the military school subculture’s facilitation of agency among cadets where several were female cadets, they adopted the academy’s codes, cultural repertoire, and embraced a women’s potential. Examples in his
study were in direct contradiction to a culture of violence and masculinity which opponents of military schools gave as minimizing women.

According to Hajjars the military school subculture institutionalizes discipline; self-discipline thrives in its environment. Examples of performances which he cited as positively impacted by self-discipline were attendance, homework completion, and adherence of military codes. Attendance in the inner city military school of his study was 93.3% and ranked fifth of 84 inner city public schools. The public military school of his study was focused on correcting minor military uniform and conduct violations, rather than having to address “widespread drug distribution and possession, frequent and serious acts of violence, substantial criminal gang influences, and other illicit behaviors that plague many inner city schools” (p. 56). When viewed from the perspective of inner city education, minor military violations of uniform and protocol standards are largely insignificant, yet to the cadets they were important. Among his conclusions was that the military school subculture yielded “positive behavioral changed for teenage students, especial given the inner-city backdrop of this particular school” (p. 58).

The importance of discipline was illustrated by a study by Public Agenda (2004) found that teachers (97%) and parents (78%) felt that in order for a school to flourish discipline was needed. However the experience of teachers (85%) and parents (73%) was that education suffered because of a few “chronic offenders” (p. 2). Teachers (77%) admitted that their effectiveness suffered due to “disruptive students.” The study further concluded that schools are addressing effectively serious behavior problems by having armed police on campus but not when addressing violations of rules which disrupt class, “Problems with student behavior appear to be more acute in urban schools and in schools
with high concentrations of student poverty” (p. 3). Teachers from those schools are three times as likely to cite discipline, and twice as many quit teaching because of the lack of student discipline. For both teachers and parents seven out of 10 felt the cause of the behavior problems was “disrespect everywhere in our culture-students absorb it and bring it to school” (p. 27).

The objections to public military schools do not withstand close scrutiny from an educational prospective. But the need for a school culture which supports the challenges to education by an undisciplined student body can be met by the military school format. Furthermore, the military school culture provides advantages for the propensity of higher education, civility, leadership skills and agency which increases student’s chances for upward social economy mobility in their future.

**Twelve Years of Dramatic Growth**

The number of military schools has increase of 19% since 1998. In 1998, there were only 74 military schools. The cadet and midshipmen population in 2011 was approximately 50,550 students with approximately 63% at the college or junior college level. This figure is close to the 1942 peak of military school population of 61,000 students. This growth includes and can be attributed to the growth at federal military academies, the military colleges, maritime academies, and the large number of public and charter secondary military schools. In Maryland, one of the public military high schools had 860 cadets, and two of Chicago’s military high schools had enrollments of more than 500. Furthermore, five of the 13 charter military secondary schools had enrollments exceeding 500 cadets, and the Sarasota, Florida Military Academy enrolled 700 cadets in 2011.
In 1972, the only public military school in the United States closed in Richmond, Virginia. By 2011, a reorientation of the military school movement towards public education had risen, with 29 new public or charter military secondary schools having been established in the United States. These 16 public and 13 charter schools were located in 13 different states: California, Delaware, Louisiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin.

This increase has taken place in a period of increased popularity of the military. Gallup polling placed confidence in the military as an institution in the 50th percentile between 1975 and 1984, with a low of 50% in 1981. From 1985 until 2001, that figure increased only to the 60th percentile, with the exception of 1991 during the Gulf War when it climbed to 85%. After the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and the Pentagon the confidence in the military as an institution has increased to between 73% and 82% between 2002 and 2011. This, as compared to the next highest rated institutions, big business at 59% to 67% and the church from 45% to 53%, placed the military at the height of institutions in the Gallup polls (Gallup Inc., 2011). The impact on the popularity of military schools benefited from these attitudes as well.

Federal military academies. In 1954, there were five federal military academies, with the establishment of the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado. The enrollment of the five academies included 15,661 cadets. In 2010, the three largest academies in the United States included the United States Air Force Academy, United States Naval Academy, and West Point; each averaged 4,575 cadets or midshipmen. In 2010, the Coast Guard Academy and the Merchant Marine Academy enrolled 973 and
964 cadets respectively. Each of these academies requires five-year, post-graduate military service, with the exception of the Merchant Marine Academy, which also requires maritime industry employment or military service.

The establishment of the newest federal academy is patterned after the oldest military schools associated with Alden B. Partridge and Sylvanus Thayer. The Air Force Academy’s first superintendent was General Hubert Harmon, West Point Class of 1915, who was recalled to active duty to lead the academy. The academy’s first permanent dean of faculty was Brigadier General Robert McDermott, who was originally a member of Norwich Class of 1941 then graduated from West Point with the Class of 1943. He was joined on the faculty by a large number of West Point alumni. The first commandant of cadets was another West Pointer, Brigadier General Robert Stillman. He also recruited other military college graduates, including an air officer commander and several air training officers. These men strived to make the honor code “a foundation for everything the academy hoped the cadets would be” (Ringencebach, 2006, p. 64) and ensured the newest academy would adopt the standards founded 150 years before. The code was almost identical to that of the other established military academies and further established the connection to the origins of the centric role that honor has in the military school culture. This historical honor code prevails in what many believe is the most modern and technological of the federal military academies.

Military colleges and universities. In 2011, there were 12 military colleges and universities in the United States with total enrollment of approximately 13,000 cadets and midshipmen. These institutions included two colleges that are essentially military campuses, two military colleges with the corps of cadets representing a large portion of a
dual student body, five maritime academies, and two land grant universities with corps of cadets and one a female corps of cadets at a private college. Virginia Military Institute had 1,569 cadets, and the Citadel had 1,899 cadets. VMI and the Citadel are the only military colleges where the environment has been maintained to be that of a strictly military campus and cadet student body. Both the Citadel and Virginia Military Institute have Army, Navy, and Air Force ROTC as options.

The United States has seven maritime academies, of which the Great Lakes Maritime Academy is a civilian institution. One already discussed is the United States Merchant Marine Academy, a federal military academy. The remaining five academies have dual student bodies with their corps of cadets numbering 4,398 cadets and midshipmen. The other academies include the State University of New York Maritime Academy (established as the New York Nautical School in 1874) with 1,154 cadets and the Massachusetts Maritime Academy with 1,162 cadets. Located in California, New York, Maine, Massachusetts, and Texas, the maritime academies have proven to be the second most viable style of military school after the federal military academies. Each of the five state maritime academies operating today is state supported and includes a Navy ROTC as an option.

Norwich University, which opened in 1820 under the direction of Alden B. Partridge, and North Georgia College, one of the land grant colleges, both have dual student bodies: civilian and military. In 2010, the Norwich University Corps of Cadets numbered approximately 1,250 cadets, about 60% of the student body. Norwich has Army, Navy, and Air Force ROTC as optional programs and is the only private military college in the United States. North Georgia College includes about 750 Cadets, or 14% of
the undergraduate population. North Georgia is unique among the military colleges in that they offer only Army ROTC and have a large number of cadets who also serve as members of the state’s National Guard.

Two land grant universities maintain a significant corps of cadets. In 2011, the Texas A&M Corps of Cadets numbered 2,177 within a student undergraduate population of 39,140, just 5.6% of the student population. Virginia Tech’s corps of cadets grew dramatically in 2011, from 769 in 2010 to 949 cadets. In 2011, the military population at Virginia Tech was only 4% of the 23,690 undergraduates. Both schools have Army, Navy, and Air Force ROTC as options.

The Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) of Mary Baldwin College was established in 1995. The program grew from the legal battles regarding the admission of women into the Corps at Virginia Military Institute. Under the leadership of Brigadier General Michael Bissell, who became commandant in 1999, enrollment at the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership expanded to between 120 and 125 cadets. The cadets’ dress uniforms are an unusual forest-green color with a West Point-style cut. Perhaps even more unusual is the fact that Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership is the only all-female military school in the world (Mary Baldwin College, 2011).

Military junior colleges. In 2011, there were five military junior colleges enrolling approximately 3,513 cadets in secondary and junior college programs. All five colleges offered a two-year Army ROTC program that awards an army commission to a junior officer. Wentworth Military Academy and College and Valley Forge Military Academy and College are both private; the remaining three colleges are state supported. All five maintain a secondary military school program except Marion Military Institute,
which discontinued its secondary program and its private status and became a state-supported junior college in 2009.

Kemper Military School in Missouri maintained a junior college until 2000 and illustrates the fiscal vulnerability of the two remaining private military junior colleges. The school was established in 1844 by Frederick T. Kemper and successfully operated as a civilian male boarding school until Kemper’s death in 1871. The leadership of the school then fell to Colonel Thomas Johnston, a former student, who in 1864 had enlisted as a 16-year-old Confederate soldier. Johnston returned to the school in 1868 after graduating from the University of Missouri (Echo Company, 2011). In 1885, he converted the school to a military format and in 1899, changed the name to Kemper Military; there were 502 cadets (Echo Company, 2011). In 1923, the school added a junior college (Shoemaker, 1943). The school reached its peak enrollment as a military junior college and military secondary school in the mid-1960s. The school became a nonprofit college.

When the Vietnam War took its toll on the nation’s military schools, Kemper’s enrollment dropped in 1976 to 89 Cadets. In an effort to save the school, female cadets were enrolled in the 1970s, and the junior college’s costly athletic program was dropped in 2000. By 1980, enrollment recovered to 224 cadets and climbed to 300 by 1999 (Rogal, 2009). Mounting debt and low enrollment placed the school in bankruptcy and finally resulted in closure in 2002. The school met its demise in the same manner as many other military schools—due to financial problems, the most common cause of private military school failures.
Private military schools. In 2010, the United States had 40 private military schools enrolling approximately 9,230 cadets. The average number for military enrollment of these schools was 230 cadets. The 10 schools with the largest enrollment averaged 427 cadets. This number compares favorably to the largest military boarding schools in 1932 when the average was 323 cadets, indicating the well-being of private military schools in 2010. The vast majority, 37 out of 40, of these private military schools are secondary schools. Seven of the schools have dual student bodies, several of which restrict the corps of cadets to the higher grades, and several of which have volunteer membership. Regionally, 68% of the schools are located in the South. This can be misleading, as seven of the 32 schools are actually located in Puerto Rico. Eight percent of the schools are located in the western states and 15% are in the Midwest. Fifteen percent of the schools are located in the north.

Between 2006 and 2011, five private military schools were confronted with financial crises. Three of these closed, including Millersburg Military Institute in Kentucky, with an enrollment as low as 55 cadets. The school was reported to have been as much as a million dollars in debt (Rogal, 2009). The other two closures were small, recently established institutions. Ontario Christian Military School in California opened in 2006 with 57 cadets but closed in 2009. Eagle Military School of South Carolina opened in 2002 but closed in 2008, when the economic downturn impacted its modest enrollment.

From 2010 to 2011, both Oak Ridge Military Academy of North Carolina and New York Military Academy were on the verge of closing. Oak Ridge hired a basketball coach who was also a hedge-fund manager. He donated $471,000 to the school to jump
start a plan to build a 2.5 million dollar sports complex. In 2011, fraud allegations against the coach threw the school into a state of financial instability (Wireback, 2011). New York Military Academy announced it was closing, but quick action by alumni, including a threat to sue the governing board, resulted in an alumni takeover. Each of these examples illustrates the vulnerability of well-established schools, as well as newly founded private military schools, to financial mismanagement, fraud, and economic downturns.

**Public and charter military schools.** In 2011, there were 29 military secondary schools operating within public education as public or charter schools. Regionally these schools were located across the United States with nine schools in the Midwest, nine schools in the West, seven schools in the South, and four in the north. Between 1915 and 1971, there was only one public military school. This Richmond, Virginia, school closed and was not replaced until the 1980 establishment of Franklin Military School. The advent of this school was during a quiet but slow growth period in the military school concept in public education, with the establishment of only six additional public or charter military schools over the next 17 years.

Of the 16 public military schools operating in 2011, 10 were located in urban environments in Chicago, Philadelphia, Richmond, and St. Louis. In 2011, enrollment in these schools included 5,276 cadets; 1,196 cadets were in Chicago. The 13 charter military schools had a total enrollment of 4,220 cadets. The charter schools were located in eight different states: California had five, Florida had two, and there was one each in Delaware, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, and Oregon. Of the 29 public and charter military schools, only four were established before 1999. The most recently
established public charter military schools are the Air Force Academy High School in Chicago; Stanislaus Military Academy in California, established in 2009; and New Orleans Military Maritime Academy in Louisiana, opened in 2011.
Chapter 13: Potential Impact of Military Schools in Public Secondary Education

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the efficacy of public and charter military secondary schools compared to similar nonmilitary public and charter schools. The primary question for this chapter is whether secondary public and charter military schools are more effective in addressing attendance, dropout rates, graduation rates, and adequate yearly progress on state standardized tests than their nonmilitary public school counterparts. This chapter will include results using comparative data from military schools and nonmilitary schools with student bodies of similar socioeconomic status.

Attendance, dropout rates, graduation rates, and adequate yearly progress on state standardized tests were chosen as measures because they have become the national standards for determining efficacy since the 1980s. The mood in the United States regarding school effectiveness was voiced by President Reagan and the National Governors Association. In his 1984 inaugural address, the President called for more competition among schools promoted by standards, because without them, he stated, there could be “no excellence in education” (Fitzharris, 1993, p. 112). The 1986 report from the National Governors Association, *Time for Results*, called for a means to determine what students could do within a format that offered state comparisons. By 1988, the National Assessment of Educational Progress, a congressionally mandated assessment program, pushed the concept of student-oriented evaluation tests and helped strengthen the concept of using standardized tests to evaluate schools themselves. The *Hawkins-Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments* of 1988 provided voluntary testing of school children in writing, science, history, and geography. Reading and mathematics were added in 1990 (Fitzharris, 1993).
These amendments helped generate the 1994 Educate America Act, which established goals set by Congress in eight categories: school readiness; school completion; student achievement and student citizenship; teacher education and professional development; mathematics and science; safety, discipline, and alcohol and drug free schools; and parental participation. This act generated more support for the concept of nationally mandated standards for schools (Educate America Act, 1994). The 1997 State of the Union message by President Clinton foreshadowed the standards for public schools and educational accountability. The President called the coming standards “not federal government standards, but national standards, representing what all students must know to succeed in the knowledge economy of the 21st century.” There was little doubt, based on the President’s statement below that the federal government intended to mandate the adoption of standards of effectiveness.

Every state and school must shape the curriculum to reflect these standards, and train teachers to lift students up to them. To help schools meet standards and measure their progress, we [federal government] will lead an effort over the next two years to develop national tests of student achievement in reading and math. (Bazzel, 2007, p. 27)

The culmination of this wave in educational reform was the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, passed with overwhelming bipartisan support, which mandated reporting and testing of school effectiveness. This has resulted in almost all 50 states developing standards-based accountability for schools (Hoy & Miskel, 2008). The requirements of the act included states setting standards to establish what all students should know, and be able to do in the core academic subject areas; measuring the performance of students and schools through standards-based assessments; reporting results to the public, including student performance on academic assessments and other outcomes such as rates of high school completion. (No Child Left Behind Act, 2002)
Research Questions

Five research questions are addressed in this chapter’s study.

1. Are public and charter military high schools statistically equivalent in attendance rates to their nonmilitary neighborhood school counterparts?

2. Are public and charter military high schools statistically equivalent in dropout rates to their nonmilitary neighborhood school counterparts?

3. Are public and charter military high schools statistically equivalent in Adequate Yearly Progress on state standardized mathematics tests to their nonmilitary neighborhood school counterparts?

4. Are public and charter military high schools statistically equivalent in Adequate Yearly Progress on state standardized English tests to their nonmilitary neighborhood school counterparts?

5. Are public and charter military high schools statistically equivalent in graduation rates to their nonmilitary neighborhood school counterparts?

These five questions are repeated for each of the nonmilitary school categories: neighborhood, magnet, and charter secondary schools.

Measurements of Effectiveness

School effectiveness since the enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act has been measured using rates of attendance, dropout rates, graduation rates, and Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) on state-mandated tests in specific subject areas. These state-mandated tests vary; for example, California uses the California Standards Tests with the mathematics section administered to ninth through eleventh graders annually, science to tenth graders, and history to eleventh graders. On the other hand, Florida uses the Florida
Comprehensive Assessment Test, which is administered annually to ninth through eleventh graders. Illinois uses the Illinois Standards Achievement Test administered to ninth through eleventh graders annually. Missouri uses the Grade-Level Expectations tests for communication arts for eleventh graders and mathematics for tenth graders. Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) achievement is reported as the percentage of students who have achieved or exceeded state goals on designated tests. The AYP achievement values used for this study included one average of those percentages (level of achievement) for mathematics tests and another for English-language arts tests (including state communication arts or reading tests). The tests and other measures of effectiveness used in determining Adequate Yearly Progress by state are listed in Table 2. The table illustrates the different ways in which states have adopted the reporting requirements under the No Child Left Behind Act.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Academic Subjects for AYP</th>
<th>Other Measures (Rates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>English-Language Arts, Mathematics</td>
<td>Graduation, Dropout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>English-Language Arts, Mathematics</td>
<td>Graduation, Dropout, Attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Reading, Mathematics</td>
<td>Graduation, Dropout, Attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>Reading, Mathematics</td>
<td>Graduation, Dropout, Attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Reading, Mathematics</td>
<td>Graduation, Attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Communication Arts, Mathematics</td>
<td>Graduation, Dropout, Attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Language Arts Literacy, Mathematics</td>
<td>Graduation, Dropout, Attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>English Language Arts, Mathematics</td>
<td>Graduation, Dropout, Attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Reading, Mathematics</td>
<td>Graduation, Dropout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Reading, Mathematics</td>
<td>Graduation, Dropout, Attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>English, Mathematics</td>
<td>Graduation, Dropout, Attendance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All schools report graduation rates as required by the *No Child Left Behind Act*, but attendance is an optional reporting measure. Two examples of states that do not require attendance reporting are Florida and California. Florida only mandates reporting of the number of students absent more than 21 days in a year (Florida Department of Education, 2011), and California does not require its school districts to report attendance rates at all (K. Scheff, personal communication, May 2011). Both of these states used dropout figures as part of the calculation of graduation rate.

**Population and Sample**

Military schools in public secondary education prior to 1999 were rare. Although the number of public or charter secondary military schools has increased from four in 1998 to 29 in 2011, the sample size is still limited. The sample for this study was further constrained by the establishment of seven of the 29 schools after 2006. These military schools were eliminated from the study because there were no graduating seniors in the 2009–2010 school year. Another three schools were unavailable because the statistics for those military schools were consolidated with the district nonmilitary public schools or consolidated with nonmilitary charter schools that operated under the same charter.

These reductions brought the number of military schools available for study to 19. These schools were located in 12 of the 14 states containing districts with public or charter military schools in the 2009–2010 school year, and 15 of the 25 school districts containing public or charter military schools in the 2009–2010 school year. The 19 schools were all established prior to 2006 and include at least one graduating class to help complete needed statistical data on effectiveness associated with the *No Child Left Behind Act* reporting requirements. The total cadet population of the 28 public or charter...
military schools in operation during the 2009–2010 school year was 4,539 charter school cadets and 5,276 public school cadets for a total of 9,815 cadets. The enrollment in the 19 sample schools was 7,707 cadets or 78.6% of the total enrollment of charter and public military schools in the United States. In turn, the 19 schools well represent the total population of 28 public and charter military schools in 2010.

**Data Collection**

In addition to the 19 public and charter military schools, data were collected from more than 500 secondary schools from 12 states for school year 2009–2010. This comparison group included 151 nonmilitary neighborhood schools, 27 nonmilitary magnet schools, and 19 nonmilitary charter schools identified as similar in location and socioeconomic status to individually associated military schools. *No Child Left Behind Act* state reporting requirements provided graduation rates, and performance index ratings were based on the percent of students meeting or exceeding goals on the state standardized mathematics and English tests. Some of these *No Child Left Behind Act* reports also provided attendance rates and dropout rates. In cases where they did not, other reports were sought from other state and school district education reports to gain the data. All data was gained from publicly accessible information.

**Procedure**

The procedure used for control in this study was to individually match the 19 charter and public military secondary schools with nonmilitary neighborhood secondary public schools, nonmilitary magnet secondary schools, and nonmilitary charter secondary schools. According to Gay and Airasain (2003), “matching is a technique for equating groups on one or more variables, usually one highly related to performance on the
dependent variable” (p. 369). Each of the 19 groups consisted of the scores of one charter or public military high school compared to the arithmetic means of the scores of all nonmilitary secondary schools in the same school district or system of a similar socioeconomic status of a single nonmilitary school category. These nonmilitary secondary schools were further classified by neighborhood, charter, and magnet schools categories to provide further understanding of military school effectiveness in public education. Not all school districts have all three nonmilitary counterpart schools (neighborhood, magnets, and charter).

Creswell (2009) identified socioeconomic status as a common variable used by social scientists. Further research has demonstrated that socioeconomic status is highly predictive in reading, verbal, and mathematics achievement (Mickelson, 2008). In order to match statistically similar schools, those with dissimilar socioeconomic status were considered to “not have a suitable match and [were] excluded” (Gay & Airasain, 2003, p. 369). If no schools existed in the school district within the socioeconomic status parameters, selection of matching schools was extended to neighboring school districts. The socioeconomic status of the schools was determined by the percentage of students receiving a free or reduced meals. This was the common means used by all state reports. Military schools were matched with nonmilitary schools having no more than a 10% difference in socioeconomic status. This process produced the number of matched pairs depicted in Table 3. Not every nonmilitary school’s data provided all five categories (attendance, dropout, and graduation rates, and mathematics and English tests achievement).
Table 12

*Number of Matching Secondary Military Schools to Nonmilitary Schools*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Schools</th>
<th>Nonmilitary Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Military Schools</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charter Military Schools</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data analysis was performed using SPSS software with a 95% confidence level. The Wilcoxon signed rank test was chosen because the populations could not be assumed to have normal distributions. The Wilcoxon test provided the z and p values for assessment and was performed to make comparisons between each military school and similar nonmilitary schools separately. The *Cohen's d* provided the effect size estimate of the matching difference for better depth of analysis. The equation for *Cohen's d* was:

\[
d = \frac{(M^1 - M^2)}{\sqrt{\frac{S^2_{military\ schools} + S^2_{other\ schools}}{2}}}
\]

where \(M^1\) and \(M^2\) are the mean of the military schools and nonmilitary schools respectively, and \(S\) is their standard deviations. The small sample size required that an additional equation be used for an unbiased estimate of the effect size. The unbiased estimate is derived from:

\[
d_{unbiased} = \left[1 - \frac{3}{4(df-1)}\right] * d
\]

where \(df\) are the number of school pairings in the test. See Appendix D for pairings used. *Cohen's d* description of effect sizes was used, with small as .2, medium as .5, and large as .8 (Wilcox, 2011).
Results

The comparison of military and neighborhood public secondary schools for the 2009–2010 school year appear in Table 13. The Wilcoxon signed rank test showing statistically significant differences in attendance rate, dropout rate, and mathematics and English tests achievement. There was no statistically significant difference in the comparison of graduation rates. Attendance yielded $z = -2.856, p < .01$, and the effect size was large with a Cohen's unbiased $d$ value of 1.477. The dropout rate yielded $z = -2.741, p < .01$, and the effect size was small with a Cohen's unbiased $d$ value of -0.359. Mathematics achievement yielded $z = -2.616, p < .01$, and the effect size was small and approaching medium with a Cohen's unbiased $d$ value of 0.418. English achievement yielded $z = -2.213, p < .05$, and the effect size was small and approaching medium with a Cohen's unbiased $d$ value of 0.458.
Matching Data for Secondary Military and Neighborhood Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>d</th>
<th>Cohen's Unbiased d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>.025</td>
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<td>Neighborhood</td>
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<td>.85</td>
<td>.058</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dropout Rate</td>
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<td>-2.741</td>
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<td>-.378</td>
<td>-0.359</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Neighborhood</td>
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<td>.08</td>
<td>.064</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYP: Mathematics</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.436</td>
<td>0.418</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.253</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYP: ELA</td>
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<td>.47</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduation Rate</td>
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<td>.494</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Neighborhood</td>
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<td>.77</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. AYP = Adequate Yearly Progress; ELA = English Language Arts.

* p < .05. ** p < .01.

The comparison of military and magnet public secondary schools for the 2009–2010 school year appear in Table 14. The Wilcoxon signed rank test indicating no statistically significant differences in attendance, mathematics, English tests achievement, or graduation. There was a statistically significant difference in the comparison for dropout rates. Military schools' dropout rates were lower with a $z = -2.293$, $p < .05$, and a medium effect size with a Cohen's unbiased $d$ value of $-0.659$. 
Table 14

*Matching Data for Secondary Military and Magnet Schools*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>Cohen’s d</th>
<th>Cohen’s Unbiased d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-0.169</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>-2.293</td>
<td>.043*</td>
<td>-0.753</td>
<td>-0.659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnet</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.0397</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropout Rate</td>
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<td>.043*</td>
<td>-0.753</td>
<td>-0.659</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Military</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnet</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYP: Mathematics</td>
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<td>.674</td>
<td>-0.560</td>
<td>.575</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.315</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnet</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYP: ELA</td>
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<td>.575</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Magnet</td>
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<td>.275</td>
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<td>Graduation Rate</td>
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<td>Magnet</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* AYP = Adequate Yearly Progress; ELA = English Language Arts.

The comparison of military and charter secondary schools for the 2009–2010 school year appear in Table 15. The Wilcoxon signed rank test indicating no statistically significant differences in attendance, mathematics, English tests achievement, or graduation. There was again statistically significant difference in the comparison for dropout rates. Military schools’ dropout rates were lower with a $z = -2.192, p < .05$, and a large effect size with a Cohen’s Unbiased $d$ value of $-1.015$. 
Table 15

Matching Data for Secondary Military and Charter Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>Cohen's d</th>
<th>Cohen's Unbiased d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-420</td>
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<td>Military</td>
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<td>.93</td>
<td>.018</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charter</td>
<td></td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropout Rate</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.020</td>
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<td>-1.107</td>
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<td>Charter</td>
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<td>Charter</td>
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<td>.45</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYP: ELA</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>.534</td>
<td>.184</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military</td>
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<td>.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charter</td>
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<td>.53</td>
<td>.272</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Graduation</td>
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<td>.84</td>
<td>.142</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* ELA = English Language Arts.
*p < .05.*
Conclusions

The study's conclusions must be tempered by the limited size of the sample and the single year of data. The data does provide an initial trend with military school performance as indicated by a one-year (2009–2010) examination. When compared with socioeconomically similar neighborhood secondary schools, military schools outperformed them in measures of attendance, dropout rates, and mathematics and English tests achievement performance. Notably, the Cohen's $d$ value reflected for both mathematics achievement and English achievement were approaching medium effect. Military school performance, when compared with socioeconomically similar magnet and charter secondary schools, showed significant differences again for dropout rates. A small Cohen's $d$ effect for the comparison with magnet schools and a large Cohen's $d$ effect for the comparison with charter schools reflected lower dropout rates in military schools. Dropout rates were statistically lower across the three categories of schools (neighborhood, magnet, and charter). Although there were many cases of statistically insignificant differences, none of the neighborhood, magnet, or charter schools statistically outperformed their military counterparts in any of the five categories of comparison.

Based on these results, there may be potential advantages of military schools as alternatives to neighborhood public secondary schools. With the sample size of this study limited to 19 military schools in one academic year, however, the need for additional research on this topic is indicated. In the future, after the recently established military schools graduate their first senior cadets, further study is warranted to examine the five measures of effectiveness over a several-year period.
Chapter 14: Military School Culture

The literature on school culture is built upon organizational behavior (Firestone & Louis, 1999). According to Schein (1999), organizational culture is "the pattern of assumptions" (p. 29) that members have developed or learned to cope with through the experiences of the group. These cultures are passed to new members and considered the acceptable manner to address the challenges of everyday organizational life. These cultural understandings are found within three levels: artifacts, values, and tacit assumptions. The strongest of the three are those tacit assumptions that members are not conscience of and act on without forethought. The strength of organizational culture is based on the homogeneity of the group, socialization of the group, and length and intensity of the shared experiences. Figure 1: illustrates the military school culture in terms of examples of artifacts, values and tacit assumptions.

Military school discipline, uniforms, daily ceremonies, and shared experiences provide a framework through which homogeneity, socialization, and the degree of shared experiences are amplified. According to Hays (1994), in a study of four military boarding schools, the military school experience is full of dilemmas and impassioned debates. "Yet there is an order within it, an order that comes from the feeling that one belongs to something important to which one can contribute" (p. 219). That feeling of belonging was reflected by Hajjar (2005) in his study of a public military school where the academy "promoted a heightened sense of agency and efficacy, fosters a concern for classmates and others" (p. 54).
Artifacts of military school culture include uniforms, insignia, and intensity of the emotions associated with team efforts and unit competition, as well as the manner in which cadets address their peers, upperclassmen, faculty, and military staff. These artifacts play a significant role in the socialization process in the private secondary military school described by Barry Temple in his experiences at a military college in the 1930s and also by Leigh R. Gignilliat, the superintendent of Culver Military Academy from 1910–1939, who described military uniforms, room inspections, and
military discipline as creating a "spirit of democracy" (Gignilliat, 1916, p. 83) where all boys had equal opportunity. This is confirmed by Hajjar (2005) in his study of a public secondary military school in which he concluded that civility and sense of concern for others were traits enhanced by the school environment.

Values espoused by military schools are generally associated with two codes: one positive in character and the other negative. The best known of these positive codes is Duty, Honor, Country from the first American military school, the United States Military Academy at West Point. Other examples of positive codes include Texas Military Academy's core values: spiritual maturity, moral integrity, well-roundedness, and scholastic aptitude (Texas Military Institute, 2006). Fork Union Military Academy's principles include dedication, integrity, and consistency. Norwich University's guiding values include eight elements:

We are men and women of honor and integrity. We shall not tolerate those who lie, cheat, or steal. We are dedicated to learning, emphasizing teamwork, leadership, creativity, and critical thinking. We respect the right to diverse points of view as a cornerstone of our democracy. We encourage service to nation and others before self. We stress being physically fit and drug free. To live the Norwich motto—I will try!—meaning perseverance in the face of adversity. We stress self-discipline, personal responsibility, and respect for law. We hold in highest esteem our people and reputation. (Norwich University, 2005, p. ii)

The most common negative code is that which a cadet must never do: break the military school's honor code. "The fundamental principle governing a cadet's conduct is the honor code, which is fundamentally the same at all schools . . . but with variant phrasing: A Cadet will not lie, cheat, or steal nor tolerate those who do" (Trousdale, 2007, p. 129). That code became a written standard in 1935 at West Point when the
principal drafter, Cadet Lawrence Lincoln of the Honor Committee, typed it while he was in the field during summer training:

The code was not my product nor even the product of the entire Honor Committee; it was the product of years in the Corps developing the Honor System and hundreds of Cadets passing it on, in part by the Honor Book; but mainly by word of mouth and practice. (Sorely, 2009. p. 47)

The honor system or code was not set down by Thayer as some suggest. Thayer’s source of honorable conduct was the code of ethical behavior that was an expectation for all commissioned officers in the Army in the 1800s. Among the communicated behaviors was that an officer and a cadet’s word was his bond (Sorley, 2009). This behavioral expectation was inherited from the British Army where an officer was expected to be a gentleman and “a gentleman’s word is his bond” (Matthews, 1999, p. 323).

According to Schein (2009), the final and most powerful element of organizational culture is shared tacit assumptions. Shared tacit assumptions result in perceptions, feelings, and behaviors that are learned and taken for granted and are not debatable. Military schools’ regulations, codes, rewards, and punishments create an environment in which there are very clear expectations and outcomes resulting from either failure to act in a certain way or rewards for positive performance. Organizational rewards in military schools are not associated with salary increases but rather with rewards that are related to self-esteem, including “reputation, or prestige, recognition, attention, importance or appreciation” (Maslow, 1987, p. 115). Behaviors of cadets become automatic, including wearing a uniform cap when outside, removing it when
inside, saluting, performing military greetings, posture, and behavior in formation and drill.

The most common source of an organizational culture, according to Schien (2009), comes from the founder of the organization. These founders shape the culture and select initial employees who they believe will maintain their vision. They often define and influence the socialization process for new hires. Using the model of the American military schools as an educational movement, the founders, Alden B. Partridge, Sylvanus Thayer, Francis H. Smith, and Stephen B. Luce, shaped the culture and influenced the initial schools' leaders. Missouri Military Academy is a good example of how the influence of the founders of the military school movement has extended into 2011. The academy was established in 1889 by A. F. Fleet, who was followed by A. K. Yancey as he reopened the school after a fire. These men attended Fleetwood Academy and Howard College, respectively. Both military schools were run under the supervision of men educated by Francis Smith of VMI when Fleet and Yancey were cadets. Of course, Smith was educated under Sylvanus Thayer at West Point, and that institution was heavily influenced Alden B. Partridge. The influences of Missouri Military Academy’s founders and the influences of the military schools that impacted their lives previously were evident in the school the author visited in December 2011. It was clear that it was a military school patterned on the discipline, moral behavior, and character development model established by the men aforementioned who have had the greatest impact military schools in the United States.

Stephen B. Luce garnered great influence at New York Maritime Academy and had direct influence on the establishment of Massachusetts Maritime Academy in 1891,
the United States Merchant Marine Academy established in 1943, and indirectly helped
to establish the California Maritime Academy in 1929, Maine Merchant Marine Academy

Graduates from Partridge’s Norwich University, Thayer’s West Point, as well as
some associated with Smith’s Virginia Military Institute, Texas A&M College, and
Virginia Tech played a major role or held significant positions of responsibility in the
newly founded Air Force Academy in 1954. Many of the military schools in operation in
2011 were not founded by graduates of those institutions; however the military school
model established by the forefathers has clearly been used as the guide for their
operation. This is exemplified at the Army and Navy Academy, which was founded in
California in 1910:

All notable schools have a grand history and great sense of tradition, and the
Army & Navy Academies are no exception. Since their foundings in 1910 our
Cadets have felt loyalty and kinship with our nation’s institutions of military
leadership and training. Our country is proud of the five service academies and
the contributions they have made in the development of our nation. From the
founding of the first military training school, the United States Military
Academy—also known as West Point—in 1802, to the establishment of the
United States Air Force Academy in 1954, the Army & Navy has inculcated their
values, traditions and sense of duty to one’s community and nation. Tradition
plays an important part in our Cadets’ educational endeavors and
accomplishments. (Army and Navy Academy, 2011, History and Traditions)

Although Schien is very influential, other scholars define organizational culture
from a different perspective. William Ouchi stated that “organizational culture consists of
a set of symbols, ceremonies, and myths that communicate the underlying values and
beliefs of that organization to its employees” (Ouchi, 1981, p. 244). The military school
culture is heavy in its use of symbols, whether they are uniforms, flags, or salutes,
symbolizing respect and relationship between leader and follower. Ceremonies are
occasional occurrences in most nonmilitary schools, where in military schools they occur multiple times a day with formations, parades, and often reveille, with the national flag raised, and retreat, with the national flag lowered. Myths and stories are often associated with the school’s legendary alumni, who tell of wartime exploits and athletic victories. At Texas Military Institute, General Douglas MacArthur is not only remembered as a hero of World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, but also as the school’s quarterback and football-team captain. These legends enhance the school’s rich environment and encourage conversations among cadets that often focus on military relationships, responsibilities, and interactions.

**Military School Culture vs. Armed Forces**

The organizational culture of a military school and that of the armed forces are not equivalent. In 1935, the president of Fork Union Military Academy summarized the difference: “Militarism is intensive preparation for war [whereas] military training in a Christian school is using the magnificent discipline of military life without any of the evils or spirit of militarism” (Trousdale, 2007, p. 90). The culture of the armed forces is characterized by combat and the masculine warrior. The armed forces’ organizations, infantry divisions, fighter wings, and aircraft carriers, unlike military schools, are organized and function for their service in combat. The primary role of the armed forces is preparation for and conduction of combat and its culture is synonymous with that image (Dunivin, 1994). This is stated in the second line of the soldier’s creed: “I am a Warrior and a member of a team” (U.S. Army, 2010, p. 1).

This ethos of combat has very limited application to today’s military schools. During the Civil War, six military schools participated in combat (Georgia Military
Institute, Virginia Military Institute, The Citadel, University of Alabama, West Florida Seminary, and the Confederate Naval Academy). During World War II, only one, the United States Merchant Marine Academy, provided cadets as crewmembers of vessels in combat. Presently, there are only four military schools within the federal military academies that require post-graduate military service: United States Military Academy, United States Naval Academy, United States Air Force Academy, and United States Coast Guard Academy. The remaining schools, including the United States Merchant Marine Academy, do not require military service, instead it requires maritime service which could be a maritime lawyer or working in one of the nation’s ports, in turn the combat ethos is not applicable.

After World War II the amount of tactical military training decreased to a point where by 2000 it was absent at the secondary level. Military schools are not organized with a focus on combat. This applies to military colleges and universities as well as secondary military schools. Between 2006 and 2009, between 35% and 52% of the cadets who graduated from the Citadel, Texas A&M, and Virginia Military Institute, accepted a service commission upon graduation. Military high schools that maintain Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) programs are federally mandated not to conduct any training related to combat. The violence is instead limited to the athletic fields with emphasis on developing well-rounded cadet athletes. Military colleges and universities do not require military service upon graduation, however several military colleges require attendance in ROTC college classes.

The Citadel, as early as 1920, sought to “prepare men for civil pursuits by giving them a sound education reinforced by the best features of military training” (Horton,
2011, December 7). From its earliest years, Virginia Military Institute used military discipline “as a means of forming and developing individual character” (Smith, 1912, p. 242). Although the cultures of the armed forces and the military schools are different, there are some commonalities.

Uniforms, rank insignia, saluting, military, common language, and protocols are similar between the armed forces and military schools. In the armed forces, the rifle is a weapon to kill the enemy; in the military school, it is an instrument used to teach drill. In modern military schools drill with arms becomes an exercise in leadership for the cadets, a means of developing attention to detail, standards, and interpersonal skills, and not a preparation for service in the armed forces.

According to Fork Union, a school not affiliated with any JROTC program, “the goal of the military school is not to create ‘soldiers’ but to build ‘solid citizens’ who embody the values of integrity, honor, duty, self-discipline, and service to others” (Fork Union Military Academy, 2010, Overview). A public military school, Chicago Military Academy states that they employ “a military structure to concentrate on academic achievement and individual responsibility” (Chicago Military Academy, 2010, About Us). According to Trousdale (2007), in a study of 10 military boarding schools, “military schools have justly and correctly shown that militarism and military style discipline in an educational environment involves wholly different concepts” (p. 392).

A strong organizational culture will determine the means of dealing with external problems, and consensus is a critical part of that strength. According to Schien (1984), this process culturally requires consensus in strategy development based on the core mission, goals, and means to accomplish those goals, as well as criteria for measuring
success and adjustments to remediation or repair of strategy. The external threat for a military high school are the less desirable influences brought into the school by its cadets from their homes and neighborhoods. The military school is countercultural and a strong socialization process for both cadets and new faculty is critical to help guide and strengthen methods of dealing with the external problems.

Body, Mind, and Spirit

Military schools develop their cadets in the three arenas of academics, athletics, and character, which may be identified differently at various schools. These pillars may be articulated as body, mind, and spirit, or the development of the whole person. Howe Military Academy, one of the oldest of the secondary military schools, established in 1884 and still in operation in 2011, and Oakland Military Institute - College Preparatory Academy, a recently established military charter school established in 2001, provide excellent examples of development of the whole person.

Howe Military Academy’s operating philosophy is based on the three facets of academics, athletics, and leadership—body, mind, and spirit—which is a common theme used throughout military schools. The school is affiliated with the Episcopal Church and seeks development of the whole cadet through “rigorous academics and spiritual formation [which produce] self-discipline, physical well-being, leadership, logical thinking, and communication skills” (Howe, 2010, Our philosophy). Oakland Military Institute has a similar foundation with three pillars: academic excellence, leadership development, and physical fitness. Through its “military frame work [the school] inspires honor and pride within its cadets, cultivating life-long respect, confidence, physical
fitness, and wellness, and appreciation for others" (Oakland Military Institute, 2010, Our Mission).

Culver Military Academy, a secondary military boarding school in Indiana, provides a good example of how the ethos of a military school has evolved over the years and remained true to their core values:

From its opening in 1894, Culver Military Academy, or CMA as it is commonly referred to, has remained committed to the education of the whole person. The traditions and rich history of Culver continue to influence how the leadership and education in the classical virtues are taught. The leadership system, based on a military model, is in place to prepare the young men of Culver to serve their country. The system is effective in providing skills for those few graduates who wish to pursue a career in the military, however, it more aptly provides essential and valuable leadership lessons for students who will go on to more traditional careers within our increasingly global community. Responsibility, accountability, service, and teamwork are all bedrocks of a Culver education that will benefit each graduate in everyday life, no matter what path he chooses. (Culver Educational Foundation, 2010, About CMA)

The model military school program has three facets of development: academic, character, and athletic. In support of the development of these facets, a military school has three departments: academic, military, and athletic. The challenge is to integrate these components within the concept of the overarching military school ethos of character development. Each of the three components works toward the development of character, a primary goal of the military school.

The integration of these competing departments under a military school culture provides the administrator with several challenges. First is educating the faculty so they understand the military school ethos. The second challenge is the integration of departments that are competing for the cadets’ efforts to maximize academic, athletic, and character development. The understanding of the military school ethos by faculty
impacts each department including the military department. Figure 2 illustrates the alignment of structure and the model cadet.

Figure 2. Military School Structure.

An important step in maximizing the impact of the military school culture is having the faculty cross check each cadet on their performance in each area. Faculty should report behavioral or academic issues to one another, so together they can address these issues in all areas and leverage character development. For example, if a football player’s conduct or performance in English class is not acceptable, forums facilitating early identification of this issue can bring the invaluable influence of the coach or military department to assist the English teacher to inspire better performance. When
faculty is well integrated and engaged, departments do not stand alone; they work as a unified team. Whether on the football field, the drill field, or in the classroom, everyone is committed to the development of the cadet and helps develop a better student, athlete, and leader.

Working together, cadet success can be linked among all three components. This cooperation among faculty affords a cadet the opportunity to achieve self-esteem through any one of these avenues, as well as achieve at least a minimal satisfactory performance in the other two components. The earlier motivational theories of Maslow (1987) apply here in a very important way. Cadets are no exception to the "desire for a stable, firmly based, (usually) high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others" (Maslow, 1943, p. 114). In the military school environment, achievement can be met in any of the three components: athletics, academics, or military. Military schools are based on the whole-person concept and from the author's experience, almost all cadets will find a component in which to excel. Achievement in one area cannot meet all self-esteem needs without satisfactory performance in the other two areas. This process is described by Trousdale (2007) as a measure of success of the secondary military school. "If they [secondary military school] have given a boy a sense of self-worth, self-esteem, pride, and a degree of confidence, they have fulfilled their mission" (p. 382).

For example, a cadet who is an outstanding athlete cannot achieve his desired goals without meeting requirements both academically and militarily. He will not be rewarded with military rank or responsibility, and the positive feedback from his coaches becomes more of a corrective-counseling tool to impress on him the need for academic
success. Without the meeting of expectations in the areas where the cadet does not excel, that cadet cannot gain the self-esteem needed.

The empowerment of the faculty to address the question of character within the military school culture is not the only critical empowerment required. Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the military school culture is the degree of empowerment provided to cadets. The military school's robust leadership challenges provide the role models, and safe place to fail for cadet leaders to form their own leadership styles.

The results of cadet empowerment afford the cadet the opportunity to fail or succeed and be held accountable. Cadet units compete against each other in drill, uniform inspection, and for designation as the best company of the year, which often incorporates grade-point averages. This competition gives cadets the opportunity to fail in an environment where the results do not damage their grades, career, or salary. Basically, the military department is a practice field for leadership skills not often taught in nonmilitary schools. Furthermore, the subject of leadership is not only addressed in an academic manner; there are daily events supporting the practice and perfection of leadership style.

An important part of a military school is the empowerment of cadets to become a part of a system. An honor committee with cadet membership is the height of that empowerment. This is where cadets sit in judgment on violations such as lying, cheating, or stealing. Traditionally, membership of the honor committee is not based on cadet rank or positions of military responsibility. Universally, it is a symbol of accepting the honor code and the cadet’s responsibility to the school. Cadet empowerment is the final step in adoption of the codes and behavioral norms expected of the cadet.
Moral Tradition

In 1972 the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia ruled against mandatory church attendance at the federal military academies and state-supported military colleges and universities ("Anderson v. Laird," 1972). The resurgence of military schools within public education further separated military schools from their traditionally close relationship with religion. On the other hand, most of the private military schools are either church sponsored or nondenominational Christian. Despite this, the character ordination of military schools has enabled the maintenance of a moral tradition.

Hays (1994) examined three Quaker religious secondary boarding schools and three private military secondary boarding schools and concluded there were similarities. All three military schools were in operation in 2011. Both the religious schools and military schools held their moral traditions and provided a set of virtues to emulate. Both types of schools have a strong ethic of service and strong moral nature. The military schools studied by Hayes each had lifestyles that grew from “carefully constructed and purposeful moral world views” (p.70). These schools gave order to cadet life through a moral tradition based on military virtues of loyalty, competence, selflessness, integrity, and pride.

Contrasting the moral traditions or military virtues of the military schools with the limitations and lack of character focus of most public education systems reveals that most public school teachers and administrators shy away from moral issues. Teaching the moral code and the vocabulary of virtue is basically absent from public education. Morality, at most, is obeying the law and not committing crimes (Hays, 1990). Between 1997 and 2006, the author, working at military schools at the secondary and college
levels, saw those two institutions clearly spell out the virtues and codes that cadets are expected to live by and faculty are expected to model and enforce. Teachable moments are expected to be used by all educators in order to develop cadet character. Military schools "by their efforts to communicate a strong moral code, a desire to serve others, and a sense of responsibility, stand out in contrast to the average public school, where few teachers have the time, opportunity, permission, or perhaps even desire to teach such lessons" (Hays, 1990, p. 8).
Chapter 15: Conclusions

This study has tracked the evolution of the military school in the United States from the need identified by the Revolutionary War, to creation of the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1802, and through the 1999–2011 resurgence of military schools in the form of public educational institutions. This chapter will conclude that four men had the greatest influence on the military school movement. This chapter will also illustrate the distribution of military schools regionally from 1802 to 2010. This statistical evidence was noted throughout the study but in this chapter is brought together to address the popular concept that military schools are historically largely a part of Southern culture. This chapter will graphically associate the ebb and flow of the number of military schools with economic and political events, illustrating the links between the economic, cultural, and political environment and their impact upon the popularity of military schools. Finally the chapter will conclude that from 1999 to 2011 the military school movement had experienced a comeback.

The Men of Greatest Influence on American Military Schools

Since 1802 in the United States, at least 834 military schools have been established and have educated some of the country’s most distinguished persons in American history. The military school movement was modeled on West Point, which was developed as a unique school culture separate from that of the armed forces. This model was perfected under Sylvanus Thayer, who served as the superintendent of West Point from 1817–1833. At the same time, Alden B. Partridge expanded the military school concept outside the confines of West Point, first with the establishment of Norwich University, and next through his personal involvement in the establishment of 18 military
schools as far south as Mississippi and as far west as Missouri. In a short 37 years, up to the time when the Virginia Military Institute was opened in 1839, at least 43 military schools had been established. Many, if not most, of these schools were founded, led, or drew faculty from either West Point or Norwich alumni and were influenced by either Partridge or Thayer.

Among those alumni was Francis H. Smith, a former cadet who studied under Thayer at West Point. As superintendent of Virginia Military Institute from 1839–1890, Smith created a military school that became a cradle for the formation of educators in the South, particularly in Virginia. His influence, mentoring, and outright promotion of the skills of VMI graduates as educators influenced an explosion of military schools in the Southern United States. Of the 138 military schools operating in the United States in the six years prior to the Civil War, approximately 96 were located in the South. A large factor in this growth and regional orientation was Smith and his VMI alumni, who founded or initially led at least 26 schools and provided faculty to many others.

Finally, Stephen B. Luce, United States Naval Academy graduate, whose midshipmen years were influenced by both West Point and Norwich alumni, took the military school concept and transferred it firmly into the education of the merchant-marine industry. His political lobbying and articles served as the catalyst for the merchant-marine academy movement. His direct involvement in the formation of the New York Nautical School made the military school format the model for educating officers for the civilian maritime industry. The New York Nautical School (later named the New York Merchant Marine Academy) would involve the development of a series of merchant-marine academies including the United States Merchant Marine Academy.
These military schools, which operate at the collegiate level, have become the second most enduring type of American military school outside the federal military academies.

Based on their contributions to the formation of a unique military school culture and the expansion of the military school movement throughout the United States, these are the four men who should be considered having the greatest influence on the military school movement: Alden B. Partridge (1785–1854), Sylvanus Thayer (1785–1872), Francis H. Smith (1812–1890), and Stephen B. Luce (1827–1917). These men established the model and trained the school leaders and faculty in these founding military institutions, spreading a unique educational format across the United States.

**Regional Historical Orientation of the United States’ Military Schools**

Although Francis H. Smith, the alumni of the Virginia Military Institute, and, to a lesser degree, the alumni of the Citadel have contributed greatly to the popularity of the military school format in the southern United States, the historical representation of military schools across the country cannot be ignored. The image of the southern cadet soldiers of the Civil War and the well-known private military secondary schools, particularly in the South and in Virginia, have created the misconception that military schools are a feature unique to the southern culture.

An examination of the number of military schools and their regional orientation for more than a century reveals that, prior to the establishment of Virginia Military Institute, the Northern States and Southern States were nearly equal in the number of military schools they contained. Since that time, the South has maintained a larger number of military schools than other regions of the country as depicted in Figure 3. After the South’s recovery from the Civil War and Reconstruction, the number of
military schools in operation from 1879–1890 was approximately 204. Of these, 107 were located in the Southern United States, but 96 military schools representing 47% of the total were operating in other regions of the country. Sixty-five of these were in Northern States, 21 in the Midwest, and 10 in the West. Between 1903 and 1926, no fewer than 278 to 280 military schools operated in the United States, representing the peak in the number of military school institutions. The Southern States were home to approximately 46% of these schools, while 23% were in the North, 18% in the Midwest, and 15% in the Western United States.

![Figure 3. Regional Distribution of Military Schools 1802-2010](image)

**Political and Economic Factors and the United States’ Military Schools**

Political and economic factors play a much greater role in the popularity of military schools than regional orientation. Figure 4 graphically illustrate the growth and decline of the number of military schools in the United States and their link to political
and economic events. The first decline in the number of military schools in operation is reflected in the period immediately following the Civil War, as many southern schools failed to reopen or transitioned to nonmilitary as a result of the war and the Reconstruction Union occupation. This is reflected in the drop from 171 military schools having operated during 1855–1865 to 147 operating during 1866–1878. This decline was reversed, as described in Chapter 8, as the Lost Cause and Grand Army of the Republic positively affected the popularity of the military school concept. This increase in military school numbers and popularity would continue from approximately the end of Reconstruction in 1879 through the start of the Great Depression in 1929. Contributing to this steady rise in the number of military schools was the national patriotic mood associated with the Spanish American War in 1898 and the expanded popularity of the military school model with educators and Christian denominations. This led to the peak in the number of military schools in operation between 1903 and 1926, when between 278 to 280 military schools were operated in the United States.

The Great Depression was the largest contributing factor to the end of the expansion of the number of military schools established in the county. Between 1929 and 1938, discounting the military schools that transitioned to nonmilitary school formats, 51 military schools closed. Also aiding in this decline were the effects of the post-World War I pacifist movement, which influenced the transition of additional schools to nonmilitary structure, publically questioned the value of a military education, and further encouraged declining enrollments. The result of these economic and political influences was a decline in the number of military schools in operation during this period.
This effect was even greater than that of the Civil War or Great Depression. During the 12-year period prior to large American involvement in the Vietnam War, 1951–1962, 211 military schools were operating in the United States. By 1998 there were only 74 military schools in operation. This drop of 133 military schools reflected a 63% reduction, the largest change in the history of the military school movement. There had been a fundamental shift in the nation’s perception of the military and the value of military schools.

The decline in number of military schools did not reverse itself until 1999. Coinciding with this was the gradual increase in numbers of public and charter military schools, new combination in American education. The increase in military school numbers has continued at a steady rate for 13 years, as depicted in Figure 4, although not as dramatically as the increases associated with the periods before and after the Civil War.
War. In 2010 cadets and midshipmen numbered 60,000, a figure approaching the enrollment peak of 1944. The political environment, particularly since the Twin Towers and Pentagon attacks of September 11, 2001, has been favorable to the military and military schools. In this atmosphere, the concerns over public education evolved to encourage the adoption of the military charter and public military school as a viable alternative in public education.

The number of military schools and enrollment in them has been heavily influenced by political, cultural, and economic factors ever since the military school concept was launched in the United States in 1802. Military conflicts, such as the Civil War with its resulting Reconstruction period and the Vietnam War, caused significant declines in the number of institutions. On the other hand, positive feelings toward the military emerged after the Civil War, from Spanish American War, and after the attacks of September 11, 2001. These attitudes helped in expanding the number of military schools, and increasing enrollments. In fact, World War II was responsible for a peak historical enrollment in military schools. War cannot be judged historically as either a multiplier or detractor of the military school. The political climate that emerges from the conflict is by far a more important factor than the conflict itself.

Since 1802, the political climate for military schools has generally been positive. For the 209 years between 1802 and 2011, there have been only three periods in which the political climate was unfavorable toward military schools. The first was a product of fighting in the Southern States during the Civil War, followed by the Union occupation of the South during the Reconstruction period from 1866–1879. The second was the post-World War I Pacifist Movement from 1919–1939. The final period was the Vietnam
War’s antiwar movement, when rebellious youth culture, enforced by Hollywood’s representation of military education, helped reduce the number of military schools from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s to levels not seen since the 1840s. By far the Vietnam War and its resulting political and cultural hostile environment was the strongest force historically in countering the military school movement.

**The Military School Resurgence**

From 1999 until 2011 there has been growth in the number of military schools in the United States. The 2011 enrollment had reached 50,500 which favorably compares to the 1942 peak of military school population of 61,000. The number of military schools had increase 19% from only 74 military schools in 1998 to 91 in 2011. This growth can be attributed to two causes: the concern to address problems of public education and the enhanced image of the military and, in turn, military schools. The expansion of the historically concept to public education in the form of public and charter military schools further provided increases in the numbers of institutions and enrollment. Chapter 13 provided initial indications that that adoption may be warranted, but further study is needed as these new schools graduate additional cadet classes.

The military’s performance since the September 11, 2001, attacks against New York and the Pentagon has further resulted in an enhanced image of the military, benefiting military schools. Figures 3 and 4 reflect a steady increase in numbers during this period but not at the pre-Great Depression rates. An explanation for the slower growth rate may be the economic decline since 2008 and its resulting closure of private military schools, as well as its dampening effect on the investments required to establish new private military schools. The Great Depression demonstrated the detrimental impact
the economy can have on private military schools. Despite this, the military school movement appears to be in a steady resurgence. Time will determine whether this trend can survive economic challenges or a potential return of an antimilitary environment based on the United States’ continual military involvements overseas. But the potential exists that the military school movement could be on the road to recovering from its post-Vietnam War decline and again become a greater force in education.
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question+in+Oregon&hl=en#v=onepage&q=The percent20school percent20in percent20Oregon&f=false


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## Appendix A: Military Schools of the United States 1802-2011

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**TOTAL 834**
Appendix B: Military Schools of the United States 2011

Federal Service Academies (5)

United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado 1947, 4,619
United States Coast Guard Academy, New London, Connecticut 1877, 973
United States Merchant Marine Academy, King Point New York 1943, 964
United States Military Academy, West Point, New York 1802 4,553,
United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland 1845, 4,552

Military Colleges and Universities (12)

California Maritime Academy, Vallejo, California 1929, 850
The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina 1842, 1,866
Maine Maritime Academy, Castine, Maine 1941 932
State University of New York Maritime College 1874, 1.154
Massachusetts Maritime Academy, Buzzard Bay, Massachusetts 1891, 1,162
North Georgia College & State University, Dahlonega, Georgia 1873, 750
Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont 1819 1,123
Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 1876 2,177
Texas Maritime Academy, Galveston, Texas 1962, 300
Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia 1839, 1,569
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, Virginia 1872, 769
Va. Women's Institute for Leadership/ Mary Baldwin College, Staunton, Virginia 1842 (1995) 120

Military Junior Colleges (5)

Georgia Military College, Milledgeville, Georgia 1879* 775
Marion Military Institute Marion, Alabama 1842 (1887) 399
New Mexico Military Institute, Roswell, New Mexico 1893* 962
Valley Forge Military Academy & College, Wayne, Pennsylvania 1928* 451
Wentworth Military Academy and College, Lexington, Missouri 1880 (1882)* 926

*Includes a high school program.

**Private Military Schools (40)**

Admiral Farragut Academy St. Petersburg, Florida 1945 NJROTC, 6-12, 348

American Christian Military Academy, San Bernardino County, CA, 1999, 6-12, 38, CCC

American Military Academy, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico 1963, AJROTC 9-12 50

Antilles Military Academy, Trujillo Alto Puerto Rico 1959, AJROTC 9-12 100

Army and Navy Academy, Carlsbad, California 1910, AJROTC, 7-12, 320

Bayamon Military Academy, Bayamon, Puerto Rico, 1975, 7-12 AFJROTC 9-12 445

Benedictine High School Richmond, Virginia 1911? Catholic 9-12, AJROTC, 278

Benedictine Military School, Savannah Georgia 1902, Catholic, 9-12, AJROTC, 309

Camden Military Academy Camden, South Carolina 1942, 7-12 302

Caguas Military Academy, Caguas, Puerto Rico 1975, AJROTC 1-12, 165

Carson Long Military Institute, New Bloomfield, PA 1837 (1916) AJROTC 6-12, 207

Chamberlain-Hunt Military Academy, Port Gibson, Mississippi 1879 (1930) 112

Christian Brothers Academy, Albany, New York 1859 (1892) Catholic, 6-12, 506

Christian Military Academy, Vega Baja, Puerto Rico 2002, K-12, 100

Culver Military Academy Culver, Indiana 1894 9-12, 455

Fishburne Military School, Waynesboro, Virginia 1879 (1884), 7-12, 170

Florida Air Academy, Melbourne, Florida 1961, 6-12, 350

Fork Union Military Academy, Fork Union, Virginia 1897 (1903) Baptist, 6-13, 535

Hargrave Military Academy, Chatham, Virginia 1909, 7-13, 340

Howe Military School, Howe, Indiana 1884, 7-12, 141

La Salle Institute, Troy, New York 1850 (1891) AJROTC, 9-12, 301

Leonard Hall School, Leonardtown, Maryland 1909 (1941), 6-12, 51
Low Country Military Academy, Ladson, South Carolina 2009 4-11, 15
Lyman Ward Military Academy, Camp Hill, Alabama 1898, 115
Marine Military Academy, Harlingen, Texas 1963, MCJROTC, 267
Massanutten Military Academy, Woodstock, Virginia 1899, 7-12, 170
Maita Luca Military Academy, Puerto Rico 1992, 4-12 65
Missouri Military Academy, Mexico, Missouri 1889, AJROTC, 6-12, 230
New York Military Academy, Cornwall-on-Hudson, NY 1889, AJROTC, 7-12, 100
North Point Military Academy, Vega Baja, Puerto Rico, date undetermined, 1-9, 45
Oak Ridge Military Academy, Oak Ridge, North Carolina 1852 (1866), 7-12, 77
Randolph-Macon Academy, Front Royal, Virginia 1892, 6-12, 365
Riverside Military Academy, Gainesville, Georgia 1907, 7-12 350
San Antonio Academy, San Antonio, Texas 1886 (1920), 3-8, 217
St. Catherine's Military Academy, Anaheim, California 1889 (1923) Catholic, 4-8, 150
St John's College High School, Wash, DC 1851, (1915) AJROTC, Catholic, 9-12, 260
St. John's Military School Salina, Kansas 1887, AJROTC, Episcopal, 5-12, 193
St. John's Northwestern Military Academy, Delafield, WI. 1884(86) AJROTC, Episc, 7-12, 300
St. Thomas Academy, Mendota Heights, Minn 1885 (1905) Catholic, 9-12, AJROTC, 580
Texas Military Institute San Antonio, Texas 1893, AJROTC, Episcopal, 6-12, 108

Public Military Schools (16)
Cleveland Junior Naval Academy, St Louis, Missouri 1981, NJROTC, 9-12, 236
Franklin Military School, Richmond, Virginia 1980, AJROTC, 9-12, 200
Marine Academy of Science and Technology, Highlands, NJ 1981, NJROTC, 9-12, 279
Kenosha Military Academy, Kenosha, Wisconsin 1997 AJROTC, 9-12, 132
Chicago Military Academy - Bronzeville Chicago, Illinois. 1999 AJROTC, 9-12, 549
George Washington Carver Military Academy, Chicago, Illinois 2000, AJROTC, 520
Southeast Academy High School, Norwalk, California, 2000, 11-12 158**

Phoenix Military Academy, Chicago, Illinois 2000, AJROTC, 9-12 404

Forestville Military Academy, Forestville, Maryland 2002, AFJROTC 860


Admiral Hyman George Rickover Naval Academy, Chicago, Illinois 2005, 9-12 397

Marine Math and Science Academy, Chicago, Illinois 2006, MCJROTC, 9-12, 321

Summerlin Military Academy, Bartow, Florida 1851 (2006) AJROTC 9-12, 451

Air Force Academy High School Chicago, Illinois 2009, AFJROTC, 9-10, 126

Stanislaus Military Academy, Turlock, California 2009, 9-12, 75

**Police-fire style cadet focus

Charter Military Schools (13)

The Willamette Leadership Academy, Veneta, Oregon 1993, 6-12, 115

Public Safety Academy, San Bernardino, California, 1999, CCC, 6-12, 562**

Oakland Military Institute - College Prep. Acad, Oakland, Cal. 2001, CCC, 6-12, 592

Sarasota Military Academy, Sarasota, Florida 2003, AJROTC, 9-12, 700

Delaware Military Academy, Wilmington, Delaware 2003, NJROTC, 9-12, 538

California Military Institute Perris, California 2003, CCC, 7-12, 545

La Sierra Military Academy, Visalia, California 2003, 7-12, 170

Western New York Maritime Academy, Buffalo, New York 2004, NJROTC, 9-12, 325

General John Vessey Leadership Academy, St Paul, Minn 2004, AJROTC, 9-12, 120

Summit Leadership Academy, Hasperia, California 2004, 9-12, 197**

Bataan Military Academy Albuquerque, New Mexico 2006, USNCC, 9-12, 120

Francis Marion Military Academy, Ocala, Florida 2008, AJROTC, 9-12, 130

New Orleans Military Maritime Academy, Louisiana 2011 MCJROTC, 9, 106***
**Police-fire style cadet focus**

*** adding 10\(^{th}\), 11\(^{th}\), 12\(^{th}\) grades annually

**Legend:** School, Location, Year of Establishment (Year converted to military school), military program*, grade levels, number of cadets 2009-2010 school year.

Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps Junior Reserve Training Corps: AJROTC, NJROTC, AFROTC, MCJROTC. California Cadet Corps: CCC. United States Naval Sea Cadet Corps: USNCC

**Summary:**

Federal Service Academies (5)

Military Colleges and Universities (12)

Military Junior Colleges (5)

Private Military Schools (40)

Public Military Schools (16)

Charter Military Schools (13)

Total 91
Appendix C: Selected Military School Alumni

“This is where I started, and I thank a merciful God that I am able to come back to the school again” (Coulter, 2002, p. 11). Remark made by General Douglas MacArthur upon his return to Texas Military Institute, 1951.

Presidents

James E. 'Jimmy' Carter, President United States 1977-1981, United States Naval Academy

Dwight D. Eisenhower, President United States 1953-61, West Point

Ulysses S. Grant, President United States 1869-77, West Point

Jefferson Davis, President Confederate States of America 1861-1865, West Point

León Febres Cordero, President of Ecuador 1984-1988, Charlotte Hall Military Academy

Martin Torrijos, President of Panama 2004-09, St John’s Military Academy (Wisconsin)

Ricardo Martinelli, President of Panama 2009-2014, Staunton Military Academy

Manuel Antonio Noriega, Military Dictator Panama 1983-1989, Peacock Military Academy

Secretary of State

Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Secretary of State 1981-82, West Point

George Catlett Marshall, Secretary of State 1945-1949, Virginia Military Institute

Generals and Admirals

Robert E. Lee, General in Chief, Confederate Armies, West Point

Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, Lieutenant General Confederate Army, West Point

John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force World War I, West Point

Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander Pacific 1941-45, UN Forces Korea, West Point.

Chester William Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, US Naval Academy

William Frederick Halsey, South Pacific Area Command, US Naval Academy
George S. Patton, Jr. Commander 3rd Army 1944-45, Virginia Military Institute, West Point

William Westmoreland, Commander of US Forces Vietnam, Citadel and West Point

H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander Gulf War, Valley Forge Military Academy, West Point

Clifton Cates, 19th Commandant US Marine Corps, Missouri Military Academy

Randolph McCall Pate, 21st Commandant US Marine Corps, Virginia Military Institute

Alfred Richmond, Commandant US Coast Guard 1954–62, Massanutten Military Academy

State Governors

Horatio Seymour, New York 1852-54,62-64, Norwich University

Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, Maine 1866-1871, Whitting's Military and Classical School

Ernest W. Gibson, Jr. Vermont 1946-1950, Norwich University

Gerald L. Baliles, Virginia 1986-90, Fishburne Military School


Rafael Hernández Colón, Governor Puerto Rico 1973-1979, Valley Forge Military Academy

Senators

Harry Pulliam Cain, Washington 1946-1953, Hill Military Academy


Barry Goldwater, Arizona 1953–65, 69–87, Staunton Military Academy


John McCain, Arizona 1987-present, United States Naval Academy

Congressmen

Frederick Charles Loofbourow, Utah 1930-1933, Ogden Military Academy
Milton H. West, Texas 1933–48, Texas Military Institute
Alvin Paul Kitchin, North Carolina 1957-1963, Oakridge Military Academy
Barry Goldwater, Jr. California 1969-83, Staunton Military Academy
Lamar Seeligson Smith, Texas 1987-Present, Texas Military Institute

**Entertainment, Media and Sports**

Cecil B. DeMille, Hollywood director, Pennsylvania Military College
Oliver Hardy, Comic Laurel & Hardy, Georgia Military College
Jonathan Winters, Comic, Norwich University
Jim Backus, Actor *Gilligan's Island*, Kentucky Military Institute
Dan Blocker, Actor Bonanza, Texas Military Institute
Hal Holbrook, Actor, Culver Military Academy
Spencer Tracy Actor, Northwestern Military and Naval Academy
Owen Wilson, Actor, New Mexico Military Institute
Marlin Perkins, Host Wild Kingdom, Wentworth Military Academy
Greg and Duane Allman, The Allman Brothers Band, Castle Heights Military Academy
Stephen Stills, Crosby Still Nash and Young Band, Admiral Farragut Academy
Dale Earnhardt, Jr. Driver NASCAR, Oakridge Military Academy
William S. Paley, CEO CBS 1928-1946, Western Military Academy (IL)
John B. Sias (1947) President, ABC TV 1986-93, The Citadel
Pierson Mapes, President of NBC 1982 to 1994, Norwich
Sam Donaldson, ABC Newsman, New Mexico Military Institute
George Steinbrenner, Owner New York Yankees 1972-2010, Culver Military Academy

Roger Staubach, Football Heisman Trophy, New Mexico Military Institute, US Naval Academy

David Robinson, Basketball Hall of Fame, United States Naval Academy

Business

Jack Eckerd, Founder Eckerd Pharmacy, Norwich University

Daniel Gerber, Founder Gerber Baby Foods, St John’s Northwestern Military Academy

Conrad Hilton, Founder Hilton Hotel Chain, New Mexico Military Institute

Jim Kimsey, Founder of America On Line (AOL), St John’s College High School, West Point

James "Bud" Walton Co-founder Wal-Mart, Wentworth Military Academy

Bob McDonald, CEO Procter & Gamble 2009-Present, West Point

Robert Pamplin, Sr. President Georgia Pacific 1957-1976, Virginia Tech

William Tiefel, Chairman CarMax 2007-Present, Valley Forge Military Academy

Harry Thayer, President or Chairman of Board AT&T 1919-1928, Norwich University

Donald Trump, Sr. Founder Trump Organization 1984-Present, New York Military Academy

Charles Phillips, President of Oracle Corporation 2003-2010, United States Air Force Academy

Authors and Poets

Lyman Frank Baum, The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, Peekskill Military Academy.

Edgar Rice Burroughs, Tarzan, Michigan Military Academy


Stephen Crane, Red Badge of Courage, Claverack College

Paul Horgan, Pulitzer Prize Twice, New Mexico Military Institute

Edgar Allan Poe, The Raven, West Point

J.D. Salinger, The Catcher in the Rye, Valley Forge Military Academy
## Appendix D: Chapter 13 Comparisons

### Number of Schools by Type for Each Military School Comparison

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Appendix E: Chapter 13 Comparisons

Campbell, Brenton - Hoboken

From: Goldweber, Paulette - Hoboken on behalf of Permissions - US
Sent: Monday, October 08, 2012 9:30 AM
To: Campbell, Brenton - Hoboken
Subject: FW: Request: permission for the adoption of a figure from Dr. Edgar Schien's book The Corporate Culture: Survival Guide 1999
Categories: Permissions

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